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“ Castells in Africa: Universities and Development collects the papers produced by 
Manuel Castells on his visits to South Africa, and publishes them in a single volume 
for the first time. The book also publishes a series of empirically-based papers which 
together display the multi-faceted and far-sighted scope of his theoretical framework, 
and its fecundity for fine-grained, detailed empirical investigations on universities and 
development in Africa. Castells, in his afterword to this book, always looking forward, 
assesses the role of the university in the wake of the upheavals to the global economic 
order. He decides the university’s function not only remains, but is more important than 
ever. This book will serve as an introduction to the relevance of his work for higher 
education in Africa for postgraduate students, reflective practitioners and researchers. 
“ The convergence between the shift to a new form of economic organisation, 
the acceleration of the technological revolution, and the re-legitimation of 
political institutions, has a site in society: higher education. This is why the 
university is simultaneously a decisive battlefield and our hope for a better 
future in the midst of the current darkness.”
 Manuel Castells in the Afterword to Castells in Africa
“ Castells in Africa is by far the best book-length publication yet on what went 
wrong with higher education after apartheid and why South Africa struggled 
to create from among its more promising universities leading producers 
of new knowledge in this part of the world system. In the work of this 
incomparable intellectual we find not only powerful diagnoses of what holds 
back our universities but also compelling solutions about what can (still) 
be done to harness the intellectual resources of Africa’s best institutions.” 
 Jonathan Jansen, President of the Academy of Sciences of South Africa
“ This book is doubly important. First, it showcases the work of Manuel Castells 
re-emphasising its continuing endurance as a framework for thinking creatively 
about the evolution of higher education globally. Second, it focuses on 
development, a preoccupation that has rather got lost in the self-referential 
squabbles about tuition fees and marketisation that have obsessed higher 
education in the developed ‘West’ in these dog days of neoliberalism. 
This collection brings us back to fundamental issues of reform, social justice 
and global equity.” 




Edited by  
Johan Muller, Nico Cloete & François van Schalkwyk
AFRICAN 
MINDS
Published in 2017 by African Minds
4 Eccleston Place, Somerset West 7130, Cape Town, South Africa
info@africanminds.org.za
www.africanminds.org.za
Chapter 3: ‘Universities as Dynamic Systems of Contradictory Functions’ first published in 2001  
by MaskewMiller Longman in Challenges of Globalisation: South African Debates with Manuel Castells 
edited by Johan Muller, Nico Cloete and Shireen Badat.
African Minds is a not-for-profit, open-access publisher. In line with our goal of developing and 
fostering access, openness and debate in the pursuit of growing and deepening the African knowledge 
base and an Africa-based creative commons, this publication forms part of our non-peer reviewed list, 
the broad mission of which is to support the dissemination of knowledge from and in Africa relevant 
to addressing the social challenges that face the African continent.






4 Eccleston Place, Somerset West 7130, Cape Town, South Africa
info@africanminds.org.za
www.africanminds.org.za
For orders from outside South Africa:
African Books Collective






About the editors  viii
SECTION 1: FRAMING CASTELLS IN AFRICA
1 Castells in South Africa  3
2 Universities and the ‘new society’  17
SECTION 2: CASTELLS IN SOUTH AFRICA
3   Universities as dynamic systems of contradictory functions  35 
4  The role of universities in development, the economy and society  57
5  Rethinking development in the global information age  67
SECTION 3: PUTTING CASTELLS TO WORK IN AFRICA
6  Roles of universities and the African context  95
7  Universities and economic development in Africa  113
8  Research universities in Africa?  135
9 African universities and connectedness in the information age  159   
10 Contradictory functions, unexpected outcomes, new challenges  187
Afterword 2017 by Manuel Castells  197
Appendices  202 
References  208




This book is the culmination of a 17-year engagement with Manuel 
Castells and his ideas. We first encountered his paper for the World 
Bank on higher education and development (an abridged version 
appears in this volume), and the application of his ideas and their 
possible relevance for higher education in Africa was underway. 
We want to thank him, as a scholar and friend, for the unparalleled 
stimulation and comradeship he has provided, and not least for the 
unfailingly courteous manner in which he did it. (The more formal 
relationship between Manuel Castells and several supporting 
organisations and initiatives – Centre for Higher Education Trust 
(CHET), Higher Education Research and Advocacy Network in 
Africa (HERANA) and Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study 
(STIAS) to name a few – is described in detail in Chapter 1.)
This book would not have been possible without the financial 
support provided by CHET by way of two of its projects focused 
squarely on the role of universities in knowledge production in 
Africa: the HERANA project funded by Carnegie Corporation of 
New York, with initial support from Ford Foundation; and the 
project ‘Factors that Affect Research Productivity at Universities’ 
funded by DST-NRF Centre of Excellence in Scientometrics and 
Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (SciSTIP).  Our thanks 
also go to Angela Mias (CHET) and Linda Benwell (Millennium 
Travel) for arranging the three meetings that contributed both to 
the conceptualisation and the completion of this book.
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In addition to publishing three seminal contributions made by 
Manuel Castells during his time in South Africa, this volume 
brings together new and previously published insights on how 
Castells has shaped research and thinking on higher education 
and development in Africa. 
What was previously published has been edited and, in some 
cases, substantially reworked to fit the ambit of the collection. 
The new material is to be found in Chapters 1 and 2, as well 
as in the concluding chapter. Chapter 1 traces the trajectory of 
Manuel Castells’s association with Africa, mediated in the main 
by the Centre for Higher Education Trust (CHET) since 1998. 
The chapter also provides the reasoning behind the publication of 
this volume. Chapter 2 focuses on a few key Castellian concepts 
to show how, when brought together, they might shine some light 
on how universities function in the present time, particularly 
in relation to development. The chapter brings into relief what 
Castells augured globalisation would mean for higher education 
(and development) – trends to which most policy-makers, analysts 
and researchers simply did not pay sufficient attention.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present Castells’s own thinking on the role 
of higher education globally and in Africa. Chapter 3 was first 
published in 2001 in Challenges of Globalisation: South African 
debates with Manuel Castells. It is republished in this volume with 




lectures delivered by Manuel Castells in South Africa. The first 
lecture, ‘The Role of Universities in Development, the Economy 
and Society’, was delivered on 7 August 2009 at the University 
of the Western Cape in Cape Town. The second public lecture, 
‘Reconceptualising Development in the Global Information Age’, 
was delivered at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study 
(STIAS) at Stellenbosch University on 5 June 2014. Both chapters 
are edited transcripts of these lectures.
The remaining chapters are versions of previously published 
chapters, edited to speak more directly to the ideas and concepts 
that emerged from Castells’s lectures and his interactions with 
higher education scholars in South Africa.  
Chapter 6 is an edited version of ‘Chapter 1: The Roles of 
Universities in the African Context’, originally published in 
Knowledge Production and Contradictory Functions in African 
Higher Education (see Cloete & Maassen 2015). The chapter 
traces how African universities have been grappling with the 
Castellian functions by situating them in the historical context in 
which African universities were established and steered.
Chapter 7 comprises edited excerpts from the first two chapters 
of the publication Universities and Economic Development in Africa 
(see Cloete et al. 2011). The chapter draws on empirical evidence 
to establish what the predominant notions of the roles of African 
universities are – both at institutional and government levels. It 
shows that the notions are mixed and often not in alignment within 
higher education systems, and even if there is a strong notion of 
the development role of the university as knowledge producer and/
or system-level alignment, the knowledge production aspirations 
are not matched by the realities at the coal-face.
Chapter 8 includes selected sections on the role of research in 
African universities from several chapters in Knowledge Production 
and Contradictory Functions in African Higher Education (see Cloete 
et al. 2015). The chapter has been updated to include previously 
unpublished data, and draws on the empirical evidence to explore 
how universities are managing their contradictory functions, 
particularly as a group of elite African universities aspire to elevate 
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the role of research. It provides a more in-depth analysis of the 
research policies and processes at African universities, and brings to 
the fore the need for system-level differentiation to ameliorate the 
tensions inherent in single universities – traditionally orientated 
towards training – attempting to strengthen research.
Chapter 9 was originally published as the chapter ‘University 
Engagement as Interconnectedness: Indicators and insights’ in 
Knowledge Production and Contradictory Functions in African Higher 
Education (see Van Schalkwyk 2015). The substantially rewritten 
version of the chapter in this collection examines how current project-
based research activities are failing to strengthen the knowledge 
production function of African universities, in so doing, curtailing 
their ability to participate in globalised knowledge networks. Unlike 
preceding chapters that honed in on the relationship between the 
university’s function as knowledge producer and its contribution 
to development, Chapter 9 explores the university in Africa in the 
context of Castells’s network society.
Chapter 10 provides a synthesis of the empirically-focused 
Chapters 6 to 9, and concludes that universities in Africa are 
struggling to balance the contradictory Castellian functions; all 
the more so when they are expected to emphasise research. The 
chapter explores who should shoulder the blame for the slow pace 
of progress towards research-led universities in Africa. And rather 
than concluding on a sombre note, the chapter reminds us to keep 
putting Castells to work in order to better understand the systemic 
and structural impediments hampering the transformation of 
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Castells in South Africa 
Nico Cloete & François van Schalkwyk
One can seldom say precisely when or where an intellectual 
thread started. An elusive starting point certainly applies to the 
idea of bringing Manuel Castells to South Africa. Most likely, it 
was one of the first policy acts of the post-apartheid Department 
of Education that triggered the idea to invite Castells. 
Soon after the first democratic elections of April 1994, the 
Department announced its intention to establish a National 
Commission on Higher Education (or the ‘NCHE’ as it is 
commonly referred to in South Africa). The NCHE, established 
by a proclamation of then president Nelson Mandela in December 
1994, was charged with advising the government of national unity 
on issues concerning the restructuring of higher education by 
undertaking a situation analysis, formulating a vision for higher 
education, and putting forward policy proposals designed to ensure 
the development of a well-planned, integrated, high-quality system 
of higher education in South Africa. Nico Cloete was Director of 
Research for the NCHE and was to become the director of the 
Centre for Higher Education Transformation (CHET) which was 
established when the NCHE had fulfilled its duties.  
The terms of reference of the NCHE stated that restructuring 
South African higher education should address the inequalities 
and inefficiencies inherited from the apartheid era, as well as 
respond to the social, cultural and economic demands of a 
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globalising world. The extent to which these two worthy aims 
were in tension was quite unrecognised at the time. 
The challenge for the NCHE was that the ‘system’ as it was 
then, was fragmented and modelled on an outdated version of the 
post-school education system in the United Kingdom (UK). This 
model had by then been radically revised and massified in the UK. 
This is, of course, a frequent dual problem in post-colonial societies: 
both the irrelevance of the ‘borrowed’ model and its obsolescence 
back in the ‘mother country’ (Cloete & Muller 1998). 
There was a tension in the NCHE; some NCHE commissioners 
saw the main problem as redressing apartheid’s inequality, while 
a minority regarded a fundamental restructuring of the system as 
the main task. This tension was never fully resolved. 
The NCHE report of 1996 proposed three principles for a 
transformation framework. The first was increased participation, 
specifically, to increase the size of the system with a primary 
focus on equity. This was a proposal for massification which the 
government rejected. Instead it opted for the Department of 
Education’s planned growth strategy. The second principle was 
heightened responsiveness within higher education to societal 
needs; namely, a shift from a closed to a more open system. The 
third principle was increased cooperation and partnerships in 
governance structures. The NCHE framework focused heavily on 
equity and democratisation, while paying virtually no attention to 
development, to research and to innovation. 
A major problem with the transformation discourse in South 
Africa at the time, including that of the NCHE, was that the single-
minded focus was on equity and democracy as counters to the 
social damage done by apartheid. But the legacy of apartheid was 
only one major problem, the other being that the transformation 
discourse needed to be connected to development – particularly the 
globalising knowledge economy and South Africa’s participation 
in it. But it wasn’t. The NCHE and subsequent policy papers did 
not take as their point of departure reflections on the roles and 
functions of a higher education system to propose a new tertiary 
education system that would include equity, democratisation 
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and development as key principles. Knowledge production and 
innovation, and the key role that higher education could play in 
economic development, were largely ignored. 
After the publication of the final report of the NCHE in 
September 1996, the newly-formed Centre for Higher Education 
Transformation, aware of some of the key issues not addressed by 
the NCHE, resolved to strengthen the knowledge base on the role 
and functions of higher education in South Africa and in Africa by 
combining traditional higher education studies with more general 
scholarly reflections on the change dynamics of higher education. 
The first foray in this direction led to a series of seminars and 
presentations by prominent scholars such as Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, Mahmood Mamdani, Peter Scott and Carol Schneider, 
and by practitioners such as Malegepuru Makgoba, Ahmed Bawa 
and Donald Ekong. The series of seminars resulted in the book 
Knowledge, Identity and Curriculum Transformation in Africa (see 
Cloete et al. 1997).
The book addressed two key challenges facing post-apartheid 
South Africa, namely, knowledge and identity. In the concluding 
chapter, ‘Citizenship and Curriculum’, Johan Muller identified the 
citizenship skills required as political (mediatory and democratic), 
cultural (navigating difference) and economic (productive and 
problem-solving). While the main focus of the project was to 
discuss knowledge and citizenship skills for a revised curriculum 
(the NCHE had decided not to address curriculum transformation 
directly), the chapter that had considerable influence on the 
direction of CHET’s future work was by Peter Scott: ‘Changes 
in Knowledge Production and Dissemination in the Context of 
Globalisation’. 
Scott had come to the attention of the NCHE via two of his 
books – The New Production of Knowledge (with Gibbons, Nowotny 
and others in 1994) and The Meaning of Mass Higher Education 
(1995) – both of which arrived in South Africa in photocopied 
form. These texts directly influenced the NCHE’s proposal on 
massification. However, neither the government nor the NCHE 
grasped the importance of his analysis that massification and 
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knowledge production in a context of globalisation was not 
simply more students and staff, but a radical restructuring of 
higher education that accompanied changes in managerialism 
and marketisation, as well as the production of knowledge itself in 
terms of consumption, circulation and conservation; exponential 
growth of information and communications technology; the shift 
away from knowledge that is academic, disciplinary, homogeneous 
and hierarchic to knowledge that is applied, transdisciplinary, 
reflexive and horizontal; the demise of the enlightenment model 
of knowledge as coherent, autonomous and self-referential; and 
the simultaneous globalisation and fragmentation of academic 
disciplines, so that disciplinary expertise is no longer unitary 
and cohesive but diffuse, fluid and opaque. Some of these 
prognostications remain contentious.
In his chapter in the book Knowledge, Identity and Curriculum 
Transformation in Africa, Scott refers to a number of theorists 
reflecting on globalisation, including Beck, Eagleton and 
Fukuyama. While these authors all had interesting things to say, 
what triggered our interest was the discovery, via Jamil Salmi, 
then senior fellow in the World Bank higher education division, 
of a paper that Manuel Castells had presented at a World Bank 
Seminar on Higher Education and Development in Kuala 
Lumpur in June 1991. 
The paper, ‘The University System: Engine of development 
in the new world economy’, approached higher education via 
sociology in a very different way to the other theorists. In 1998, 
Johan Muller and Nico Cloete met with Martin Carnoy, one of the 
world’s foremost comparative education economists and as one of 
Castells’s long-time friends and intellectual collaborators, Carnoy 
introduced the pair to the ‘trilogy’ – The Rise of the Network Society 
(1996), The Power of Identity (1997) and End of Millennium 
(1998). Carnoy suggested that if CHET wanted to understand 
the relationships between globalisation, higher education and 
development, it should invite Castells who, according to Carnoy, 
was very interested in Africa, but had paid little attention to our 
continent in the trilogy owing to an absence of reliable data. We 
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received an enthusiastic response to our invitation letter, but were 
informed that due to the interest around the trilogy, Castells’s 
diary was full until June 2000. 
The delay turned out to be a blessing – CHET was better 
prepared in 2001 than it would have been in 1998. By 2000, 
Castells was one of the five most cited social scientists in the world. 
Even South Africa’s President Mbeki was familiar with the trilogy 
and announced to his Cabinet that Castells was the Karl Marx of 
the 21st century. Castells regarded this as a huge compliment, and 
a huge misunderstanding. 
CHET coordinated Castells’s first visit in collaboration with 
representatives from the National Economic Development 
and Labour Council, the Council on Higher Education, the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa, the Human Sciences 
Research Council, the Universities of the Witwatersrand, Natal 
and Cape Town, and the Presidency. Castells was accompanied by 
Carnoy and the visit consisted of six seminars in Johannesburg, 
Durban and Cape Town, and two meetings with President Mbeki. 
In addition to academics and students, there were participants and 
presenters from government, business councils and trade unions, 
and the public meetings were well-attended. Much to Castells’s 
irritation, many participants kept regarding him as a promoter of 
globalisation, instead of an analyst of globalisation.  
Such was his resonance at the time, that Castells was being 
referenced by politicians in parliament. Ben Turok, in a debate 
in the National Assembly on financing for development and a 
new paradigm of economic and social development designed 
to eradicate poverty (19 September 2000) commented: ‘Only a 
few weeks ago, Manuel Castells, the very distinguished Spanish 
professor who visited South Africa, said to us – and he met the 
President – “Either South Africa sinks or swims.” You either swim 
in the tide of technology or you sink as a country. He went on 
to say [...] that the world brand of capitalism is implacable and 
cruel. Globalisation is sundering the world into two groups: One, 
with dynamic information-based economies and the other with 
the vast deteriorating old economies dominated by informal and 
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survivalist activities, and Africa is the latter case. He said that if we 
– Africa and South Africa – do not join this new technicological 
[sic] age we will be obliterated.’ And the Minister for the Public 
Service and Administration in the National Council of Provinces 
(26 September 2002) declared: ‘Prof. Manuel Castells, a world-
renowned sociologist, is part of this Council and he was present 
last year. He said – and has done so in various lectures – that the 
availability and use of information and communication technology 
is a prerequisite for economic and social development in our world. 
It is the functional equivalent of electricity in the industrial era.’
While the higher education community had latched onto 
Castells’s unique and compelling approach to the role of the 
university, his early interactions with the Mbeki government were 
centred on the importance of information and communication 
technology (ICT) infrastructure as a determinant of the country’s 
ability to participate in the global networked economy. 
After one scheduled meeting, Mbeki insisted on a second 
day with Castells, from which emerged the decision to form 
the Presidential Information and Communications Technology 
Advisory Council, established with remarkable speed in October 
2001. Its main aim was to accelerate efforts to establish South 
Africa as an advanced information-based society which would be 
the engine for a knowledge economy, moving South Africa away 
from its endemic dependency on mined resources.1  
The new Council was a high-powered group consisting of chief 
executives from global companies such as Oracle’s Larry Ellison, 
Carly Fiorina of Hewlett Packard, Thierry de Beauce of Vivendi 
Universal, Rajendra Pawar of NIIT Technologies, Esther Dyson 
of Edventure, Reza Mahdavi of Cisco Systems, Sten Fornell of 
Ericsson, Veli Sundback of Nokia and Valentin Chapero of 
Siemens. It also included Mark Shuttleworth (South Africa’s IT 
billionaire) and, from government’s side, Mbeki himself plus a 
number of ministers and directors-general. Manuel Castells was 
the only academic on the Advisory Council. 
1 http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2002/ict1004.htm
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The group did have some influence on the establishment of the 
Presidential National Commission on Information Society and 
Development which was tasked to develop a government policy 
framework for ICT, strategies to make government a model user 
of ICT, and the preferred models for creating an information 
society.2
By 2006 the Commission fragmented with Cisco withdrawing 
due to possible conflicts of interest because they were advising 
and doing business with government.3 There were also rumours 
about lack of implementation and that Mbeki had lost interest 
as conflicts within the ANC, particularly with Deputy President 
Zuma, escalated. At a workshop with Castells at STIAS in 2011, 
the previous head of policy and government communications 
responded to a question about the failure of the grand ICT 
ambitions by saying that the HIV/Aids fiasco had had a negative 
effect on Castells’s visit. Mbeki had, as he had done in the case 
of ICT, established a Presidential Advisory Aids Panel.4 The Aids 
Panel included denialists such as Peter Duesberg, incidentally also 
from the University of California. Considering how this debacle 
had embarrassed the government, many Cabinet members were 
apparently deeply sceptical about the ‘information society’, which 
they saw as another Mbeki folly with Californian advisors.
Many authors have highlighted the importance of the state in 
developing countries if countries are to realise the potential of 
ICTs for development (Grace et al. 2001; Heeks 2002).5 Notably, 
Castells provides an historical analysis of the changing role of 
the state in a globalised world and explores its ability both to 
constrain and enable agencies. In his seminal three volumes on 
the Information Age: Economy, society and culture, Castells (1996; 
1997; 1998) does this in relation to technology and innovation. 





5 This section draws extensively on the work of Gilwald (2009).
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role of the state as a result of global pressures from the nation 
state in the industrial era to what he calls the ‘networked state’ in 
the informational era provides a backdrop for understanding the 
impact of globalisation on the state and society, and the necessity 
for countries to develop their information infrastructure and 
human capital to meet the challenges arising from this.
The unevenness of this global development, according to 
Castells (1996; 1997; 1998), reflects the relative ability of social 
institutions, such as the state, to enable the mastery of strategic 
technology. This, he argues, can propel a society into the new 
economy. He sees the changes in the mode of production as 
revolutionary technological developments distinguishing this 
informational era from the previous industrial era. Castells 
(1996: 7) contends that while knowledge and information have 
been central to the process of production in previous eras, it is 
only in the informational mode of development that the ‘action 
of knowledge upon knowledge itself ’ is the main source of 
productivity. In this epoch, knowledge generation, processing and 
transmission become the fundamental sources of productivity 
and power.
While originating in the productive process, the technology 
and its associated relationships, according to Castells (1996; 
1997; 1998), spread throughout society, so influencing the 
concentration and distribution of power. It is not that technology 
per se determines historical evolution and social change, but the 
technology (or lack of it) that embodies the capacity of societies to 
transform themselves as well as the uses to which societies decide 
to put their technological potential. It is for this reason that 
Castells (1996; 1997; 1998) contends that the state should play 
a central role in developing a forceful supply-side policy through 
investment in education – critical to the citizens’ ability to adjust 
to change brought about by technological innovation – and in the 
necessary infrastructure such as telecommunications.
Despite being tarred by the vagaries of South African politics, by 
the time Castells left Africa for the first time, he had put firmly on 
the national policy agenda the following: the increasing centrality 
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of knowledge and information to production and development in 
a globalising world; the key role of societal learning, or ‘learning 
to learn’, in keeping these productive goods vital in the social 
body; and the deep influence the network society would have on 
our senses of personal and collective identity. This took the debate 
several leagues beyond the NCHE. 
For higher education in particular, his chapter ‘Universities as 
Dynamic Systems of Contradictory Functions’ (Castells 2001) 
drew on the 1991 ‘engine of development’ paper in terms of the four 
functions of universities, and added new insights and reflections 
on higher education and development policy in the third world 
(particularly in Africa and Latin America). One important insight, 
which started to affect South African higher education by 2015, 
was that ‘the demand for higher education has reached the status 
of a social need, regardless of the actual functional requirements 
of the economy or of the institutions’ (Castells 2001: 211). The 
tension that Castells was pointing to, between ‘social needs’ and 
‘functional requirements’, was not visible to South Africans at the 
time of Castells’s first visit.
Three strands of the work that CHET pursued post-Castells 
2000 are captured in subheadings of Castells’s (2001) ‘Universities 
as Dynamic Systems of Contradictory Functions’ published in 
Challenges of Globalisation: South African debates with Manuel 
Castells (Muller et al. 2001): (1) ‘Universities in the Third World: 
From dependency to development’, (2) ‘Higher education as 
development policy: The new frontier of international aid’, and 
(3) ‘Universities at the crossroads of a new international order’.
The first direct intellectual contribution of Castells to this 
work was realised in the book Transformation in Higher Education: 
Global pressures and local realities (published in South Africa in 
2002 and by Springer for the international market in 2006). The 
subtitle comes from Castells’s chapter in Challenges of Globalisation 
titled ‘Think Local, Act Global’. The conclusion of this review 
of transformation in South Africa focused on new international 
trends and responses by the South African government and other 
social institutions. A major novelty was a deeper understanding of 
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the limits of policy, bracketed by both local and global realities. 
Castells’s theory that universities cannot specialise in only one 
function, and that in order to combine and make compatible 
various (sometimes contradictory) functions, both academic and 
governance capacities were needed, shaped the work of CHET 
for years to come in terms of institutional performance and 
differentiation.
The second thread related to international development aid and 
led to the publication of a report on the topic as it relates to higher 
education in Africa (Maassen et al. 2007) as well as in a follow-up 
chapter (Maassen & Cloete 2009) on the disconnectedness of the 
university as a policy issue in development cooperation in a book 
titled International Organisations and Higher Education Policy: 
Thinking globally, acting locally (Basset & Maldonado-Maldonado 
2009).
The third thread, with funding from NORAD and the newly-
formed US Foundation Partnership for Higher Education in 
Africa (which was part of the study on development aid), was 
to support the establishment of the Higher Education Research 
and Advocacy Network in Africa (HERANA). HERANA drew 
on Castells’s network notions, his assertion that the recruitment 
of elites and professional training had been the main functions 
of universities in third world countries, and that in order to 
move from dependency to development, a greater focus on the 
research and knowledge production function is needed in African 
universities. The important advice to development aid agencies and 
governments was the need for ‘selective aid, either concentrating 
resources in the best of the existing academic centres and/or 
creating new universities supported by national governments, 
private firms and international institutions’ (Castells 2001: 217). 
Castells returned to South Africa in 2009, this time hosted by 
the Stellenbosch Institute of Advanced Studies (STIAS). During 
his 2000 visit, Castells was impressed by the larger Cape Town 
metropole’s combination of natural beauty, winelands and the 
sophistication of its four universities within a radius of 50km. He 
proposed a Princeton-type Advanced Studies Institute to be shared 
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by the universities. The leadership at the Universities of Cape 
Town and the Western Cape showed no interest, but Stellenbosch 
University had already started to talk about such an institute, and 
in 2005 the Stellenbosch Institute of Advanced Studies (STIAS) 
was established with the support of the Marianne and Marcus 
Wallenberg Foundation.6 STIAS is now well-established and has 
hosted a number of Nobel prize winners as fellows. Castells is 
counted among the Institute’s enthusiastic fellows, and he spent 
time there during 2009, 2011 and 2014. 
During his 2009 visit Castells delivered a special lecture on 
higher education at the University of the Western Cape. In this 
lecture, he combined the four main functions with the NCHE’s 
proposals about equity, responsiveness and citizenship formation. 
Castells’s third visit was in 2011 to host, in collaboration with 
STIAS and CHET, a seminar series on informational development. 
The topic signals strong links with the arguments presented in 
2000, particularly those on identity and the critical contribution 
of education in informational development. The seminars were 
a precursor to the book Reconceptualising Development in the 
Information Age, edited by Manuel Castells and Pekka Himanen 
(2014), that includes a chapter on South Africa co-authored by 
Nico Cloete and Alison Gilwald (Cloete & Gilwald 2014).
Soon after this visit, the HERANA project, which included 
eight flagship universities in sub-Saharan Africa, published 
the book Universities and Economic Development in Africa 
(Cloete et al. 2011). The main findings of this project provided 
empirical support for Castells’s assertion that the focus of African 
universities had been on elite formation and training, and that 
‘research production at seven of the eight institutions (University 
of Cape Town excluded) was not strong enough to enable them 
to build on their traditional undergraduate teaching roles to make 
a sustainable, comprehensive contribution to development via 
new knowledge production’ (Cloete et al. 2011: 165). The book 




effort between government, external stakeholders and the 
universities to systematically strengthen the contribution higher 
education can make to development, as was happening at the 
time in near-East countries like South Korea and Singapore. 
HERANA Phase 3, launched in 2012, aimed at promoting 
data-informed planning at the eight ‘flagship’ African universities, 
and improving knowledge production in support of the continent’s 
development challenges. The focus shifted to a set of indicators 
that dealt with postgraduate production, staff capacity and research 
output. The major output from this project was the publication of 
Knowledge Production and Contradictory Functions in African Higher 
Education (Cloete et al. 2015). 
The launch of Knowledge Production and Contradictory Functions 
in African Higher Education at the Africa Higher Education 
Summit in Dakar in March 2015 was the only contribution that 
was based on empirical research at African universities. The book 
also made a significant contribution to the formation of the African 
Research Universities Alliance, a tangible demonstration that 
there is an emerging interest in Africa strengthening knowledge 
production as a core university function. Castells commented that 
the book ‘demonstrate[s] the essential role of higher education in 
the development of Africa and of the world at large’ (on the cover 
of Cloete et al. 2015).
In 2014, Castells returned to South Africa for a fourth time to 
host another seminar and, this time, to launch Reconceptualising 
Development (Castells & Himanen 2014). On 5 June 2014, in the 
lead up to the seminar, Castells delivered his third public lecture in 
South Africa. The lecture focused on the need to reconceptualise 
development, acknowledging the role of universities in a new 
development paradigm.
***
In 2002, not long after Castells’s first visit to South Africa, CHET 
transformed from a typical, increasingly bureaucratic non-
governmental organisation located in Pretoria into a much leaner 
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networked organisation, and relocated to Cape Town. CHET 
became an organisation with only one full-time employee; all the 
other expertise and skills required, including for doing research, 
were contracted in as and when required. The administrative, 
accounting, communications and event management functions 
were also outsourced to a network of expert service providers. 
The Pretoria CHET bears little resemblance to Cape Town 
CHET but three striking strategic consistencies remain. The 
first is CHET’s ability to organise forums for linking academic 
researchers to higher education policy-makers. The second is the 
ongoing pursuit to bolster empirically the argument for the role 
of knowledge and, by implication, the role of the university in 
development, while always acknowledging the tensions between 
the four functions of universities brought to CHET’s attention 
by Castells. The third is CHET’s continued commitment to 
publishing its research.
CHET has self-published many of its reports and books, 
but it has also partnered with local publishers – with Maskew 
Miller Longman and Juta in the early days and, more recently, 
with open access academic publisher African Minds. Castells’s 
first contribution was published as five chapters alongside 
commentaries by Martin Carnoy and others in the edited volume 
Challenges of Globalisation: South African debates with Manuel 
Castells (Muller et al. 2001). CHET produced transcripts of his 
2009 and 2014 lectures, and published them on its website. This 
frustrated many scholars eager to locate these contributions on 
the content-saturated world wide web and ready to reference 
Castells’s contribution to their work appropriately. Adding to 
the frustration, Challenges of Globalisation went out of print 
some years ago, and the electronic files could not be recovered to 
publish the book online as an ebook. 
Alert to the ongoing interest in Castells’s work by scholars of 
higher education studies and others, and to the limited access to 
his contributions, African Minds undertook to publish the out-
of-print chapter and the two public lectures. Initially, the plan was 
to publish the three contributions ‘as is’ without an introduction 
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or any accompanying commentary. However, in discussions with 
Nico Cloete (CHET) and with Johan Muller, two of the editors 
of the first Castells publication, it was agreed that the publication 
presented an opportunity not only to make Castells’s contribution 
to higher education more widely accessible but also to showcase 
the contribution that Castells has made to higher education 
research and thinking in Africa fifteen years after his first visit to 
South Africa.
While the starting point of Castells’s visits to South Africa may 
be shrouded by fading (and ageing) memories, it is hoped that 
by publishing his three seminal contributions on the university, 
and by supplementing them with chapters that make explicit how 
Castells has shaped the research agenda, the effects of bringing 
his big-picture thinking to bear on the university in Africa will 
remain indelible.     
17
Chapter 2
Universities and the ‘new society’
Johan Muller
Introduction
The current times have not been kind to globalisation. It was not 
always so. When Manuel Castells first came to the attention of 
all but a tiny handful of South Africans in 2000 on the occasion 
of his first visit to the country, South Africa was newly liberated, 
the future was unimaginably open, and globalisation seemed 
the right partner for national reconstruction and development. 
Castells was its avatar. While warning of the tensions and currents 
that globalisation could unleash, Castells was seen as bearing the 
optimistic message that globalisation could be a powerful positive 
force if it was managed correctly.1 By 2016, that hope, at least in 
its simplistic form, had been mauled in dramatic fashion, though 
some would say its dark side could have been predicted if not 
averted had we paid more careful attention. What is unequivocally 
clear is that, as we put together this second book of Castells’s 
contributions, a wave of anti-technological modernisation and 
anti-globalisation is sweeping through the traditional West, and 
1 The title of the book was Challenges of Globalisation (Muller et al. 2001). It is true that 
the Introduction warned explicitly against seeing Castells as primarily a globalisation 




a virulent populism is everywhere on the rise. The times are not 
propitious for the global cosmopolitan project.
But it would certainly be a grave mistake to think that 
globalisation has little to say and contribute to higher education 
today; the universal dismay of the UK universities to the strictures 
that Brexit will bring is indicative of the widely shared nostrum 
that universities need access to world networks to thrive (Corbett 
& Gordon 2017). But how are we to think that nostrum in a 
developing country that has a fledgling higher education system 
and too many patchy institutions? What are the opportunities 
and threats to higher education in the shadow of 2016? How 
might Manuel Castells illuminate the path today?
Re-reading his key text from that time, published again 
here for its prescience and foresight, and with the wisdom of 
hindsight, one can see he was warning against certain trends that 
we in South Africa simply didn’t pay sufficient attention to. Take 
‘massification’, for example, something invested with a charge of 
moral rightness hard to resist at the time. After all, black students 
had for too long been denied the fruits of education in general 
and higher education in particular. Who would deny their moral 
right to higher education, a right enshrined in the Freedom 
Charter and the Constitution? Massification was the necessary 
vehicle to deliver this right, and we were encouraged in this belief 
by other luminaries visiting in the early 1990s, like Sir Peter Scott 
(Scott 1997). What we took away then from Castells’s magisterial 
essay was that development required four explicit functions to be 
effectively performed by the university system. What we did not 
notice as clearly was that a further implicit function, the pressures 
for access ‘regardless of the actual functional requirements of 
the economy’ (Chapter 3: 41) – massification for massification’s 
sake – though indubitably a legitimate social demand, had 
to be carefully managed if it was not to render the delivery of 
the explicit development functions ineffective, if it was not to 
‘suffocate’ the development potential of the universities. Castells 
could not have been clearer: if access to universities is opened 
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and the university is unable to separate out this function from its 
legitimate functions, conditions for high-level research become 
tenuous, then impossible, and the best graduates will leave, or 
simply not return after getting their PhDs in the metropoles, an 
endemic situation in African universities further to the north of 
South Africa. The students who remain behind get frustrated, and 
lose respect for the science function – a bell ringing loudly on 
the campuses in South Africa in late 2016 as the students fought 
not only for free education, but took the fight to, and against, 
their professors. Neither the education function nor the science 
function can properly thrive in such an environment. 
The implications of the Castellian schema are thus not 
undilutedly optimistic, though Castells has more often than 
not been taken for a techno-optimist. The reasons lie in the 
architecture of his theoretical apparatus. This apparatus contains 
structural conditions as well as agents, powers to produce and 
powers to dominate, contradictions that have to be managed, and 
this can be done with wisdom or with folly. As against the rather 
smug narrative of universities being, next to the Church, the most 
durable of institutions, he tells a different story that includes at 
least the following: first and foremost, do universities have faculty 
capacity to attract good students and to do globally recognisable 
research? Have they produced a recognisable track record and 
reputation? Can the faculty, and the university as an institution, 
plug into global networks? Above all, can the university balance 
the historically specific form of the contradictory functions and 
adapt to its historical place and role and thrive? It is by no means 
a foregone conclusion. 
This seems a rather large message to extract from Castells, whose 
main contribution to the sociology of universities in development 
can fairly be said to lie in the three pieces printed here. There is 
only one index entry to ‘universities’ in the famous trilogy, for 
example. This should not be taken to mean that his work does not 
speak to universities, and powerfully so. To get beneath the skin of 
Castells will require a little digging.
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On power, knowledge and capacity
The aim in this brief introduction is not to provide a comprehensive 
review of Castells’s theoretical reach. Rather it is to focus on a 
few key concepts and show how, in connecting them up, they 
together might shine some light on how universities function in 
the present time, particularly in relation to development.
A strong case can be made that the central concept in social 
science is power, and Castells places this concept centrally in 
his work. Starting with Poulantzian Marxism (Castells 2009 is 
dedicated to him), by the time of the trilogy, Castells’s theory of 
the state and of political power is more orthodoxly Weberian (see 
also Castells 2009: 44). That is to say, power is the imposition of 
the will of one upon another, and the state, sovereign since the 
Treaty of Westphalia throughout Europe, has a monopoly on the 
lawful exercise not only of power but also of violent power. At 
the height of the power of the nation state, say up to the Second 
World War, might determined what was right.
In the networked world, this power changes subtly but 
decisively. Under globalisation, states can be said to lose power, but 
not influence. They can shape outcomes, but they can no longer 
determine them in the same way. This is because, in addition to the 
traditional three layers of power of the nation state – the local, the 
regional and the national – a fourth supra-national layer emerges, 
which now conditions, and places limits on, the traditional power 
of the territorially bounded entity. Castells names the two new 
forms of power in this new network configuration rule-setting (or 
governance by standards) and governance in networks. A higher 
educational example might be helpful.
Take the case of transnational qualifications frameworks. The 
European Qualifications Framework as an exemplar of a supra-
national standard-setting body has created a set of parameters to 
which all qualifications in the Eurozone must conform in order to 
be registered. Castells would say that of the two kinds of new agent 
wielding power in the global networks, here the programmers hold 
sway – the group of early-joining representatives, principally in 
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this case those from the Irish qualifications authority – since they 
were able to set the criteria for the standards which control the 
rules for inclusion and exclusion to the qualifications framework. 
This has meant that for the late-joining countries, the wiggle room 
to negotiate their terms of inclusion is considerably reduced, 
although there too other considerations prevail: for late-joining 
Norway, a relatively influential country although not legally part 
of the EU, wiggling gained some concessions; for even later-
joining Estonia, with lower standing in Europe, the terms of entry 
were simply accepted as if set by edict (see Elken 2016). The UK, 
by contrast, with their impending Brexit, are betting that they 
have sufficient alternative networks to join to mitigate the costs 
of exit. Time will tell whether they will opt to switch from the 
European Qualifications Authority to which they presently belong. 
Everything turns on the alternatives available. Castells calls the 
power to be able to join comparable alternative networks switching 
power, which, alongside programming power, circumscribes the 
range of new powers operating in the network society.
Although Castells doesn’t refine this new set of powers much 
further, political science at large has tried to capture them, and 
the somewhat diminished form of power Castells calls influence, 
in what Nye has called the new paradigm of ‘soft power’ (Nye 
1990, 2011). ‘Soft’ power is exercised via persuasion, and 
entails the ability to shape preferences through appeal and 
attraction, where credibility becomes a key resource. By Nye’s 
own admission, this notion of power is descriptive rather than 
normative, or even really rigorously conceptual. This has not 
stopped it being seized upon by the would-be standard setters, 
or would-be programmers, to construct global rankings from 
this rather soft notion – the ‘Soft Power World Rankings’ (for 
which Nye writes a Foreword) and the ‘Monocle Soft Power 
Survey’. For a more rigorous conceptual account, a brief look at 
Steven Lukes (2005) is instructive.
Lukes is well known for his thesis about the three faces of 
power. These ‘faces’ are conventionally seen as on a continuum 
from empirical enactments of the exercise of power (‘A exercises 
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power over B’) identified with the empirical study of power by 
political scientists like Dahl; through more indirect exercises of 
power where power can be seen as for the common good, identified 
with sociologists like Parsons; to a radical form, where power 
shapes preferences in such a way as to circumvent the affected 
agent’s freedom and rational self-determination. In revising his 
thesis in 2005, Lukes comes increasingly to lean on the distinction 
made by Spinoza, between potentia, which is roughly glossed 
as ‘power to’, or the ability and capacity to do something; and 
potestas, roughly ‘power over’, which is the traditional notion of 
power as domination of one agent over another. Potestas is always 
deformative, it withdraws or deprives, it places another in your 
power, constraining their choices, securing their compliance; 
potentia is productive or creative, it extends horizons, it imagines 
new futures. As Giddens (1979: 348) says with customary clarity, 
‘Power in this broad sense is equivalent to the transformative capacity 
of human action.’ It involves the capacity to achieve something of 
value. In this sense, as we will see, highly specialised knowledge as 
produced by universities confers a very specialised capacity to its 
holders, which is where universities and development come in, but 
more on this later.
Lukes draws several lessons from this seminal distinction. First, 
power as capacity weans power from its exercise: one may possess 
power, but that is separate from exercising it. One may decide 
not to exercise it, or to exercise it badly – or, in more Castellian 
vein, in a non-networked field or site, which means its force is 
blunted or diminished. Secondly, following Spinoza, potentia is 
the more encompassing notion; all power is a capacity, potestas 
just a special case of it. In fact, Lukes would advocate that we 
shift entirely to what he calls a dispositional account of power, 
an account in terms of capacities, an account he allies to Sen and 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. Castells will have none of it. 
Although he cites the distinction between ‘power over’ and ‘power 
to’, which he attributes to Parsons (Castells 2009: 13), he goes on 
to say that ‘the power to do something […] is always the power 
to do something against someone’ (Castells 2009: 13). That is, 
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for Castells ‘power to’ is also always ‘power over’. On this point, 
Castells is himself highly consistent, as we commented in the 
conclusion to the earlier volume.
Fortunately, we do not have to arbitrate between Lukes and 
Castells; in any case, we agree with Castells. It is enough to say 
that, as we enter the networked spaces of informationalism, the 
dispositional dimension of power comes more insistently into 
view. We can see this in the way that Castells defines the powers of 
programmers and switchers in terms of their abilities and capacities. 
We also commented on this when we commented on Castells’s oft-
misinterpreted notion of knowledge in our earlier volume (Muller 
et al. 2001). This bears a brief re-statement. 
Commentators persist with the cavil that Castells didn’t take 
knowledge seriously. Maton (2014: 2), to cite just one recent 
example, complains that Castells ‘relegates’ knowledge to a 
footnote, and concludes that, like other mainstream sociologists, 
he treats it as a ‘black box’. What is quite true is that he does not 
treat knowledge as a factitious object or structure, as Maton and 
others do, for instance; for him, as we have already seen, it is a 
productive capacity. As we pointed out earlier, Castells regards 
the data and information as ‘bits’ out there, while knowledge as a 
capacity is the ability to assemble the data into information with 
which to assess, make informed guesses and expert hypotheses, 
and integrate the most robust of these into theories that relate in 
determinable ways to the existing theoretical corpus. 
The bottom line then is that, while Castells (and others in 
the political economy tradition) treats knowledge as a capacity of 
knowledgeable agents, educators tend to treat knowledge as the 
existing knowledge corpus as well as the new knowledge which can 
be demonstrably added to it. For the economists, knowledge is 
an expert capacity ‘in here’; for educators, knowledge is an expert 
commodity that can be treated as ‘out there’. There are good 
reasons for both approaches to knowledge. 
The educators need to focus on two issues that economists 
take for granted. The first is they need to conceptualise the ‘what’ 
of learning in terms of a specifiable curriculum. The question 
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they must be able to answer is: what is the knowledge that must 
be selected into the curriculum and sequenced and paced in a 
determinable fashion? Attempts to design a curriculum in terms 
only of capacities (educators call them ‘competences’), in terms 
of what learners should be able to do, are currently favoured by 
outcomes-based approaches to curriculum (like the European 
Qualifications Framework mentioned earlier), but their greatest 
drawback is they signal rather poorly what teachers and learners 
are expected to cover over a specific period. Specifying the end 
point of learning doesn’t tell one how to get there. Educators 
cannot avoid a certain degree of treating knowledge as ‘out there’. 
The second issue educators focus on is: what is the individual 
scholar’s, or institution’s, contribution to new knowledge? Here 
the outputs ‘out there’ are treated as proxies for their (the scholar’s) 
productiveness. To answer both of these questions requires treating 
knowledge as ‘out there’ in some sense or other.
Economists by contrast have a different question to 
answer, one related more directly to labour power and labour 
productivity. Knowledge is treated here as a productive asset. In 
this sense, labour units are treated as already capacitated, so the 
need to specify the curriculum, or to count output units, falls 
away. It is not so much that the ‘out there’ doesn’t count, as some 
sociologists of education have concluded; it is that what is ‘in 
here’ counts far more for the future value-adding activity of the 
concern. To see why that is, a brief detour into what Castells 
means by ‘development’ is in order.
Towards the ‘new society’ (Castells 1998: 360) 
The place where Castells is clearest about this capacity is in his 
distinction between two forms of labour power and their relative 
value. ‘The most fundamental divide in the network society, 
albeit not the only one, is between self-programmable labour and 
generic labour’ (Castells 2009: 30). Castells continues, and it is 
worth quoting him at length:
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Self-programmable labour has the autonomous capacity to focus 
on the goal assigned to it in the process of production, find the 
relevant information, recombine it into knowledge, using the 
available knowledge stock […] the more what is required from 
labour is the capacity to search and recombine information 
[…] in terms of value-making (in finance, in manufacturing, 
in research, in sports, in entertainment, in military action, or in 
political capital), it is the self-programmable worker who counts 
for any organisation in control of resources. (Castells 2009: 30)
The second form of labour, generic labour, may well possess 
skills of a fairly specialised sort, but they are not what Castells 
would call ‘informational’ skills, they do not lend themselves to 
being autonomously renewed in the workplace – once trained, 
always trained so to speak. So when innovation and production 
requirements change – and they will increasingly do so at an ever-
greater pace in the network economy – the self-programmable 
worker can self-renew, while the generic worker must either be 
replaced by another more skilled worker, or by automation. In the 
remorseless logic of the network world, they do not have the key 
capacity to self-renew and are therefore replaceable.
The name ‘network world’ though masks the dynamic that drives 
it. Castells draws a distinction between the mode of production 
and the mode of development. The two main modes of production 
have been capitalism on the one hand and statism/collectivism 
on the other. The network society has tilted the balance towards 
capitalism, but not without hybrid modes emerging; the Chinese 
and Russian societies are just two that come readily to mind, not 
to mention the East Asian ones, about which more below. In a 
sense, the old tension between these still sits at the heart of modes 
of production.
It is in the mode of development that the greatest change is to 
be discerned, from industrialism to a post-industrial mode that 
some have called the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ and Castells 
calls ‘informationalism’. It is this mode of development that has 
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been the topic of discussion in this introduction, and which 
heralds Castells’s ‘new society’, bringing with it decisive changes 
in the social relations of production, experience and power.
This view of development might seem quite conventional, 
but what Castells is trying to do is show how the concept of 
informationalism as a mode of development marks a break 
with both dependency theories of development and neoclassical 
economics in the field of development theory, usually called 
‘neo-liberalism’ for short. The four Asian Tigers taken together, 
for example, confound both theories (Castells 2009: 250). 
Dependency theory predicted that economic development under 
capitalism in formerly dependent countries was not possible; 
and neoclassicism predicted that success would depend upon 
the market winning out over the state in directing the economy. 
The Tigers have been successful under capitalism, but they all 
had states that had intervened systematically in their strategic 
guidance of national firms and multinational corporations. They 
have also repressed or limited democracy in one or other way, 
concentrating on the improvement of living standards rather than 
citizen participation (Stalder 2006: 119). This too goes against the 
neoclassical grain.
Two other factors were crucial to their spectacular lift off. These 
were low labour costs and a large, well-educated and skilled labour 
force. For all of them thus, the ‘availability of educated labour, 
able to reskill itself during the process of industrial upgrading, with 
high productivity and a level of wages that was low by international 
standards’ (Stalder 2006: 274, italics in original) was the key. This 
gave the labour force the flexibility to adapt to the informational 
paradigm – to science, hi-tech and R&D. Castells is at pains 
to stress the role of the state in producing ‘high-quality labour’ 
(Stalder 2006: 276). All of this stands in stark contrast to most if 
not all other postcolonies, where poor quality education and high 
wages, driven up by second and third industrial revolution unions, 
created the opposite set of conditions, with their consequent costs.
We may speculate then that where the proportion of self-
programmable to generic labour is tilted positively in favour of 
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the self-programmables, conditions are propitious enough that 
a country can dig itself out of the dependency trap. Where the 
balance is tilted the other way, the path to independence is much 
more arduous. The differential between the two forms of labour 
will only increase under informationalism. The factor making 
the difference is education, especially and increasingly higher 
education: ‘The critical quality in differentiating the two kinds of 
labour is education, and the capacity of accessing higher levels of 
education’ (Stalder 2006: 361). This underlines the critical role 
of universities in effecting the ‘new society’, the post-dependency 
thriving economy and society.
The empirical chapters in this volume that follow the three 
benchmark papers by Castells examine this Castellian legacy. 
Theoretically, they do this mainly by invoking the ‘four functions’ 
schema Castells introduces in his first paper. It is in their 
empirical realisation of Castells, though, that a larger conceptual 
debt becomes apparent. Their main empirical target is knowledge 
production, and their main indicator is the publication output 
of universities, their research productivity, including doctoral 
graduates. Of course, in a purely empirical tradition, the amount 
of research produced is correlated with the amount of innovation 
in the national innovation system. But the authors are operating 
here at least implicitly in a Castellian vein. The capacity to do 
research signifies the specialised capacity to manipulate symbolic 
systems, the result of which, in many key cases, has material 
payoffs and consequences. This is the symbolic capacity that 
is the basic condition for self-programmability. It is not only 
transmitted through induction into research, but this is the 
university’s pre-eminent way of transmitting it, at least at a high 
level. The PhD is the proxy indicator that signifies the summit of 
self-programmability.
A research-productive institution is an environment where 
symbolic manipulation is a constant backdrop to other academic 
labours, and smart graduates need such an environment to 
flourish, and thereby to contribute to it with their own research 
outputs, patents, software programmes and other symbolic 
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value-producing products. The amount of research output an 
institution produces is thus not only an index of its contribution 
to the present innovation economy, but through its magnetic 
inductive pull on good graduates, produces the producers of the 
future health of the innovation system as well.
It is frequently said that universities have to educate for the 
middle sectors of society as well, and Castells has incorporated 
the training of the civil service and bureaucracy into his fourth 
function of universities. There was a time in the postcolony when 
this, along with the ideological function and the training of 
dominant elites was all that universities did, at least in Africa. In 
too many cases, that is all they still do. But to train a skilled civil 
servant, it is no longer sufficient to teach the skills of concentration 
and procedural accuracy, along with the social virtues of attention 
to detail, loyalty to the state and sobriety. Most of these fairly 
repetitive skills are now swallowed up by software programmes. 
So, it is thought, what those in the service professions now most 
need are social skills like interpersonal and communication skills. 
From the view developed here, the skills civil servants will also 
increasingly need are the skills of symbolic manipulation – drawing 
up and managing procurement and performance plans, strategic 
planning, performance management and the like. While much of 
these too are available as software, adapting them to the particular 
needs of the institution requires higher-level skills than before. To 
coin a phrase, these skills have the potential to create a knowledge 
or informational dividend; they are able to generate new value. The 
procedural and communication skills do not have this potential.
The twin themes of this book – universities and their role in 
development – are now in focus. Universities are, self-evidently, 
the privileged social institution for the inculcation of high-
level expertise (what Castells calls in these essays the ‘education’ 
function) and the development of self-programmable, innovative 
or inventive capacity (what he calls here the ‘scientific’ function). 
It is the latter, though intimately dependent on the former, 
which counts most under informationalism. As we will also see 
in the chapters below, the dependence goes both ways: if an 
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institution focuses on the education function to the neglect of 
the scientific or research function, the expertise level purveyed 
by the institution runs a real risk of slowly dropping down the 
scale from informational towards generic. On the other hand, if 
another institution develops a grand policy to be a research-led 
institution but neglects to employ the highly skilled scholars to do 
the research, the policy will remain empty. A theme of Castells’s is 
that each needs the other in order to thrive.
In order to see this connection more clearly, a second link 
back to our first volume (Muller et al. 2001) may be helpful. 
In that discussion, we highlighted the fact that the ubiquitous 
term, ‘learning to learn’, was an institutional capacity rather 
than an individual capacity. Distinguishing with Eder (1999) 
between ‘rule learning’ and ‘substantive learning’, we argued 
that in order for an institution to be productively or creatively 
adaptable to challenges of the network society, it had to have 
the capacity to ‘learn to learn’, that is, to adapt to challenges and 
mediate contradictions. In the first paper, Castells is concerned 
to outline two sets of contradictions that adaptable institutions 
are able to mediate: that between the divergent demands of the 
extrinsic four functions of universities; and that between the four 
extrinsic functions and the intrinsic social function of expanded 
access. These contradictions must be mediated in order for the two key 
functions, the education and science functions, to flourish, for success 
in the network world. This is the core challenge for the would-be 
developmental university, particularly in the developing world.
There is a connection between the idea of self-programmability, 
a capacity at the individual level, and ‘learning to learn’ or what 
Castells calls here ‘adaptability’, the commensurate capacity 
at the institutional level. These capacities must run in tandem. 
It does not help if an institution has excellent high-level self-
programmable staff, but, in a burst of moral conscience, throws 
open its doors so that these high-capacity staff are swamped and 
the science function of research consequently smothered. Nor 
does it serve if an institution espouses the fine ideals of becoming 
a research-led institution but does not invest in the kind of staff 
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that can deliver the desired research. These mismatches are well 
illustrated in the data presented in the chapters that follow, 
mismatches considerably illuminated by Castells’s perspicacious 
theory in the bracing chapters that precede them. These highlight 
the growing pains of developmentalism, as universities in Africa 
struggle to discover what it is to be a developmental university in 
a developing country. As the theory predicts, and as the empirical 
chapters that follow show, not all of them will make it.
It remains to connect this account back to the two faces of 
power, the productive face and the face of domination. As we 
commented earlier, Castells is insistent that productive power 
is not the ‘good’ power, and domination the ‘bad’ power. The 
two always come together. As we saw with the example of the 
European Qualifications Framework, two faces of ‘power over’ 
can be observed here. They are exclusion and inclusion. Those 
with power can so define the standards, or rules for inclusion, 
that some can be kept out, others let in. But as we also saw with 
that example, that the way the programmers can wield power 
is not only exclusionary; they also do so by determining the 
rules of inclusion and the terms of participating once in. Once 
the criteria have been set – be they data protocols, intellectual 
property regulations, or criteria for university rankings, there is 
always less than optimal wiggle room; how much depends on the 
relative power of the actor entering the network. Once in, and 
once the regulations are binding, the only counter-power is to 
switch, a strategy dramatised by Brexit. Only rarely can the rules 
be effectively challenged from within.
Again though, care must be taken to see both sides. University 
rankings confer distinct network advantages over those not ranked 
or lowly ranked. Castells’s theory urges us to see both sides of 
the coin, not just one, an injunction not always easy to heed, as 
numbers of the South African responses to Castells in the earlier 
volume can attest. At Davos in January 2017, this message was 
underlined from an unlikely source, the secretary general of the 
Chinese Communist party. In his keynote, Xi Jinping stressed 
that globalisation is a ‘double-edged sword’, continuing to say, 
31
CHAPTER 2 Muller: Universities and the ‘new society’
‘It is true that economic globalisation has created new problems. 
But this is no justification to write off economic globalisation.’ 
He went on to make a telling analogy: ‘Pursuing protectionism 
is like locking oneself in a dark room. While wind and rain may 
be kept outside, that dark room will also block light and air’ (Xi 
2017; see also Gui 2017). Indeed. This betokens a flexibility 
many did not suspect the mandarins of the Chinese command 
economy possessed; but, as the third essay of Castells’s below will 
show, he spotted it earlier than most. It is for this, amongst many 
other shafts of perspicacity, that we continue to return to these 
neglected pieces, and is why they are published here.





Universities as dynamic systems of contradictory functions
Manuel Castells
Universities are institutions that in all societies, throughout 
history, have performed basic functions that are implicit in the 
role that is assigned to them by society through political power 
or economic influence. These functions, and their combination, 
result from the specific history of education, science, culture and 
ideology in each country. However, we can distinguish four major 
functions at the theoretical level whose specific weight in each 
historical epoch defines the predominate role of a given university 
system and the specific task of each university within the overall 
university system. 
Firstly, universities have historically played a major role as 
ideological apparatuses, rooted in the European tradition of Church-
based universities, either in the statist version of the French, Italian 
or Spanish universities (closely linked to the religious orders, to 
the Roman Catholic Church and to the national or local states) or 
in the more liberal tradition of theological schools of Anglo-Saxon 
variety, ancestors of the liberal arts colleges. The formation and 
diffusion of ideology has been, and still is, a fundamental role of 
universities, in spite of the ideology of their ideology-free role.
However, we must consider this role in the plurality of 
ideological manifestations. Ideological apparatuses are not 
purely reproductive machines, as seen in the functionalist theory 
exemplified by Pierre Bourdieu (1970). They are submitted, 
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as Alain Touraine has shown (1972), to the conflicts and 
contradictions of society, and therefore they will tend to express 
– and even amplify – the ideological struggles present in all 
societies. Thus, both conservative and radical ideologies find their 
expression in the universities, although the more the ideological 
hegemony of dominant elites is established in society at large, 
the more conservative ideologies tend to be predominant in the 
university, with the expression of radicalism being confined to a 
minority of the student body as well as to some ‘official radicals’ 
among the faculty members, tolerated on behalf of the necessary 
flexibility of the system. On the other hand, the more the socio- 
political rule of society relies on coercion rather than on consensus, 
the more universities become the amplifiers of the challenge to 
domination in society at large, as is often the case, for instance, in 
Latin America (Nassif et al. 1984). In such cases, universities are 
still predominately ideological apparatuses, although they work 
for social change rather than for social conservatism. 
Secondly, universities have always been mechanisms of 
selection of dominant elites. Included in such mechanisms, 
beyond selection in the strict sense, are the socialisation process 
of these elites, the formation of the networks for their cohesion, 
and the establishment of codes of distinction between these 
elites and the rest of the society. The classic liberal arts college 
in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, including the Oxbridge version 
of theological schools, or the state-based European universities, 
played a fundamental role in the formation of the new elites of 
the proto-industrial and industrial societies, as family heritage 
was eroded in its legitimacy as the sole source of social power. 
Without substitution for the ideological role of universities 
(and actually frequently overlapping with it), elite selection 
and the formation of social networks became the backbone 
of the leading institutions of the university system, actually 
constructing the internal hierarchy of such systems on the basis 
of a scale of proximity to the values and standards generated 
in such institutions. The English system, built around the 
undisputed dominance of Oxford and Cambridge, is probably 
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the quintessence of this elitist role of the university, an extremely 
important function in any society. But the role played by Ivy 
League universities in the United States, by the University 
of Louvain, based on the influence of the Catholic Church in 
Belgium, or by the University of Moscow in the Soviet Union, is 
in fact very similar, and reproduces the process of elite selection 
and formation, while adapting it to the historical and cultural 
characteristics of each society.
The elite selection function should not be associated necessarily 
with private universities oriented toward the aristocratic or 
bourgeois elites. For instance, in France, where the service of 
the state was traditionally the noblest function, carrying with 
it the highest power and prestige, the elite university is fully 
institutionalised in the system of the grandes écoles, loosely 
connected to the university system, but largely independent 
from it. As is well known, the grandes écoles prepare exclusively 
for civil service, with the graduates committing themselves to at 
least ten years of service to the state. At the top of the technical 
grandes écoles, the École Polytechnique is technically linked to the 
French Army, and although the great majority of its graduates 
have probably never touched a gun, they keep climbing in the 
hierarchy of army officers, since their ‘active duty’ generally takes 
place in the technocracy of the French state.
As a sign of the dominance of the state over private firms in 
France, the elite of industrialists (but also of leading managers) is 
often recruited among former graduates of the grandes écoles, after 
they have accomplished their ‘tour of duty’ in government. Thus, 
elite-oriented universities are linked to the specific history and 
composition of elite formation in each country.
The science-oriented university came, in fact, very late in 
history, in spite of the practice of science in universities in all times, 
including the achievement of fundamental scientific discoveries 
in universities that were by and large ideological apparatuses. The 
first universities focusing on science and research as a fundamental 
task were the leading German universities in the second half of 
the 19th century, although there were a few early transfers of the 
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science university model to the United States, particularly the 
Johns Hopkins University, built around the Medical School.
What seems today to be the third and most obvious function 
of the university, that is, the generation of new knowledge is, 
in fact, the exception throughout the world. In many countries 
it had not yet been fully recognised as a fundamental task by 
the political institutions and private firms until the coming of 
the current technological revolution, when the examples of the 
decisive influence of American science-oriented universities 
in the new processes of economic growth (the ‘Silicon Valley 
syndrome’) won the reputation of being ‘useful and productive’ 
for the universities of the Information Age. However, this shift 
in the conception of the university’s role should not overlook 
the fact that in most of Europe, research has been institutionally 
separated from higher education and confined into scheduled 
‘National Scientific Research Centres’ of the French, Spanish 
or Italian type, while the German model (still operating on 
the principle of separation between teaching and research) has 
been somewhat more flexible in the interaction between the 
two functions. Many European governments have assumed the 
functions of scientific research in specialised institutions – not 
trusting the universities, which are considered too vulnerable to 
student pressures. In other areas of the world, particularly Japan, 
private firms have also distrusted universities as research-oriented 
organisations, and many have their own in-house research 
laboratories supported by government funds, directly linked to 
these firms’ needs and orientations.
The popularity of the research-oriented university came from 
the success of such models in the American university system. 
Both private universities, modelled after pioneering engineering 
schools such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
Stanford or Caltech, and public universities endowed by Land 
Grant policies, particularly in the Midwest and California, played 
a fundamental role in generating new knowledge and in using 
it to usher in a new era of industrialisation on the basis of new 
technologies (Veysey 1965). But, while this model is now vastly 
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imitated throughout the world, it is very specific to America 
(although, as mentioned, it originated in the German university 
experience), and remains the statistical exception among 
universities, even in the United States where only about 200 of 
the 3500 universities and colleges can be considered as knowledge 
producers at various levels.
The science university in the United States received a major 
boost from the military needs of government, during both World 
War II and the Cold War, since new technologies became critical 
to assess the American military hegemony in the second half of 
the 20th century. However, the interesting fact is that the science 
university model became fully developed in America only as an 
expansion of the role of another model of university, centred on a 
different function: the professional university.
The professional university is the university focused on a fourth 
function, perhaps the largest and most important nowadays: 
the training of the bureaucracy. This has always been a basic 
function of the university, since its days as a Church school when 
it specialised in the formation of the Church bureaucrats. And 
it was certainly the focus of the Napoleonic model of university 
that inspired most European universities, or of the traditional 
Chinese university system, structured around the preparation of 
the Imperial system of examinations as a form of access to the 
state bureaucracy, and a model that certainly inspired the Japanese 
and Korean systems. The training of the bureaucracy, be it the 
Imperial service or the plethora of lawyers that populated the 
Italian or Spanish administrations, was (and is) a fundamental 
function of the university in most countries.
Thus, much of the university system is rooted in a statist 
tradition. However, when the process of industrialisation required 
the training of a mass of engineers, accountants, economists, social 
workers and other professions, and when the expansion of the 
health and education systems demanded millions of teaching staff 
and medical personnel, universities were called upon to provide 
both general and specialised training for this massive, skilled 
labour force. At the same time, they had to equip themselves 
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to accomplish this function, thus becoming large consumers of 
their own production. The professional university, focusing on 
the training of the labour forces, was particularly successful in 
those countries where it was close enough to the industrial world 
to be useful for the economy, but not so close that it would lose 
its specific role vis-à-vis the short-term interests of particular 
segments of the industry. 
Thus, the Land Grant universities in the United States created 
by state governments to fulfil the development tasks of the regional 
economy were the exemplary experience that opened the path 
for future professional universities. The agricultural schools of 
California and Wisconsin or the engineering schools of Michigan 
and Illinois, generated a culture of close interaction between the 
university and the business world, providing the ground for the 
expansion of the role of these universities in the whole realm of 
science, technology and the humanities, but always closely linked 
to their original developmental tasks. The American university 
experience is better represented by the professional model 
epitomised by MIT or Wisconsin than by elite universities such 
as Yale or Stanford, regional varieties or reproduction of social 
elites. The science-oriented university came later, and developed 
both on the basis of the elite university and of the professional 
university, until forming a more complex structure in which 
several functions interact with each other.
However, for the purpose of the analysis presented here, the 
important fact is that it was the professional university that gave 
birth to the science university as the needs of the economy made 
research increasingly important as a strategic tool to enhance 
productivity and competitiveness.
The ability of universities to generate research while dissemi-
nating it into the industrial world was critical for the university 
to keep its training function together with its scientific function 
(Wolfe 1972). On the other hand, those universities, as in the 
socialist countries, that became completely submitted to the needs 
of the labour market in the context of a planned economy were, 
in fact, unable to perform their training function, even less their 
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research function (Peper 1984). This was because in a world where 
technology is rapidly changing, the critical training for engineers 
and technicians is the one that enables them to constantly adapt to 
new technologies. Engineering training that was obsolete as soon 
as the young engineer would quit the school, actually making him 
or her entirely dependent on his or her training on the job – that 
is exactly the contrary function that the university is supposed to 
perform, although practical experience is always critical in adapting 
and applying general knowledge. These four functions (generation 
and transmission of ideology, selection and formation of the 
dominant elites, production and application of knowledge, training 
the skilled labour force) represent the main tasks performed by 
universities, with different emphases on one or another according 
to countries, historical periods and specific institutions. 
But universities as organisations are also submitted to the 
pressures of society, beyond the explicit roles they have been 
asked to assume, and the overall process results in a complex 
and contradictory reality. In many societies, and certainly in the 
West, the demand for higher education has reached the status of 
a social need, regardless of the actual functional requirements of 
the economy or of the institutions.
This social need, as expression of the aspiration of all societies 
to upgrade their education, has led to the so-called ‘massification 
of the university system’, as the institutions respond to excess 
demand by downgrading some elements of the system and 
transforming them into reservoirs of idle labour, a particularly 
useful function if we consider that this idle labour is in fact 
formed by potentially restive youth. Thus, an implicit function 
of modern university systems is that of surplus labour absorption, 
particularly for those lower-middle class sectors who think their 
children are entitled to social mobility through the university 
system. But the more a university system is able to separate this 
‘warehouse function’ from the rest, the more it is both successful 
and unjust. The more a university system is politically or socially 
forced to make coexist the implicitly excluded segments with its 
productive functions, the less effective it is, actually disintegrating 
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into various organisational systems that try to recreate social 
segregation outside the formal institutional system. Indeed, the 
critical element in the structure and dynamics of the university 
system is their ability to combine and make compatible seemingly 
contradictory functions which have all constituted the system 
historically and are all probably being required at any given 
moment by the social interests underlying higher education 
policies. This is probably the most complex analytical element 
to convey to policy-makers: namely, that because universities 
are social systems and historically produced institutions, all their 
functions take place simultaneously within the same structure, 
although with different emphases. It is not possible to have a pure, 
or quasi-pure, model of the university.
Indeed, once the developmental potential of universities 
has been generally acknowledged, many countries try to build 
‘technology institutes’, ‘research universities’ and ‘university–
industry partnerships’. Thus, after centuries of using universities 
mainly as ideological apparatuses and/ or elite selecting devices, 
there is a rush of policy-makers and private firms toward the 
university as a productive force in the informational economy. 
But universities will always be, at the same time, conflictual 
organisations, open to the debates of society, and thus to the 
generation and confrontation of ideologies. The technocratic 
version of a ‘clean’, ‘purely scientific’ or ‘purely professional’ 
university is just an historical vision sentenced to be constantly 
betrayed by historical reality, as the experience of the rather good 
quality Korean universities, never tamed by the government 
in spite of its political control, clearly shows. The real issue 
is not so much to shift universities from the public arena to 
secluded laboratories or to capitalist board meetings, as to create 
institutions solid enough and dynamic enough to withstand 
the tensions that will necessarily trigger the simultaneous 
performance of somewhat contradictory functions. The ability 
to manage such contradictions, while emphasising the role of 
universities in the generation of knowledge and the training of 
labour in the context of the new requirements of the development 
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process, will condition to a large extent the capacity of new 
countries and regions to become part of the dynamic system of 
the new world economy.
To assess the role and tasks of Third World universities in the 
development process we must first consider their specificity against 
the background of the analytical framework presented in this paper. 
It is certainly simplistic to consider altogether the diversity of 
institutions and cultures that are included in the ambiguous term 
of the ‘Third World university’. Yet, with the important exceptions 
of China and Thailand, the specificity of the university system in 
the Third World is that it is historically rooted in its colonial past. 
Such specificity maximises the role of universities as ideological 
apparatuses in their origins, as well as their reaction against cultural 
colonialism, but emphasises their ideological dimension in the first 
stage of their post-independence period.
Indeed, in the case of the British colonies, the report of 
the Asquith Commission (1945) set up the conditions for the 
organisation of universities in these colonies around the model 
of the British civic university. In the case of the French colonies 
in Africa, a meeting in 1944, held in Brazzaville by the French 
provisional government, saw the universities as an extension of 
the French university system, and organised them as preparing the 
best students to follow their training in the metropolis (Sherman 
1990). An even clearer expression of direct cultural imposition 
is the case of Zaire, where the Louvanium University Centre in 
Congo was an extension of the Catholic University of Louvain.
Even modern universities today, such as the University of Hong 
Kong, appear to the visiting faculty members, including this author, 
as pure British exports, keeping all the imperial flavour of Kipling’s 
writings. As for Latin America, the much earlier independence 
date makes the origins of universities appear less directly relevant 
to their current role. However, the statist-religious character of 
the colonial foundations of the university system still permeates 
the structure and ideology of contemporary colleges, emphasising 
ideology and social status over the economic and labour functions 
of most Latin American universities (Solari 1988).
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The recruitment of social elites, first for the colonial 
administration, later on for the new political elites created with 
independence, became the fundamental function of universities in 
the Third World. Because the political regimes were unstable for a 
long time, universities – in Latin America for two centuries and in 
Asia and Africa in the second half of the 19th century – became the 
social matrix of conflicting political elites, conservative, reformist 
or revolutionary, all competing to lead and shape the nationalist 
ideology of cultural self-determination and political autonomy. 
Thus, in many countries, for a long time, the political function 
of the university (what is called the ‘militant university’ in Latin 
America) – merging the ideological function and the formation 
of new social elites – has been predominant, to the detriment 
of the educational and economic tasks that the university could 
have performed. As several university leaders have proclaimed, the 
‘political preconditions’ had first to be set up for universities to be 
able to proceed with the accomplishment of their specific role. 
The intellectual and personal drama of some of the best college 
professors in the Third World is that in order to pursue their 
academic endeavour, it had to be closely linked to the university 
system in the dominant countries, thus denying to some extent 
their cultural identity and taking the risk of being rejected by their 
own societies and considered alien to their problems and struggles. 
The contradictions between academic freedom and political 
militantism, as well as between the drive for modernisation and 
the preservation of cultural identity, have been a fundamental 
cause for the loss of the best academic talent in most Third World 
countries.
Nevertheless, when countries had to face the development 
tasks in a modern, increasingly integrated world economy in the 
last 30 years, the need to train skilled labour gave a new impetus 
to universities as educational institutions. Furthermore, the 
extension of the traditionally important middle class in Latin 
America, and the formation of a new professional class in Asia and 
Africa, both giving priority to the education of their children at 
the highest possible level, led to a massive expansion of university 
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enrolment. In fact, the new nationalist governments used the 
creation of universities and the increase in the number of students 
as a substantial measure of their development efforts. The number 
of university students has dramatically increased in recent years in 
most countries.
However, much of this increase has taken place in traditional 
areas of education (law, humanities and social sciences) since 
the first task of the university system continued to be to recruit 
and train the administrative and managerial classes on which 
the political system continued to rely. Along with it, in the most 
socially oriented regimes, this took place in the expansion of 
careers destined for social services, particularly education and 
health. Indeed, educational workers (mainly school teachers) have 
become one of the most important occupational groups in the 
lower-middle-classes of developing countries.
There have also been substantial attempts in a number 
of countries to increase the level of training in the scientific 
and technical professions, particularly in engineering and in 
agriculture-related degrees. Yet, such efforts have faced three 
major obstacles:
• The lack of trained faculty in sufficient numbers who are able 
to instruct the students in the most recent technology;
• The lack of an adequate level of funding to train students in 
experimental sciences and professional schools, leading to a 
teaching programme dominated by verbal communication and 
excessive numbers of students in the classroom, undermining 
the quality of the technical training;
• The well-known vicious circle: there are few highly skilled jobs 
for engineers and scientists in developing countries, because 
few firms can operate in these countries at a high technological 
level, because of the lack of skilled manpower.
The net result is that much of the increase in university recruitment 
goes to careers without direct impact on the development process 
because they are less expensive, and the failures in the training 
46
CASTELLS IN AFRICA
are less visible. In addition, the quality of technical training is 
generally very low, not enabling countries to take their place in 
the world at large. There is of course the possibility of breaking 
the vicious circle by a deliberate policy of investment in technical 
higher education. In fact, countries that have engaged in such a 
policy have received substantial pay-offs. This is the case of South 
Korea, of China, Taiwan, and to a lesser extent, of Singapore and 
of Malaysia. The policy involves the recruitment of foreign faculty 
and/or the recruitment of highly trained nationals attracted to their 
home country from their positions in more advanced university 
systems. There is a definite trend in the last decade towards the 
creation of new ‘technology institutes’ in a number of countries 
to emphasise the need to train skilled engineers, scientists and 
technicians. However, only some of these institutes live up to the 
expectations generated by their flashy names and their brand new 
buildings: those investing enough resources in good faculty and 
modern equipment to update the quality of their training. Thus, 
only relatively rich countries are able to provide the necessary 
resources to upgrade their labour force, creating a new gap within 
the Third World.
While the training function of Third World universities is slowly 
making progress, at least in some areas, the science function is 
increasingly lagging in relationship to the acceleration of scientific 
research in the advanced countries, particularly in research and 
development in the critical areas of new technologies. This is both 
for structural reasons and for institutional causes linked to the 
specificity of Third World universities.
Structural reasons have to do with the cumulative character of 
the process of uneven scientific development. Centres of excellence 
that take the lead attract the best researchers who obtain the best 
equipment and material conditions, being able to attract the best 
students who end up forming a closely connected network. Thus, 
most of the best Third World scientists migrating to the United 
States or Europe (or staying in these countries after completing 
their doctorates) do so because it is the only way for them to 
continue to do research in the cutting edge of their speciality. 
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In fact, salary and working conditions appear to be secondary 
factors in relation to the basic condition: to belong to an advanced 
scientific milieu. This is partly linked to the amount of resources 
devoted to research and development by advanced countries. But 
there are also important institutional conditions, linked to the 
specificity of Third World universities, that make difficult their 
performance as centres of generation of knowledge. The need to 
preserve cultural identity, and the tensions created by the extreme 
politicisation of universities in overcrowded conditions, make it 
extremely difficult to manage the co-existence of the ideological 
and political functions with the scientific activity of the university. 
The necessary distance and independence of academic research 
vis-á-vis the immediate pressures of political conflicts become 
literally impossible when students, and some faculty, are engaged 
in changing the world or in affirming themselves as their main 
goal. In addition, the existence of large segments of the university 
population that are simply treated as surplus labour makes it rather 
difficult to maintain the respect for scientific activity (whose pay-
offs are necessarily in the long term) on the part of students and 
faculty who are relatively marginal to the society or from university 
administrators whose main concern is to keep order and maintain 
the system operating in formal terms, regardless of its actual output 
in the generation and transmission of knowledge.
The inability to manage contradictory functions within the 
same system has led a number of countries to concentrate their 
efforts in a few technical universities (many of them of new 
creation), while leaving much of the existing university system to 
its own decomposition. This can be a short-term solution for the 
training of some technical personnel in certain specialities, but it 
will hardly respond to the needs of the scientific university. One of 
the key elements in the development of the universities as centres 
of discovery and innovation is precisely the cross-fertilisation 
between different disciplines (including the humanities), 
together with their detachment vis-á-vis the immediate needs 
of the economy. Without the self-determination of the scientific 
community in the pursuit of the goals of scientific research, there 
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will be no discovery. There is certainly a major need for the linkage 
between science, technology and industrial applications. But it is 
only possible to apply the science that exists. And there will only 
be scientific discovery, and connection with the world centres of 
scientific discovery, if universities are complete systems, bringing 
together technical training, scientific research and humanistic 
education, since the human spirit cannot be piecemealed to obtain 
only the precise technical skills required for enhancing the quality 
of regional crops. Thus, the refuge of the productive functions of 
the university system in a few, secluded technical schools can only 
be a temporary measure to rebuild a complete higher education 
system on the basis of additional resources, better management 
and adequate connections with the world’s scientific centres, in 
respect of the identity of each culture.
Universities in the Third World are making dramatic progress 
in quantitative terms but are still unable by and large to perform 
their developmental function. Even university systems with great 
scientific excellence, such as the Indian or Chinese university systems, 
are falling behind those systems that have been able to manage the 
interaction between science, technology, economy and society. The 
ideological and political origins of most Third World universities 
cannot be ignored but should not be permitted to suffocate the 
necessary evolution of the university toward its central role in 
modernisation and development. If Third World countries are also 
to enter the Information Age and reject an increasingly marginal 
role in the world system, development policies must include the 
impulse and transformation of higher education systems as a key 
element of the new historical project.
If the substantial enhancement of university systems is critical 
for the development process in the new world economy, and if 
most countries are unable to mobilise the necessary resources 
to that end, it follows that the new frontier of international aid 
passes through the territory of higher education. However, the 
effectiveness of such aid will be conditioned by the ability to 
design policies that take into account the specificity of universities 
as institutions, and are able at the same time to link the science 
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and training functions closely with the needs and goals of the 
economy and society.
It would seem that in most countries, university systems 
overwhelmed by numbers and handicapped by lack of resources 
and excessive ideologisation cannot be restructured in their totality 
in the short term. Thus, this imposes the notion of selective aid, 
either concentrating resources in the best of the existing academic 
centres and/or creating new universities supported by national 
governments, private firms and international institutions. Yet, in 
both cases it is crucial that universities are conceived as complete 
academic centres of learning and research, with all levels of 
training (undergraduate and graduate, including doctorate) and 
with as many areas of study as possible, certainly mixing science, 
technology, humanities, social sciences and professional schools. 
The cross-fertilisation between different areas of specialisation, 
with flexible programmes that emphasise the capacity of students to 
think, find the necessary information, and be able to reprogramme 
themselves in the future seems to be the most effective pedagogic 
formula according to most experts of education who are open 
to the new characteristics of technology and management in the 
advanced economy. At the same time, the co-existence of different 
levels of training (graduate and undergraduate) makes possible 
the interaction between advanced students dedicating themselves 
to research and teaching, and professionally oriented students, 
future skilled workers, who will receive some of their training 
from innovation-oriented teachers, able to open up their horizons 
beyond the current state of specialised knowledge.
The new Third World universities must also emphasise research, 
both basic and applied, since this will become the necessary ground 
for the upgrading of the country’s productive system. Research 
must be connected both to the world’s scientific networks and to 
the specific needs and productive structure of the country. This 
probably requires the existence of specialised organisations that 
must be part of the university system, organising both connections 
toward the world and toward the economic structure of the 
country (information centres, international exchange programmes, 
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bureaus of technology transfer, bureaus of industrial or agricultural 
extension, university-enterprise networks, etc.).
Institutional reforms of universities, or the creation of new 
universities, should be undertaken under co-operative agreements 
between international institutions (such as the United Nations or 
the World Bank) and national governments of the host country, 
with the support and participation of private firms interested 
in the upgrading of the technological basis of countries or 
world regions. They should simultaneously foster institutional 
innovation (the setting up of new institutions or the reform of 
the existing ones to make them able to manage the contradictory 
requirements of various university functions), and provide the 
necessary resources for the upgrading of the system. Foremost 
among the needed resources is the human capital represented 
by faculty and researchers of top quality, fully integrated in the 
world’s scientific and technological networks. While in the long 
term the new Third World universities should be able to compete 
for resources in the open world market, as well as generating 
their own high-quality academic personnel, in the coming years 
the sudden improvement in the quality of the universities will 
probably have to come from a combination of several policies:
• The training or retraining of young faculty and doctoral 
students in centres of excellence of advanced countries, after 
taking the necessary measures to provide them with the 
scientific and professional conditions to receive them in their 
home countries after their training period.
• The recruitment of nationals of Third World countries 
established in the universities of advanced societies, offering 
them equal or better conditions of work than the ones 
they enjoy in the universities where they are employed. Aid 
programmes should target specific individuals and provide 
the necessary support for endowed chairs and research centres 
in areas of priority.
• The temporary use of visiting foreign faculty in strategic fields 
of research under strictly planned conditions, conducive to the 
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formation of a research group in the Third World university, 
and to the continuation of the linkage between the newly 
established group and the visiting faculty once they return to 
the centre of excellence from where they were recruited. In 
other words, the critical matter here is to use visiting faculty 
as priming devices for the setting up of linkages between less 
developed and more developed university centres.
• The use of talent existing in the private firms and public 
sector of Third World countries, as adjunct professors able to 
provide their experience and knowledge to a university world 
that had been generally ignored because of the low social and 
economic status of the university system.
• The establishment of joint research centres and training 
programmes between technologically advanced private firms 
(either national or multinational) and national universities 
supported by international organisations. These mutually 
beneficial agreements, of which there are already numerous 
examples, should be integrated in a broader programme of 
institution building, instead of being kept, as is generally the 
case, under the close control of the participant corporation.
Once the two basic elements of a good university are established, 
that is, a proper institutional setting and high quality faculty, 
material resources in terms of equipment and physical plant can 
be provided without being wasted. Only after such infrastructure 
exists, can recruitment of students begin and the necessary funds 
for fellowships and tuition be facilitated.
It is obvious that such programmes of multilateral investment 
in higher education are expensive and will only yield substantial 
results in the medium term, at the earliest in a ten-year period. It is 
also true that such is the case for most development programmes 
investing in infrastructure. The key issue is to understand that the 
most important infrastructure in the economy of our age is the 
human brain and the collective capacity of a given society to link 
up all its brains with the brains of the world.
Still, it is an expensive programme that, given the permanent 
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limit of scarce resources, will have to concentrate in some centres 
of higher education that operate, at the same time, as models for 
other systems, and as the providers of informational inputs for 
entire regions of the world. Some countries are large enough to 
receive aid directly to their existing national institutions, from 
which large numbers of people will benefit and major natural and 
industrial resources will be generated (China, India, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, Brazil and Mexico).
In other instances, it will probably be advisable to build 
regional international universities (such as the University of 
Central America, the South East Asian Institute of Technology, 
the West African International University) that will concentrate 
financial, technological and human resources in a few centres 
of excellence, able to generate world-class research and training 
in a few years. However, the experience of several international 
university centres (in some of which this author has been a 
faculty member) shows the absolute need to anchor international 
universities in the national universities of the region, instead of 
bypassing them. It is the essential condition to be truly useful 
to the economies and institutions of each country, instead of 
creating a pool of graduates that generally dissolve themselves 
in the international networks or become marginal in their own 
countries upon their return. A possible solution to the problems 
I have mentioned could be the absorption of high-quality 
faculty members back into the national universities of their 
own countries, after they have spent a limited time (five years 
for instance) in joint centres, or regional universities, formed by 
association between the universities of the countries in the region. 
Thus, the joint centre could become an element of integration 
and cross-fertilisation between the various national universities, 
selecting the best students, and being formed by faculty of the 
national universities on a rotating basis.
In any case, specific organisational forms can be found if 
the basic principle is assumed: it is necessary to concentrate 
international and national resources in a few centres (either in large 
countries or in regional groupings of countries) that will operate 
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in direct connection with the development needs of their societies 
and economies. International aid (both public and private) should 
be channelled through these institutions, with strict control over 
the proper use of the funds in respect of the national sovereignty 
and cultural identity of the countries involved.
While it is relatively easy to agree on the importance of 
improving higher education for the development of the Third 
World, the question arises of who could be interested in supporting 
such a major undertaking and why countries or firms would be 
ready to assume the substantial economic cost and political effort 
required for such a new form of development policy.
At the turn of the millennium, humankind could envisage a 
bright future after the end of the Cold War and the demise of 
the Communist threat, counting on the development process 
that is well engaged in most of Asia, and expecting the current 
technological revolution to yield its promises, as yet unfulfilled, 
of a dramatic enhancement in economic productivity. We seem 
indeed to be on the edge of not the end, but of the beginning 
of history, if by history we understand the opportunity for 
the human species to fully develop its biological and cultural 
capacities.
Yet, at the same time there are substantial pitfalls in our social 
organisation, if we consider the extent of economic inequality and 
political oppression at the world level and the lack of harmony 
between economic growth and ecological conservation. Since 
most of these evils take root in the context of poverty and under-
development prevailing in large areas of what is still called the 
Third World, it would seem that the construction of a more stable, 
more promising international order in the aftermath of the Cold 
War requires the multilateral tackling of the development process 
on a planetary basis. Advanced countries, and their private firms, 
cannot thrive in a shrunken planet, concentrating their technology 
and their resources on a diminishing segment of humankind. And 
this is for several fundamental reasons:
• Morally, our model of society will be judged by our children 
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by its capacity to look beyond the immediate self-interest of 
each one of its individual members.
• Functionally, the growing deterioration of natural resources 
and collective public health, directly linked to poverty and 
mass desperation, will affect the whole of humankind: the 
Peruvian cholera epidemic is only the beginning of what 
could be a return to the medieval plagues if living conditions 
are not improved in the sprawling shanty towns of the Third 
World.
• Politically, widespread misery and functional marginality 
for countries and regions in the midst of a world marked by 
economic affluence and technological miracles, transmitted 
by the electronic media, will feed ideological fundamentalism, 
fanaticism and terrorism, as forms of negation by the excluded 
against the exclusionary practices of the dominant countries.
• Economically, the potential gap between the fast rate of 
technological innovation and the slower growth of markets can 
only be solved in the long term by including new markets in the 
world economy – new people with new needs to be satisfied. 
Both the former Second World and the Third World have to 
be brought into a unified, dynamic world economy, in which 
today’s aid is in fact the investment for tomorrow, in a process 
similar to the mutual benefits brought to the United States and 
Western European economies by the Marshall Plan after World 
War II. A much broader Marshall Plan, multilaterally financed 
and controlled on a planetary scale, is necessary to integrate 
the whole of humankind in the development process, thus 
ensuring material progress and social stability for decades to 
come. The development of the Third World is in the economic 
self-interest of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries and their corporations. 
Now, if we take seriously the analyses pointing toward the 
formation of a new economy, in which the ability to generate 
and process information is a key to productivity, it will not 
be possible to integrate Third World countries in a dynamic 
world economy without creating the necessary infrastructure 
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in higher education. Because research and education policies 
take time to bear their splendid fruits, such policies must be 
placed at the forefront of international aid at the present time, 
when the seeds of a new world order are being sown.
Notes
This paper formed part of a larger report ‘The University System: 
Engine of development in the new world economy’, presented at 
a World Bank Seminar on Higher Education and Development 
held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 1991 (Castells 1991). The 
paper as it appears in this volume, was first published in 2001 as 
‘Universities as Dynamic Systems of Contradictory Functions’ in 
the book Challenges of Globalisation: South African debates with 




The role of universities in development, the economy  
and society
Manuel Castells
If we take seriously the notion that we live in a global knowledge 
economy and in a society based on processing information – 
as universities primarily are – then the quality, effectiveness 
and relevance of the university system will be directly related 
to the ability of people, society and institutions to develop. In 
the context of a technological revolution and of a revolution in 
communication, the university becomes a central actor of scientific 
and technological change, but also of other dimensions: of the 
capacity to train a labour force adequate to the new conditions of 
production and management. Universities also become the critical 
source of the equalisation of chances and democratisation of 
society by making possible equal opportunities for people. This is 
not only a contribution to economic growth, it is a contribution to 
social equality or, at least, lesser inequality. The university’s ability 
to develop new cultures is an additional factor: that is, to be the 
source of cultural renewal and cultural innovation linked to the 
new forms of living we are entering. Finally, the university has also 
been dramatically affected by technological change itself. As an 
institution that processes information, its own information and 
communication technologies are deeply affecting the functioning 
and the culture of the university, sometimes without the full 
knowledge of what is happening and without controlling these 
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processes. Yet, in spite of all these challenges, possibilities and 
opportunities for the university system, in many cases universities 
continue to be corporatist and bureaucratic, defending their own 
interests – particularly in terms of the professors – and extremely 
rigid in their functioning in terms of their administration.
To try to understand the processes of change, I will take a 
wide perspective of the different types of universities that have 
appeared throughout history, and that combine in our current 
experience. It is useful to see the universities as fulfilling different 
functions which are accentuated in some universities at some 
moments of history, but that, to some extent, constantly combine 
and re-combine, and that depend on the emphasis on one or the 
other function. Hence my notion of the university system – not 
just universities – because different units serve different functions 
and the whole system has to combine these different functions.
Historically, universities started largely as producers of values 
and social legitimation. All the major universities in the world 
started as schools of theology: Bologna, the first in Europe, and 
then Cambridge, Oxford, Harvard, Salamanca, the Sorbonne 
and so on. As theological schools, they were producers of values 
and social legitimation. Other non-religious universities played a 
similar role in producing, for instance, imperial values in the case 
of some major universities, justifying domination and Western 
superiority in the colonial world.
The second function, and in historical terms equally as 
important as the production of values, was the selection of the 
elite and the establishment of a stratification in society, making 
sure that the elites would go through the selection functions in 
some of these universities. This function is extremely important 
both then and now. The Ivy League institutions in the United 
States, or the grandes écoles in France, or Cambridge and Oxford 
in England, are somewhat better than other universities, but not 
so much better as to account for the fact that 90% of the elites 
that govern business and the polity come from these universities. 
The selection of elites is therefore extremely important, more so 
than the other functions.
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Then the third function, also in historical sequence, was 
the training of the labour force. This saw the emergence of the 
professional university – particularly important were the schools 
of medicine, law and engineering. Engineering schools were 
critical for the development of industrialisation. Examples include 
the School of Lausanne (one of the top engineering schools in 
Europe), Caltech as a pure engineering university in the US, and 
Imperial College to some extent in the UK.
There is another type of university which is not among those 
already mentioned, namely the science university. This is the 
university in which the primary function and emphasis is on the 
production of knowledge, of scientific knowledge. This is a very 
late invention that took root in the German universities of the 
second half of the 19th century. Humboldt was the first to assume 
that the role of science production was the primary function of the 
university. This idea was only taken up in the United States much 
later. The first university to copy the German model was Johns 
Hopkins – not Harvard or MIT. In the United States, universities 
that were the so-called Land Grant public universities also 
developed as science-based universities but with applications into 
society; for instance, Berkeley started as an agricultural school and 
Michigan as a mining university. The fourth function is therefore 
science – science specifically to develop particular industries that 
were very important for the country.
Fifth then, in historical sequence, are the ‘generalist’ 
universities, universities that came to elevate the education level 
of the population at large, bringing in to the universities at least 
20–25% of the propertied classes. These were the universities that 
developed in France, Italy, Spain and Latin America after World 
War II, and then in Africa after their independence. ‘Everybody 
should be able to go to university’ was the thinking, and it was 
important to keep the other functions in relatively separate 
institutions, so as not to be overwhelmed by mass education. 
Each country developed systems in which the elite would be 
formed differently and in which science would be produced 
differently. In the case of Europe, they separated the research 
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centres from the universities to create national research centres, 
and so on. This generalist type of university is what I call the 
mass teaching university: not to provide training but to provide 
degrees, with degrees granting access to the labour market and 
allowing graduates to be trained on the job.
The final function is what I call the entrepreneurial universities. 
These universities focus on innovation and the connection 
between the world of business and that of science and technology. 
The classic example of this type is Stanford, which deliberately 
organised itself to be a great scientific university while at the 
same time connecting constantly to the business world. MIT also 
moved decisively in this direction, as have many other universities 
in the world – in Singapore, most notably. The notion is an 
interaction, a very close interaction, between excelling in science 
and technology, and at the same time being able to develop an 
entrepreneurial system.
All of these functions are combined in different ways 
throughout the entire university system; one of the key issues is 
how to articulate these different functions without downplaying 
one or the other. For instance, it is obvious that not every 
university can be a research university. But at the same time, all 
universities have to have access to the research centres that exist 
in the university system for specific purposes, and they may 
develop a small nuclei of research that is, on the one hand, linked 
to the needs of society and the economy and, on the other, fed 
by the networks of research that can be constructed in the entire 
university system. Moreover, because we are in a global economy 
and in a global research system the notion of universities being 
stand-alone, major research centres is gone. The critical thing is to 
be in the networks of global production of knowledge, of research 
and innovation. For that, what you need is not to be the best or 
even the best in every aspect. You need to have a ticket to enter 
one of the networks; you have to provide something that is not 
necessarily the best in the world but is interesting enough that 
all the other participants in the global research network of one 
particular field want you to be in the network. For this, of course, 
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the internet is crucial. You don’t necessarily have to go to other 
research centres; you can spread your results, connect and work in 
a global network of research without necessarily having to spend 
every two years in another country.
In the current condition of the global knowledge economy, 
knowledge production and technological innovation become the 
most important productive forces. Therefore, without at least 
some level of a national research system composed of universities, 
the private sector and public research centres, no country can 
really participate in the global knowledge economy.
Resources are not forever. What does endure are people with 
needs, and if you have and develop talented people, you then have 
the most important resource in the form of the human mind. 
There are endless examples of how betting on the human mind 
has been decisive for the development of countries. The East Asian 
countries that were extremely poor after World War II, and are 
now ‘tigers’, all have one thing in common: a very good education 
system at all levels that is not only based on the traditional value 
of education, but also on government investment in the quality 
and quantity of education, and then later based on investment 
by companies and private universities. Korea, Taiwan, Singapore 
and Hong Kong all have great education systems and very good 
university systems precisely because they prioritised education. 
There is a direct correlation between the capacity to invest in 
education and universities at the level of economic growth as well 
as human development, which is fundamental.
In addition, of course, universities have a major role in 
producing a quality labour force, not only in knowledge but also in 
terms of the quality of labour. In our type of economy and society, 
the key quality of the labour force depends on its education, and 
the labour force’s education depends on the educators; in other 
words, the quality depends on the educators.
The educators are those who have to be trained by the 
universities of quality; without that – even if we build schools, 
even with laptops for every child – if there are no good teachers, 
there can be no good education. And that requires all kinds of 
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things, including the working conditions of the teachers. We 
often talk about Finland as an exemplary case. What is the most 
important thing about Finland? It is the quality of the education 
system and how well teachers are paid and respected in society. 
This factor starts with being well trained at university level. 
Moreover, the type of training that we need these days is what 
I call ‘learning to learn’, which is the constant re-programming 
of skills in a constantly changing economic, technological and 
socio-cultural environment. All the information is on the 
internet – if you know how to look for it and what to do with 
it. We no longer have to implant knowledge in young people’s 
minds that will quickly become obsolete. Therefore, their ability 
to constantly recycle knowledge and skills requires two things: 
first, that education is basically creating what I call the ‘self-
programmable ability’ of everybody to change in many different 
directions all through their professional lives; and, second, 
retraining throughout the life cycle which can only be done in 
one way – via distance education through the internet, which can 
be of high quality and not necessarily at lower costs because it is 
expensive to do it well. 
Therefore, the role of distance education becomes critical 
because it allows two things: first, to constantly ‘recycle’ people 
all through their professional lives; and, second, to immediately 
teach the professionals who train the nurses, the rural doctors, 
the teachers. The notion that we have to teach children so well 
that, in 25 years’ time, we will have a qualified labour force is 
self-defeating.
Developing countries have to leap-frog dramatically, and you 
can only leap-frog in education by using virtual education to 
teach those who are already in their jobs. In this respect, South 
Africa has great potential because of the University of South Africa 
(Unisa) and other institutions. However, their internet teaching 
is not very  advanced. Internet teaching is the only way forward; 
other ways are inefficient and burdensome, and ultimately result 
in an inferior level of education, and there’s no reason why it 
should be like this.
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Another possible function of the university is, in our current 
context, the production and consolidation of values – ethical and 
personal values – and the formation of flexible personalities. What 
is meant by flexible personalities? We live in a constantly changing 
world, accelerating change. We need to develop pedagogic models 
that don’t give precise instructions on how to behave in life, but 
instead provide people with the capacity to adeptly reorganise 
their lives in response to the incessant transformation of the living 
environment. At the same time, flexible personalities are anchored 
in certain values so that they don’t fall apart. Students need to be 
trained to have a few, fixed values – don’t abuse others, don’t be 
greedy, etc. – not a general civic education system. We have to be 
the role models and demonstrate values by setting an example. 
In short, all that is required are a set of values and at the same 
time flexible personalities – that is the ideal combination. This 
is a fundamental function of the university which is usually not 
taken seriously by any university that I know of, although some 
are starting to think about it – particularly in business schools that 
have realised that without ethics in business, you end up doing 
bad business that collapses financial markets.
Universities increasingly emphasise interdisciplinarity. 
This is a bad word in many academic circles, and yet this is 
what our economy, our science and our technologies demand 
these days. Everybody talks about bio-informatics and new 
materials – disciplines on the borders of traditional disciplines. 
What makes interdisciplinarity so obvious and yet so difficult? 
Disciplines are like peace treaties between warring factions, so 
delicate that departments and disciplines cannot be changed at 
will. Interdisciplinarity is only practised in some disciplines, for 
instance, in communications, or in city and regional planning. 
I always end up in these disciplines simply because I feel freer; 
I don’t have to demonstrate whether I am a sociologist or an 
economist or a political scientist. But try to recruit a political 
scientist in a sociology department. It is therefore essential 
that interdisciplinarity is promoted by the university itself. 
The University of Southern California has a policy to reward 
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interdisciplinarity: if you are interdisciplinary, you get a higher 
salary. There is also a special chair for interdisciplinary academics. 
In other words, interdisciplinarity is another critical concern.
Then there is the notion of public and private universities: 
experience shows that this is not the most relevant matter 
responsible for efficiency in the university. There are great public 
universities in the world – Berkeley, Michigan, Cambridge, 
Oxford. In Europe all the universities are public; only some 
strange, marginal universities are private. In the United States 
there is no real difference in quality. There is Stanford, but there 
is also Berkeley; there is Harvard, but there is also the University 
of Michigan; there is Wisconsin – all equally good. The private 
institutions might be more influential in selecting elites, but they 
are not better. The difference lies in how bureaucratic a university 
is, how flexible it is, how managerial it is. Private universities 
which are bureaucratic, and I will not name names, are in fact 
not competitive. Public universities that are managed efficiently, 
as was the case at the University of California at one time, can be 
extremely competitive. How universities are managed is critical. 
Furthermore, whether a university in legal terms is public or 
private is not as essential as the university being geared towards 
the public interest. Institutions may be private but still operate in 
the public interest. Universities that don’t operate in the public 
interest are businesses, and pay the price for it, in taxation and 
many other ways. Universities can be private or public but work 
towards the public interest, accessing both government and 
private funds, but on this basis.
Finally, there is the notion of the technological transformation 
of the university – which has to be tackled seriously. We are 
already in a hybrid system; we are not in either a face-to-face 
or a virtual university. Face-to-face universities are partly virtual 
because of the internet – we email our students, we are constantly 
connected. But all this is happening without any real policy, 
with no transformation of the university’s pedagogic method. 
Introducing e-learning – not just distance learning – as a critical 
element in the learning environment at face-to-face universities is 
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as essential as using it in virtual universities. All this depends on 
the university’s capacity to maintain its autonomy. Universities 
are the last space of freedom, relatively, in society and it is essential 
to preserve that space not only for scientific but also for social and 
political reasons. At the same time, we have to earn this autonomy 
and this freedom every day and use it in the public interest, not in 
the defence of our privileges. If we combine these two things, we 
can continue the tradition that started a thousand years ago. If we 
don’t, pressure from society will destroy the university as a space 
for reflection and innovation.
Note
This chapter is an edited transcript of a lecture delivered by Manuel 
Castells at the University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South 




Rethinking development in the global information age
Manuel Castells
The topic of my lecture today came about when I was trying to 
rethink development on the basis of a number of empirical studies, 
interacting with different conceptions and different approaches 
to development. I try to cut across the distinction between 
theory and empirical research in society because I always have 
in mind what this means in terms of policy, politics and change. 
This is based, on the one hand, on some reflection informed by 
theoretical frameworks and, on the other, by observation, and 
making sure the observation modifies the theory. I do this because 
my principle is that when theory conflicts with observation, you 
don’t throw away the observation: you throw away the theory. We 
did in fact ‘throw away’ a number of theories.
What I am going to present is not the surviving theories but the 
theoretical approaches and insights we reached after the process of 
filtering what we were thinking on the basis of observing.
We know that ‘development’ has multiple meanings. This is 
important: it’s not just a terminological debate. Words matter. 
The world has been differentiating between ‘developed’ and 
‘underdeveloped’ and ‘developing’ for a long time; and no one 
knows exactly what these terms mean anymore.
Sometimes countries, like Singapore, still argue that they 
should be considered developing because that would mean 
United Nations subsidies. In fact, these categories don’t work, and 
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certainly don’t work in a world in which everything is connected 
through networks which, as we know, both include and exclude. 
Everything is connected but much is disconnected. Therefore the 
‘developing’ and ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘developed’ depends on 
where you are: in which neighbourhood, at which time and how 
and why. That is a completely different notion to the one that 
created this distinction between what used to be the ‘developed’, 
meaning the West, and ‘underdeveloped’, meaning the rest, the 
huge majority of the world, with Japan being the exception. 
People kept saying, ‘They are developed, but they are not Western’ 
until someone decided they are actually Western because they use 
technology. Frankly, intellectually and epistemologically speaking, 
all these categories have largely been dominated by Eurocentrism 
and colonialism, justifying domination through the notions of 
civilised and uncivilised, and so on.
Consequently, we decided to cut through this to see what is 
actually happening in the world. My analysis here will try to go 
beyond the usual approaches, which are either descriptive (these 
are the processes of development), analytical (how this can be 
understood), normative (that which development should be), or 
apparently technical (which in fact says, ‘No, no, no, we’re not 
doing philosophy or ideology here; we are just technical: economic 
growth or social development’). In fact, values – fundamental 
values – are all included in the measures of calculation: they are 
embedded. Thus the way we calculate already conveys a certain 
number of values and assumptions.
To start with, I provide my own definition of development, 
which I posit as ideologically free in the sense that it can be filled 
in with different ideologies, and therefore it is not my ideology: 
you all can insert your ideology and it works. It is also open-ended 
in terms of content. I define development as the self-defined 
process – self is important – by which humans, as a collective, 
enhance their well-being by creating the structural conditions for 
the expanded reproduction of the process of development itself, 
so enhancing their well-being and, at the same time, creating the 
structural conditions for this process to go on.
69
CHAPTER 5 Castells: Rethinking development in the global information age
However, the values that inform such development goals 
– the Millennium Development Goals, for instance – can be 
very different. For instance, for some, economic growth and 
accumulation of material wealth as measured by GDP is the 
critical thing: Let’s simplify life; this is development, and then 
the rest will follow. What was ultimately implied, when it was 
not blatantly ideological, were Western values; and these so-called 
Western values were Anglo-Saxon and northern European, and 
would certainly not include Italy, Spain or Portugal. So, for some, 
this is enough: measure development as GDP. But we know that 
GDP is a completely arbitrary measure that was, historically, a 
provisional statistical measure that Simon Kuznets developed in 
1938 in the United States simply to measure how the economy 
was doing during the Depression. It was a Prohibition artefact, 
abandoned later on for more sophisticated measures. But people 
say, ‘We have one way to measure everything all together’, without 
considering the price, the floatation of prices or other forms of 
value. Since then, GDP has become a political ‘god’ in the world. 
Any problem you have, you increase the GDP, then you are okay 
and the rest is subjective. But is the GDP objective? No. GDP is 
a statistical measure that is historically situated, which has been 
refined and reformed many, many times to the point that we now 
don’t know exactly what the definition of GDP is, or on which 
calculations it is based.
For instance, we were talking earlier with a group of African 
development scholars about the notion that last year Nigeria 
suddenly became the largest economy in Africa, overtaking South 
Africa, because new calculations came out. New calculations from 
where, by whom and under which conditions? I am sure that there 
are all kinds of statistical warfare going on about this in terms of 
national pride, without measuring how much personal, human 
and ecological disaster is involved in this notion of overtaking 
South Africa with a new measure of GDP. 
For others, human well-being is development. But what is 
human well-being? This point normally starts the discussion. For yet 
others, you cannot talk about development without sustainability. 
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But then, what is sustainability? One counter-argument is, ‘Do 
birds or animals have more rights than poor people, who actually 
have to eat?’ What are the different dimensions of sustainability? 
Again, it is subjective: it is when people consider, as I do, that 
the conservation of the liveability of the species on the planet is 
a fundamental value – more important than economic growth – 
that sustainable development becomes the most important aspect 
of development. (By the way, I always say the liveability of the 
‘human species’, not the ‘planet’. We are not saving the planet. 
The planet will be okay without us. It will in fact be much better 
without us. What we are defending is ourselves on the planet, not 
the actual planet.) 
Others directly express the values behind the goals of 
development, and they just say ‘development’. Amartya Sen and 
others focus on human dignity. Development is human dignity: 
dignity is development. 
I will try to cover each one of these categories and assumptions. 
My purpose being analytical, I will propose a typology of 
meanings of development that, together, could shed some light 
on strategies and policies to improve the well-being of humans 
and their relationship to our environment, which is the only thing 
that ultimately really matters.
Let’s take economic growth defined, as we said, as GDP. 
There is a whole history of more refined calculations of GDP: 
more refined but more difficult because when you start including 
the issue of productivity and how to measure it, and the issue of 
value, then how do you start measuring services, and what kind of 
services do you measure, under what conditions? Do we include 
the value that global financial markets assign to companies and 
to production in the value that we create? These values assigned 
by global financial markets are actually very important because 
the value of a company depends on that financial valuation. But 
this financial valuation depends, as Paul Volcker has repeatedly 
pointed out, on perception. It is not that there is reality and then 
the perception: perception is the reality.
So, how do we include financial valuation in the calculation 
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of GDP? This has a very concrete impact on the amount of 
wealth that the society generates. For instance, in the financial 
crisis of 2008, two thirds of the wealth in the world was wiped 
out; it disappeared. How did it disappear? It disappeared from 
the financial calculations. But at the same time, the financial 
calculations were determining the way the economy was 
performing. So, if you have a company and suddenly you are 
completely devalued and you cannot borrow against the value of 
the company, then that is a very real effect. But what happens to 
the GDP depends on perception, and on the calculation of the 
GDP. In other words, what appears to be a direct, no-problem 
approach to defining development – for example, let’s just measure 
material wealth – becomes problematic the moment you actually 
start doing it, when all kinds of methodological, theoretical and 
statistical calculations arise as problems. 
At one point, some well-intentioned United Nations experts 
started to say, ‘Well, GDP does not really measure a number of 
other dimensions, such as quality of life, an area that depends on 
basically public goods like health, education, subsistence services, 
urban infrastructure, etc.’ All these aspects were conceptualised 
as human development. The Human Development Index was 
basically constructed to include all these public goods and the 
provision of these public goods. People then even said, ‘Well, why 
don’t we do something even more sophisticated that includes the 
actual happiness of people, not just their well-being?’ Bhutan 
created the Gross National Happiness Index in 1972. Well, why 
not? If it is human development, what about human happiness? 
Is that development or not development? And it sounds terrific, 
except how is it actually calculated? The Bhutan Happiness Index 
is actually a survey that asks people everywhere in the country 
how they feel. Thus it is not too different from public opinion 
polls on the relationship of poverty to government policies. And 
then along the way, they added a few other things. I like this idea 
that you have to measure something else.
The fact remains, however, that the fundamental approach 
to human development in terms of the Northern development 
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approach depends on measurability. Everything that we can 
measure in terms of economic growth is regarded as development; 
and then that which we cannot measure, but which is still 
important – like education – is human development.
The key element in my perspective is that the terms define some 
relationship between economic growth and human development, 
particularly under the conditions in which the economic growth 
is largely dependent on productivity growth generated by a 
much more productive aggregate production function (I will 
come back to this later). This means not only the capacity to 
introduce information and knowledge into production, but also 
the capacity to operate a much more effective feedback loop 
between economic growth and human development. The notion 
that we are in an information and knowledge economy can be 
absolutely misleading. Not because information and knowledge 
are not important: they have always been important. There has 
been no economy and no society in the world in which wealth 
and power don’t depend on information and knowledge. They 
have always been absolutely critical factors for wealth generation 
and power generation. What has changed is something called the 
information and communication technology (ICT) revolution, 
meaning microelectronics-based ICTs, with all their consequences: 
the ability to create organisational forms; the infrastructure and 
the rapidity of processing information, transforming it into 
knowledge; and using these transformations into knowledge 
to make actual changes in the production system. That is the 
difference.
How one actually processes better information is not just 
about technology. Technology is what affords the possibility 
of this type of effective processing. The important thing is that 
the human mind – where the knowledge is embodied – has to 
be capable of managing this capacity to process information, 
generate knowledge and implement it in different dimensions of 
human activity. Ultimately, all of these goals influence the ability 
of society not just to generate technology for social productivity, 
but to generate what people call human capital. I don’t like the 
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term but let’s say it refers to human subjects able to further 
their understanding and their adaptation of information and 
knowledge in every domain of human activity. This is ultimately 
about the quality of human labour in the broadest sense: not only 
the worker but the entire society. This certainly entails education, 
but all kinds of education, not just higher education, because if 
we have people in higher education who are uneducated at the 
primary and secondary level, we don’t really have education. 
And it isn’t just about education but also health, because if we 
are completely neurotic and sick, we will not be able to process 
anything even if we are highly educated. Thus higher education 
requires health: not personal health with your doctor; it is also 
about the environment. We have epidemics regardless of how 
good your health is in your individual existence. The issue is 
how this impacts the overall quality of humans as producers and 
creators of everything. 
However, this is not just about the actual embodiment in 
human labour of the ability to generate and produce. It is also 
about the social conditions and the conditions of stability. We 
use all of this to generate endless wars and terrors between us. 
The intelligence and the information that we have embodied in 
our capacity to create becomes at the same time a capacity to 
destroy. The moment you say that information development is at 
the source of enhanced productivity, and enhanced productivity 
comes from the interaction and the feedback loop between actual 
material production and the conditions of existence that become 
a key element in the productivity of this material production, the 
moment you say that, you have to start including all kinds of 
elements which have a synergistic relationship between material 
production and the conditions of material production, which are, 
at the same time, the well-being of society. This is what I call 
informational development.
This particular connection and this model of information 
development is the most effective model for generating productivity 
and competitiveness. This is something that I developed years ago 
and that we tried to test. It was originally based on my empirical 
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analysis of two very different contexts in South East Asia, which 
was really about this feedback loop between the public sector 
that was providing good quality labour and stability, and then 
an economic sector that was extremely competitive at the global 
level. My book on the comparative development of Hong Kong 
and Singapore and my work on Finland, captured in the book I 
did with Pekka Himanen, entitled The Information Society and the 
Welfare State: The Finnish Model, shows exactly this synergistic 
relationship.
Then there is a fourth dimension of development: sustainable 
development, which includes the capacity to make both economic 
growth and human development compatible with the conservation 
of the liveability of humans in our only home, planet Earth, at the 
micro and macro levels.
And then, finally, there is another dimension of development, 
which is the holistic concept of development. This concept 
is normative. It says what we consider desirable in terms of 
values – such as human rights, animal rights, equality, gender, 
empowerment and gender equality, solidarity and the ability to 
live in a multicultural world through the reciprocal enrichment 
of diverse identities without cancelling any of them out – but 
at the same time moves beyond the exclusive dynamics of 
identities. Peace and democracy: these are encompassed by this 
idea of human dignity that includes and presupposes all the other 
business of development. It actually isn’t a different concept: it 
presupposes all the rest. It’s not descriptive and it’s not analytical: 
it’s normative. In that sense, it means that development must 
increase the quality of life, must be sustainable and must not 
sacrifice human dignity: in fact, economic growth should actually 
support and make possible human dignity. That is the way the 
different elements are interconnected.
I will try to look carefully at each one of these key elements 
and their interactions to see what the conditions are for these 
processes of development or the possible synergistic relationship 
between them. I will end by looking in some detail at what for 
me is the absolutely key element in the whole discussion: the 
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process of implementation of any developmental approach and 
the agency involved in the implementation, because development 
is as good as the agency that enacts development.
Any empirically grounded theoretical and policy discussion 
must be specific to the context in which it operates. And in our 
space/time, this is what we call the global information age. We 
cannot talk about development in general: we are talking about 
the specific conditions within which our world operates today. 
And this is the global information age. The global information age 
is characterised by the process of globalisation. Globalisation is not 
internationalisation and it is not the world economy: these have 
existed for centuries. It is the process by which a given system, be 
it economic or cultural, but mainly economic, operates as a unit 
in real time. This process depends on three new conditions:
• First, the technological infrastructure that allowed this to 
happen. We are a global system because we did not have this 
technological (or ICT) infrastructure before.
• Second, an organisational form – called networking – that 
allows greater efficiency and greater capacity to manage 
everything on a global scale without losing the purpose 
and the efficiency in the process. In the same way that the 
Industrial Revolution created large-scale organisations (vertical 
organisations, big companies, big enterprises), the new forms 
of technology that manage information and communication 
allow the creation of a much more versatile, interactive, 
flexible, adaptable system on the basis of networking.
• And third, an institutional condition: deregulation, involving 
withdrawal from the rules that were anchored in the nation 
state (which, contrary to some theories, have not disappeared).
It is the way in which states operate that opens up the connection 
between different states at the level of the world so that the 
networks can take over and criss-cross the planet, articulating 
activities. So, globalisation is simply the network: it’s a global 
network (or global networks) organising every activity in 
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real time on a planetary scale. In that way, the whole planet is 
interconnected, which means what is valuable for some networks 
is connected; and what is not is disconnected. Therefore we go 
not into First World, Second World, Third World; we go into 
First World, which is everything that is connected everywhere; 
and Fourth World which has no value and is thus disconnected.
The information age refers basically to informationalism, that 
is, to the technological paradigm for our time that is based on 
ICTs. (These technologies are also connected to the biological 
revolution because they allow the processing of information that 
enables us to recombine DNA and therefore to start acting as the 
re-programmers of living matter.)
That is why it is said that information is not what characterises 
our time. Instead, it is our ability to process and apply and develop 
information. I like to refer to one particular study published in 
Science, a great scientific journal. Here is the revolution: in 2002, 
52% of the information (all types of information: measurement, 
understanding and everything else) on the planet was digitised. 
The article calculated that it was 95% in 2007.
The same researcher told me recently, it is now 98%. So the 
large majority of this information is digitised and is accessible 
via the internet and other computer networks. That’s what the 
technological revolution means. Not that there is information: 
it is information that can be recombined, accessed, developed 
and utilised on a global scale. That is just one measure of the 
phenomenon.
What are the key elements that redefine empirically, and 
then conceptually, the five dimensions of development, and 
under which conditions? And what are the conditions of their 
articulation? For this, let me employ empirical observation and 
try to emphasise the fundamental transformations operating in 
the world in each one of these five dimensions in the last ten to 
fifteen years.
First of all, let’s look at productivity growth (which, of 
course, characterises the new economy) linked to information 
development. We have statistical evidence about the relationship, 
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strong networking and human resources, conditions that 
massively increase after a period of productivity, which is the surge 
of economic growth on the basis of ICTs, diffusing information 
and applying knowledge. However, at the same time, we also 
have statistical evidence that the productivity yields have been 
concentrated in the financial sector. And there has been a shift to a 
new form of capitalism, which is global informational capitalism, 
re-utilising capital using precisely these technologies. The same 
technologies that increase productivity in the economy also make 
possible the re-utilisation of capital in every aspect: derivatives, 
options, futures, etc. This ultimately created the major financial 
crisis that exploded in 2008–2010. (That financial crisis was 
complicated and I cannot summarise it here. For those who are 
not satisfied with this summary, I refer you to the book published 
last year by Oxford University Press under my leadership entitled 
Aftermath: The cultures of the economic crisis, in which we show 
the mechanism and then argue that it is the way we conceive the 
economy that led to the virtualisation of capital that then led to 
the financial crash.)
At the same time that this crisis emerged – linked to the 
new interaction between productivity, financial capitalism and 
new technology/other uses of technology – other economic 
dynamics took place in most of the world. That is why I always 
refer to this crisis that we are theoretically living in (in Europe 
and the United States) as the ‘non-global’, global crisis. Because 
at exactly the same time – between 2008 and 2012 – most of 
the world grew more than ever on a sustained scale. There was a 
little bump in 2009 because external markets had to be corrected 
through domestic spending. But fundamentally, all the crises in 
Europe and the United States over all these years, have witnessed 
the emergence of the so-called ‘newly industrialising’ or newly 
developing countries. No one knows what these terms mean. But 
they refer to China, India, Brazil and Indonesia. To a large extent, 
it means most of the world: Latin America has been growing very 
fast; Russia, on the basis of energy and raw materials, has been 
growing; both East and South East Asia have been growing.
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What are the key factors beneath these new development 
processes that have transformed the notion between periphery 
and the network?
Technology is there. There is a perception that China is cheap 
labour. Not at all. China is high technology and relatively cheap 
labour, which is increasing in price. The most valuable company 
in the world now in terms of capitalisation value is a company 
called Alibaba, an e-commerce company in China. It is one of 
the few very large Chinese companies that is not owned by the 
government. Another giant is Huawei, which is multi-sectoral and 
invests in everything (but is a government company). The largest 
computer maker in the world is Lenovo. Among other things, 
they acquired IBM just a year ago. IBM does not manufacture 
computers: we know this. IBM provides services. Most of the 
actual computer makers have disappeared from the Western 
world: their whole value evaporated but we still need computers. 
We need computers in order to sell everything online. And to sell 
everything online, Alibaba has actually started to control eBay.
What are the factors for this growth that includes countries 
previously considered unlikely to be sources of it? Imagine Bolivia 
as being a miracle in the global economy. Bolivia has lithium, 
which is crucial in much of modern microelectronic production 
as well as in medical applications such as antidepressants, which 
are a growing market. Ecuador and Chile are the biggest sources 
of lithium. Again, what are the key elements that have led to the 
emergence of a completely new world, in which the economic 
growth process has been redefined in the last ten years?
First, macro-economic destabilisation. This is not simply 
about controlling public spending. In most of the countries I 
have mentioned – in Latin America, in Asia – public spending 
has increased. It has decreased in Europe and the United States, 
but in Latin America, even social spending has increased. Macro-
economic destabilisation lies in fact in the regulation of capital 
flows: the disruptive effects of free capital flows. Is China globalised? 
Yes and no. It is globalised in terms of the export markets but in 
terms of financial capital, it isn’t. There is a border – China is in 
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the global financial market but the global financial market is not 
in China, and the Chinese have been insulated from the impact of 
the global financial crisis. Consider virtually any country. Brazil, 
for example, manages exchange rates very tightly. After their crisis 
they had in 1999, they decided it would not happen again. And 
most of the Latin American countries have maintained very tight 
financial regulation.
Second, knowledge and information has been important. Most 
of these countries have incorporated the new technological systems 
into their production, not necessarily by having high-tech industries 
but by using high-tech in their industries, and particularly in their 
use of science- and technology-based informational tourism, 
informational agriculture and informational fish farming. Take 
Chile, which is now the economic miracle in Latin America. This 
miracle is not related to the Pinochet free market approach, but to 
the Chilean government’s democratic approach in terms of state-
led competitiveness in a free, open global market. Here are some 
examples. Chile has constitutionally made provision that 2% of 
its copper exports – copper is Chile’s most important export – 
goes into a reserve fund that no one can touch. This reserve fund 
invests in science and R&D, with one exception: if there is an 
earthquake, they can use it for reconstruction. However, the fund 
is mainly a kind of saving fund for the future. What is Chile’s 
main export after copper? Most people would say wine, which is 
a major export, but not the main one. This particular export has 
three times more value (not volume) – salmon. There were no 
salmon in Chile when I started working there 40 years ago. Perhaps 
there were a few in the mountains, but not in real quantities. The 
Chileans went to Norway to study how salmon farming was done, 
and then created a much more efficient, cheaper fresh-salmon 
exporting industry that has overtaken Norway in both the United 
States market, which is the important one, and the Latin American 
market. In Latin America, you eat salmon everywhere, as we do 
everywhere in the world. This salmon, however, is certainly not 
from Norway; it is from Chile.
Besides the companies I have cited, Indian and Indonesian 
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companies have been investing in structured industries practically 
everywhere. I mentioned Chile and salmon, but there are large 
areas of Argentina and Brazil being developed to produce soya 
for the Asian market, using a new business model that they call 
network business. It allows major agricultural producers who don’t 
have land to rent the land, hire workers on a temporary basis, and 
use technology under licence. This all comes together when there 
is an order from China, for example, for a big soya consignment. 
Then they put together all the elements of this expertise; they act 
as the experts; and then they dissolve the network. After that, they 
recreate the network on the basis of another order for export. All 
this is about technology. All this is about communication, but it 
is not communication to produce chips: they produce chips to 
create communication to do their business as they do.
Structured industries have a key role in this new development. 
Structured industries are more important for the new growth in the 
world today than high-tech industries. They are, of course much 
more important than the old production processes, like automobile 
production. I am not even counting the dynamic economy, which 
is the economy of drug trafficking and other illegal activities. 
According to the calculations of the United Nations Centre 
for Crime Prevention, money laundering alone – just money 
laundering within the criminal economy, not even its production 
– makes up about 7% of the world’s GDP, which is more than the 
total earnings of the world’s automobile and electronic industries 
combined. This is now where the big money is going.
As we have seen, the old industrial production system is really 
going downhill from just producing automobiles. Eventually, they 
will unleash the capacity to produce electric cars. China has been 
the key market for the South, but so have India and Indonesia. 
What is happening now is that, on the basis of the extraordinary 
economic dynamism of these new giant economies, the rest of 
the South is developing. This is certainly the case in both Latin 
America and Africa. As you know, China has created a new model 
of growth (let’s not call it development), in which the need to 
absorb the huge amount of energy and raw materials coming from 
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this economic growth of between 10–12% per year (already over 
the past 15 years) is pumping up the structured exports everywhere 
on the planet. Because of this, all the other countries in the world 
are exporting to China, while at the same time China is investing in 
their countries. As an example, Bolivia has signed a major strategic 
agreement to sell China all its lithium production over the next 20 
years; however, it has not yet even started to extract the lithium 
from the mines. As South Africans, you will know about all the 
strategic agreements between China and Mozambique, Angola, 
South Africa (to some extent), and so on.
Higher education and R&D continue to be the central 
factors of production. This is critical; but the need here is not for 
something that has to be in unison everywhere. These countries 
are all tapping into global networks. If they can, they develop 
primary and secondary education but without great quality. They 
proceed with what I call warehousing of children rather than the 
education of children. Their university systems are expanding 
dramatically but not necessarily with great quality. What they 
have is enough knowledge, enough research, to connect to the 
global networks of research and to send students to study in 
overseas institutions, who come back to the country through a 
different model. AnnaLee Saxenian, a colleague at Berkeley, calls 
this model not ‘brain drain’ but ‘brain circulation’. A student goes 
to Stanford from India, Taiwan or Israel, gets a degree and then 
starts a company, and after a few years, has a healthy business. 
In Silicon Valley, 40% of companies now have a CEO who is a 
foreigner, particularly Chinese or Indian. The human capital of the 
world goes to Silicon Valley. But they do not just stay in Silicon 
Valley, but go back to China and set up a company; and then 
they move between China and Silicon Valley, and this sustains the 
network. Then other people come along and do the same thing. 
Thus, this network of high-tech production is not necessarily only 
concentrated in the main centres but is extended throughout the 
networked planet. Basic research is more and more concentrated, 




Of course the dark spot in this flexible model continues to 
be Africa because it is very difficult to set up minimum levels of 
innovation and technological research in most African countries. 
But in Asia and Latin America, it is already happening. However, 
because this network process is as described, the wealth being 
generated is increasingly concentrated in global networks, 
reproducing and enlarging the process of accumulation, but at 
the same time expanding social inequality (measured in income 
and assets).
It is interesting that the most successful book on Amazon in 
the United States has recently been Thomas Piketty’s Capital in 
the Twentieth Century. This shows statistically that this particular 
model is highly dynamic. It is not going to collapse by itself. It is 
increasing wealth at an unprecedented level, but not recycling the 
wealth into the economy, but rather into caches of asset control 
that ultimately creates oligarchs who do not need to do anything 
except accumulate and keep accumulating.
Consequently, we have, on the one hand, a decline in spite of the 
traditional supremacy of the Cold War, and a massive expansion of 
wealth and markets in a large majority of countries (about 75%): 
not wealth for the people, but for the countries that control the 
people. Simultaneously, there is an increasing concentration of 
social and economic problems. Overall, in quantitative terms, 
human development has improved, whether we measure it with 
general education indicators, or with health indicators such as 
infant mortality, mortality, life expectancy, etc. This improvement 
is in spite of recent, well-documented epidemics. But in the world, 
and particularly in the so-called ‘newly developing’ countries, has 
there been a substantial improvement in education, health, basic 
service delivery infrastructure, sewerage, water? Yes. Housing is 
not good, but it is much better in terms of the rate of growth. Is 
there less poverty? Interestingly, there is huge inequality but less 
poverty, when poverty is defined in bureaucratic terms to mean a 
certain level of income according to whichever statistical agency 
is measuring it.
It should be remembered that this is also culturally determined. 
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Fernando Chirino tells me there is no word in Quechuan for 
poverty. The equivalent word, pasha, does not mean a lack of 
money but a lack of family and friends. This is real pasha, and you 
are really in trouble. But having no money is sometimes good, 
sometimes bad. And he reminded me of an anecdote from one 
of his fieldwork studies when he was in Bolivia at the time of the 
Argentinean crisis. He asked a poor Bolivian in the street: ‘So what 
do you think about the world?’ ‘Oh bad, the world is going very 
bad, particularly for Argentina.’ ‘Wait a second, you are much 
poorer than any Argentinean.’ ‘Yes, but they are not used to being 
poor.’ So, the point really is how you perceive poverty, and not 
whether the bureaucrat says, ‘You are poor’ or ‘You are not poor’.
But, with all these provisos, there is still the idea that statistically 
defined poverty has diminished in most areas of the world. In 
1990, taking Latin America as a whole, not just the star countries, 
48.4% of the population lived below the poverty line. In 2013, it 
was 27.9% – a 20 percentage point decline, which occurred at the 
same time as massive demographic growth. 
I am not biased towards communication because I am a 
communications professor. I became a communications professor 
because I considered it to be important. It’s not that I forgot 
about sociology and went into communication. I go after the 
problems rather than finding out how problems come to me. Of 
course, communication is absolutely essential. Every survey in the 
world – our study on communication in Latin America, in Africa 
or in China – showed that communication today is absolutely 
fundamental for people. It is the most important item in poor 
people’s budgets. The data show that, with 7.6 billion people on 
the planet, there are seven billion mobile phone numbers. Not 
devices. Numbers. And numbers mean subscribers. Everybody is 
connected regardless of precisely how – whether good or bad. 
There may be bad quality connections, but, of this seven 
billion, three billion are smart phones. Certainly, some Swedes 
have three smart phones and know how to use them. But in 
Argentina, the rate of mobile phone penetration is 120%. In 
Bogota, it is 95%.
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The point is that there is massive access to communication. We 
have shown statistically and demographically in Latin America 
that it is directly correlated to economic growth, but also to 
poverty reduction. However, all this communication doesn’t do 
anything to improve inequality. On the contrary, it increases 
inequality in society – the more you communicate, the more 
unequal you become. However, poverty is reduced.
Increasingly, there is synergistic feedback between human 
development and growth in productivity. And again, it is not 
just education per se, but the ability to connect educational 
institutions, and to advance the production of goods and services 
throughout the world.
A most interesting case is Costa Rica, a small country of 
4.5 million people which has had democracy since World War II. 
Costa Rica country has been growing steadily, not spectacularly, 
but with one of the steadiest growth rates over the years in Latin 
America. So what are their exports, and based on their exports, 
what is Costa Rica’s export industry? Unless you have direct 
knowledge of this little country, you wouldn’t know that 43% 
of their exports is microelectronics. After that, it is ecotourism, 
yet another informational industry. Ecotourism requires a very 
serious environmental policy. As it happens, 25% of Costa Rican 
territory is national parks, which is a huge value-add to tourism 
in Costa Rica. 
How has this success been possible? First, through pacifism 
(see the chapter by Isadora Chachon [2014] entitled ‘Pacifism, 
Human Development, and the Information Model’). Costa Rica 
took the decision in 1948 to permanently eliminate all armed 
forces, and is the only country in the world with no armed forces, 
despite being situated in one of the most violent regions in the 
world. Costa Rica specialises in diplomacy, and has a whole army 
of diplomats, who are sent everywhere – although it is usually only 
the Nicaraguans who bother them. This has come about through 
a constitutional amendment that decreed that the amount they 
were spending on the military – approximately between 8% and 
10% – should be directed towards education and/or health instead. 
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Thus they created a welfare state, and destroyed the welfare state 
at the same time. They did not have a military coup. (You need 
a military to have a military coup.) Therefore they have stability. 
All the international institutions have a presence in Costa Rica, 
as does every major corporation that wants to do something in 
Central America or the northern part of Latin America. It’s a nice 
country, with peace and stability.
The second reason for their success is human development. 
They created a welfare state with full health coverage and a skilled 
technical labour force that attended universities and technological 
institutes. This fact resulted in microelectronic giant, Intel, 
locating there, establishing the high-tech sector in Costa Rica. 
Many other companies started to arrive in the country and make 
use of local labour, trained at the country’s universities. 
The third observation is, ‘be careful not to be too smart’. Intel 
is leaving Costa Rica for China for this very reason. As pleasant 
as it is to live in Costa Rica, the prospect of being in the middle 
of the Chinese market is more attractive. It remains to be seen if 
Costa Rica – having been able to do the smart thing and attract 
Intel, create clusters of qualified technical labour – can survive 
when Intel goes to China. Being married to a multinational is not 
such a good thing when it moves with the global market. It is a 
clever strategy to enable a process of synergy and development in 
which the basis for technological development is created. But the 
jury is still out on the matter of Costa Rica.
As discussed earlier, human development is working, as shown 
by quantitative indicators. But indicators of quality of life in 
most countries show a massive decline in what I would call the 
subjective conditions of life: violence; fear; metropolitan areas that 
are destructive in terms of health, transportation, pollution, etc. 
If we measure human development with traditional indicators, 
things look wonderful. However, if we measure what people do 
and think about their actual living conditions, we see a different 
situation. Take Brazil. They had a progressive government with 
a distribution policy that halved poverty and drove economic 
growth. They are doing well in terms of economic growth. All 
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the indicators we have mentioned are positive. But the Brazilians, 
starting last year and continuing to this day, protest more and 
more, specifically against their urban conditions – against the fear, 
violence, the housing, transportation, pollution, the aggravated 
respiratory diseases, and so on. My one-line summary is that we 
are improving human development, but moving towards inhuman 
development, which is all these other conditions.
Let me briefly consider the other dimensions, starting with 
sustainable development. The usual indicators are not relevant if 
we take development to mean sustainable development.
Most indicators around the globe are deteriorating. Global issues 
are not being tackled because of disagreements between nations. 
And we always knew that the bottom line for environmentalists 
was whether the whole world followed the same development 
model as the United States. If they did so with the same intensity 
and with the same growth, then the whole world, including the 
States, would grow, and this would be totally unsustainable. We 
are there already. The rest of the world is using the same model 
that the United States traditionally used, and is growing three to 
four times faster. Antarctica is melting.
It was first forecast, and now it is happening. Some people 
say, ‘Who cares about the penguins?’ But we will have to pay 
the consequences: everybody will experience the consequences. 
Science and technology are absolutely capable of controlling 
this process, knowing exactly what is happening and why, and 
measuring and establishing a number of indicators. But given 
the state of global governments, what indicators do science 
and technology apply to environmental degradation? Basically, 
scientific knowledge tells us exactly and precisely how we will 
die, and not how we will be saved, because it is not science and 
technology that can save us: it is policies, it is countries, it is 
people. And in this, we are way behind.
Next, one must consider dignity. On the one hand, there has 
been a rise in global consciousness of the basic dimensions of 
human existence. Take gender equality. In spite of everything, there 
has still been a major improvement in gender equality because of 
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women’s current state of awareness, which is the most important 
thing. It is not the law, it is how women think about themselves.
The protection of children, dealing with a dignified ageing 
process – these are both positive trends. Animal rights: these are 
still contested, but the concept that we are as good as the way 
we treat our animals (or the animals that are not ours) is well 
established. This is a major indicator. Banning torture and illegal 
imprisonment. Although it still happens all the time, in principle 
it shouldn’t, which again is another transformation.
On the other hand, we still have oppressive racial discrimination; 
we still have slavery. Political rights are formalised but not enforced; 
freedom of expression is free until it’s not. Peace abounds but we 
have multiple wars all the time. The banning of the arms trade has 
never happened because the world’s most important powers are 
its biggest arms dealers. Global organised crime is rampant and 
controls entire countries through its institutions; and we know 
exactly where they are and when there are attempts to deal with 
them. And then, we have observed a major rise in racism and 
xenophobia all over the world, particularly in Europe. At this 
point, depending on the country, between 15 and 25% of Europe’s 
population have explicit racist and xenophobic tendencies, and 
are ready to translate them into mainstream politics.
If we measure by these standards, where is dignity? We are 
going backwards. The principles of dignity are now enshrined in 
all laws, even international laws. The practice of dignity is only 
enforced when people, particularly women, are able to resist the 
trends in society. But the trends in society go against what has 
been achieved in terms of consciousness and in terms of the law. 
We do have some elements which are linked to people’s capacity 
to inform and mobilise themselves and alert public opinion. And 
that largely depends on internet freedom and people’s global 
capacity to communicate with one another, which is, incidentally, 
not a small minority – three billion people in the world now have 
access to the internet, and seven billion people are connected via 
mobile phones. We have a global communication network that 
can mobilise and construct what I call the spaces of autonomy 
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from which societies change themselves. But, because of that, 
there are increasing threats to internet freedom. The internet is 
being used more and more for surveillance and is being targeted 
as such by most governments in the world.
The final key issue is that none of the debates on development, 
and none of the policies we design, can work unless there is a 
transformation of agency. This means a transformation of 
the institutions, organisations and human constructions that 
ultimately manage development, assign goals and implement 
them. Starting empirically, the recent processes of economic 
growth and human development have been enacted fundamentally 
by the state – by governments, not by markets.
This is extremely important to understand. Latin America 
in the 1990s decided that deregulation – free markets – was the 
route to development. The region collapsed economically due to 
several kinds of crisis, and it collapsed socially and politically as 
well. And throughout the continent, either populist or democratic 
governments were elected, but with a different orientation that 
established a new development model in most of Latin America.
An exception is Columbia. Columbia is a special and different 
case because it has had a very serious civil war that it is still trying 
to end. However, by and large, a new model has started: a so-
called neo-developmentalism in the Latin American countries 
where the state takes the lead.
This was exactly the process that took place in East Asia. 
Remember that famous World Bank report about 12 years ago 
that said markets were key to development. Markets were seen as 
key to opening up the global economy, and therefore increasing 
global competitiveness because domestic markets were too small 
and too poor for major development. But the actual key actor 
in East Asia and South Asia, according to the World Bank and 
according to my own empirical observations, was the state. It 
was government. We now have the same thing being repeated 
in Latin America. After all, there is this wonderful paradox that 
the so-called miracle, the economic miracle of our time that has 
saved capitalism from deeper crisis in terms of market function, 
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is China, that is, a communist state. China is a state that remains 
communist and a state, controlling everything politically and 
bureaucratically, mainly through large government-owned 
companies and with a prescribed strategy throughout.
Interestingly,  the same thing is happening in Indonesia, to 
a large extent, with military production; and in India, this was 
what ultimately led to Bangalore becoming a government hub 
that stimulated technological development. 
In Latin America, it is absolutely clear that this has been the 
case. There are some bad examples – Venezuela has destroyed the 
economy through a patrimonial state. But in other cases – Brazil 
particularly, but also Chile – it has not been the market; rather it 
has been different levels of state initiatives and state policy.
However, if the state is the actor of the new process of 
development, it requires major transformation, since most 
states are inefficient, bureaucratic, corrupt – certainly corrupt – 
and in some cases more than that. They require organisational 
transformation. They require what we call the ‘welfare state 2.0’. 
We can show empirically that the European welfare states are 
going downhill, not because of economic factors, but because of 
the increasing costs and bureaucratisation of the welfare state.
We also observe massive corruption of the state, which makes 
the key agency of development unable to perform in the long 
term, particularly in such places as Africa. I would say the most 
important development problem in Africa is that the key actor for 
development in the world now is the state. And the African state 
is the weakest, most corrupt, most inefficient, most predatory 
of all states. Let’s put South Africa to one side: still corrupt and 
inefficient, but not predatory; not yet. But if we take state by state 
in Africa, the main problem is that the states are instruments, 
not only for oppression – that’s normal – but of predation on 
their societies. And predatory doesn’t just mean corrupt: it means 
it organises the economy of the country to sell the structured 
economy – the resources of the country – to whoever and then 
puts the wealth into the pockets of individuals or their families, 
in a Swiss bank, or (increasingly) in a Bahamas bank (which is 
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safer), or in a Russian bank. This is currently happening. Thus, the 
predatory state is a fundamental problem in Africa.
At the level of the world at large, the issue is that there is an 
increasing disconnection between citizens and their governments, 
even in democratic countries. The data show that two thirds of 
citizens in the world don’t recognise their governments as democratic, 
including in the United States and Europe. In the United States, 
money controls politics; and then money controls America. This 
is what people feel, but they don’t have answers. So they vote for 
whichever party; or they develop new social movements.
The United Nations is not an international, independent 
institution; it is a co-governmental institution. I know this 
personally because in 2000, Fernando Henrique Cardoso was 
appointed by Kofi Annan to organise what they call a panel of 
high-level personalities in which there were all kinds of prominent 
people, and one academic – me. For two years we worked on 
the relationship between the United Nations and the global 
society, looking at how we could establish a non-governmental 
connection. We presented the report and Kofi Annan liked it very 
much; and then it had to be presented to the General Assembly. 
The General Assembly took 20 minutes to return the report to 
Kofi Annan and tell him, ‘Who do you think you are? We are the 
representatives of the people of the world and we pay your salary, 
by the way. So, shelve this report and don’t ever come back with 
such an idea.’ It is in the minutes of the UN General Assembly.
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are sometimes a 
partial answer in terms of legitimacy: they are more legitimate than 
any other institutions in the world. I call them neo-governmental 
organisations, not non-governmental because, in most cases, they 
are directly or indirectly subsidised by some kind of government.
The consequence of all this analysis, on the one hand, is that if 
we consider that development is the process by which empowered 
and informed people define their own goals (not the Millennium 
Development Goals, but their daily goals) and try to implement 
them, there is a fundamental problem. More serious than the 
models of development or the conceptions of development, is the 
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disconnection between people’s capacity to determine their lives 
and the nature of the institutions that are supposed to implement all 
these programmes. This is ultimately the most important problem 
of development. In fact, in the interests of the developmental state, 
what is required at this point is the development of society, with 
people taking development into their own hands. And they are 
doing it, but not yet through institutions. We are in the process of 
a historical transition, caught in a very special moment in which 
the existing economy is highly dynamic. Human development – 
measured by traditional forms of indicators – is improving and 
increasing, but the actual perception of this as well as people’s 
living conditions are deteriorating. The main reasons for this are 
violence, fear, institutional crisis, the predatory state, corruption, 
and an inability to feel safe because those who are in charge of 
making you safe are themselves the most unsafe institutions.
Under such conditions we are entering a period of historical 
transition in which people resort to the oldest forms of social 
change in humankind’s history. We take it into our own hands: 
we confront the institutions; we try to solve the problem by 
ourselves. We don’t know how, but eventually we will do it. And 
this happens with all sorts of consequences, good and bad. I’m 
not normative in that sense: people can do horrible things, but 
they will do them by themselves, and they are doing them by 
themselves. That is what is behind the wave of social movements I 
have been studying for a few years, in which hundreds of millions 
of people in over one hundred countries and in over five thousand 
cities in the world have been protesting, camping, marching, 
organising on the internet against the institutions, with only a 
little negotiation because people don’t trust them.
In my view, frankly, there is one interesting thing in all these 
developments and that is what is happening in Brazil these days. I 
was there this time last year when the movement had started a year 
ago. They wanted me to go again, but I could not. I had to be in 
South Africa. They said, ‘But we have the World Cup.’ I said, ‘But 
at this point, there are other problems in Brazil.’ They answered, 
‘No, you will see, it will be a very fun World Cup.’ Could we 
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have ever imagined that Brazilians would be totally opposed to 
the World Cup and protest against it so massively, even though 
they are very proud of their team, who they want to win the 
Cup? They are against the World Cup because of the corruption 
in FIFA, because of the corruption of local authorities that have 
given in to the interests of the construction companies taking over 
cities and destroying much of the environment. This notion was 
expressed very well in one of the major demonstrations recently: 
‘We exchange one hospital for ten stadiums.’ If the Brazilians can 
do that, the whole world can.
Note
This chapter is an edited transcript of a public lecture delivered by 
Manuel Castells at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study 
(STIAS) in Stellenbosch, South Africa, on 5 June 2014.
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Roles of universities and the African context
Nico Cloete & Peter Maassen
While the first of CHET’s ‘Castells books’, Challenges of 
Globalisation: South African debates with Manuel Castells (Muller et 
al. 2001),  was primarily about the challenges that South Africa and 
its universities were facing during rapid globalisation, the second 
and third books, Universities and Economic Development in Africa 
(Cloete et al. 2011) and Knowledge Production and Contradictory 
Functions in African Higher Education (Cloete et al. 2015), 
concerned themselves more directly with the developmental roles 
of the university in Africa in relation to the knowledge economy. 
In his lecture at the University of the Western Cape in 2009 
(see Chapter 4), Castells provided a typically encompassing, but 
interlinked view of higher education in society (Chapter 4: 57): 
If we take seriously the notion that we live in a global knowledge 
economy and in a society based on processing information 
– as universities primarily are – then the quality, effectiveness 
and relevance of the university system will be directly related 
to the ability of people, society and institutions to develop. In 
the context of a technological revolution and of a revolution in 
communication, the university becomes a central actor of scientific 
and technological change, but also of other dimensions: of the 
capacity to train a labour force adequate to the new conditions 
of production and management. Universities also become the 
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critical source of the equalisation of chances and democratisation 
of society by making possible equal opportunities for people. 
This is not only a contribution to economic growth, it is a 
contribution to social equality or, at least, lesser inequality.
Castells is referring here to the core functions of the university. He 
echoes in this the work of many great thinkers on the ideas underlying 
the university including Alexander von Humboldt, Cardinal 
Newman and, more recently, Clark Kerr. The latter emphasised 
that research universities cannot be single-purpose institutions, 
but rather must be pluralistic in the sense of combining various 
functions. In his work, Kerr has argued that it is far too simple to 
claim that the three main university functions are teaching, research 
and service (see, for example, Kerr 1991: 47–67). 
Drawing on Kerr and Castells, the four key roles of higher 
education can be summarised as follows. Firstly, historically, 
universities played a major role as ideological apparatuses; 
that is, as producers of values and social legitimation. These 
institutions were rooted in the European tradition of church-
based theology schools (Bologna, Cambridge, Oxford, Harvard 
and Salamanca). Other non-religious universities played a similar 
role in producing, for instance, imperial values in the case of some 
major universities, and of justifying domination and Western 
superiority in the colonial world. But, as times changed, a key 
task of these institutions became the shaping of civic values and 
‘flexible personalities’ in the development of prospective (re-
centring) identities, which uses future-oriented narratives to 
construct a new basis for social belonging and citizenship (Cross 
et al. 1999). To this day, the formation and diffusion of ideology 
is still a fundamental role of universities, despite claims to the 
contrary (Cross et al. 1999).
The second role – historically as important as the production 
of values – was the selection of the dominant elites. The selection 
of the elites is accompanied by a socialisation process that 
includes the formation of networks for their social cohesion, and 
the establishment of codes of distinction between them and the 
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rest of society (Castells 2001). Values and elite selection became 
closely connected through networks exemplified by, for example, 
the Ivy League institutions in the United States, the grandes écoles 
in France, or Cambridge and Oxford in England. But, as demand 
for access to higher education grew, universities differentiated. And 
while for some institutions elite selection and formation remained 
their primary role, large numbers of generalist universities 
emerged which increased higher education participation rates 
dramatically. Martin Trow (2007) referred to this as the shift from 
elite (15% participation rate) via mass (15–40%) to universal 
(over 40%) higher education; or in Peter Scott’s (1995) terms, the 
massification of higher education. Scott’s important contribution 
was to show that massification is not just a linear expansion of 
participation; it is also an integral part of modernisation, with 
associated socio-economic, cultural and science and technology 
changes. In addition, Scott (1995: 1) added that a characteristic 
of massified systems is that they are ‘endlessly open, radically 
reflexive with considerable ambiguity and radical discontinuities’. 
Castells has warned against the dangers attending the strategy of 
‘endlessly open’, as we have seen above.
In these massified systems, the notion of ‘elite’ has changed 
dramatically – from the university selecting students belonging 
to a political and/or socio-economic elite class, to the university 
being an institution for selecting academic talents; that is, ideally 
at least, an academic elite, independent of (or at least much less 
dependent on) class or background. John Shaplin, reviewing 
Thomas Pikkety’s work on university endowments, education and 
social mobility, reports that research shows that the proportion 
of college degrees earned by children whose parents belong to 
the bottom two quartiles of the income hierarchy stagnated at 
10–20% during the period 1970 to 2010 (Shaplin 2014). By 
contrast, the proportion of college degrees earned by children 
whose parents are in the top quartile increased from 40% to 
80% – meaning ‘parental income is an almost perfect predictor 
of university access’ (Shaplin 2014). Massification is thus a mixed 
blessing, as Castells has warned.
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The third role for universities was the training of the labour 
force. The professional university has always had this basic 
function, ever since it started specialising in the training of church 
bureaucrats. Both the Napoleonic model (with its introduction 
of grandes écoles) and the Chinese Imperial systems used specific 
institutions to select and prepare the state bureaucracy (Castells 
2001). However, this role extended to other emerging professions 
– the schools of medicine, law and engineering were critical 
as training institutions for industrialisation development. In 
due course, ‘training’ changed from being the reproduction or 
transmission of ‘accepted’ knowledge to ‘learning to learn’ or to 
become ‘self-programmable’ workers, which refers to the ability 
to change and adapt to many different occupations and new 
technologies all through one’s professional life (Castells 2001).
The fourth role for universities is associated with the relatively 
late invention of the German research university model that 
emerged in the second half of the 18th century. This saw the 
development of a different type of university that could be called a 
‘science university’, in which the primary focus is on the production 
of scientific knowledge. While the science-orientation seems to be 
the most obvious function of a university (implying the generation 
of new knowledge), the true research-intensive university forms a 
minority institution in higher education systems, and particularly 
so in developing countries (Altbach 2013). 
The popularity of the research-orientated university came 
from the success of the German universities which, by 1933, 
had trained and employed twice as many Nobel prize winners 
as the then US and UK universities combined (Watson 2010). 
After the Second World War, this dominance was taken over 
by the US university system. In certain respects, the US system 
combined the classic German research university model with the 
so-called ‘Land-Grant’ university model, which had a specific 
focus on science with application into society.1 Originally, the 
1 The Land-Grant universities were established via the Morrill Act of 1862 (which was 
amended in 1890). Interestingly, both the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
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role of these Land-Grant universities was to develop and apply 
knowledge for improving the productivity of US agriculture; to 
contribute to solving specific problems resulting from the rapid 
urbanisation of the US (Gornitzka & Maassen 2007); and to 
support the development of specific industries that had regional 
or national importance. Other key functions of the Land-Grant 
universities that are seldom mentioned included the requirement 
of the provision of extension services (especially in the area of 
agriculture), as well as the stated intention to provide greater 
access to higher education throughout the US (Douglass 2007).
As emphasised by Kerr, and indeed by Castells, a challenge for 
universities is that they cannot specialise in only one function; in 
fact, many try to fulfil all four roles at the same time. Therefore, 
a critical element in the structure and dynamics of university 
systems is to combine and make compatible various contradictory 
functions. For example, ideological apparatuses are not purely 
reproductive machines, as Pierre Bourdieu sometimes implied.2 
Both conservative and radical ideologies are not only in the 
system but in individual universities as well. And often, the more 
the socio-political rule of society relies on coercion rather than on 
consensus, the more universities become centres of challenge to the 
political system. In such cases, universities are still predominately 
ideological apparatuses, although they work for social change 
rather than for social conservatism (Kerr 1991). 
Another tension arose when the developmental potential of 
universities became apparent and many countries tried to build 
‘research universities’, ‘technology institutes’ and ‘university–
industry partnerships’. After centuries of using universities as 
ideological apparatuses and training institutions, the university 
rather quickly came under pressure to be a productive force – 
implying that universities had to be connected simultaneously to 
the informational economy and to the socio-cultural changes the 
society was undergoing (Gornitzka & Maassen 2007). Here, the 
and the University of California, Berkeley, started as Land Grant universities.
2 See, for example, Bourdieu and Passeron (1990).
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issue is not to have universities as societal transformers, or to isolate 
the universities from the social into secluded laboratories or the 
boardrooms of multinational firms, but to develop institutions 
which are solid and dynamic enough to withstand the tensions 
triggered by the simultaneous performance of contradictory 
functions. As Castells (Chapter 3: 42–43) put it:
The ability to manage such contradictions while emphasizing the 
universities’ role in generating knowledge and training labour in 
the context of the new requirements of the development process 
will to a large extent determine the capacity of countries and 
regions to become part of the new world economy.
Finally, in the current conditions of the global knowledge 
economy, knowledge production and technological innovation 
become the most important productive forces. This requires that 
every country has at least some level of a national research system 
(comprising universities and other types of higher education 
institutions, private sector and public research centres, and private 
sector research and development) in order to be able to participate 
in the global knowledge economy (see Castells, Chapter 4 
above). There has been a growing policy focus on the university’s 
contributions to innovation and economic development – the 
main assumption being that more complex and competitive 
economic and technological global environments require rapid 
adaptation to shifting opportunities and constraints. As such, the 
university is expected to play a central role in this adaptation since, 
as the main knowledge institution in any society, it is assumed to 
link research and education effectively to innovation. 
This expectation has been the underlying rationale for reforms 
aimed at stimulating universities to develop more determined 
institutional strategies to enhance research opportunities and a 
strong, unitary and professional leadership and management 
capacity. Furthermore, higher education policies have become 
increasingly coordinated with other policy areas, such as innovation 
and technology, as part of national (and supranational) knowledge 
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and innovation policies (Braun 2008: 234). At the same time, 
there is a growing insight into the simplicity and relative one-
sidedness of these policies. As is argued by Mazzucato (2013: 
52), in her seminal book The Entrepreneurial State, it is crucial to 
separate the role of the university in the production of knowledge 
from the role of industry in innovation through the development 
of early stage technologies: ‘Getting universities to do both runs, 
amongst other things, the risk of generating technologies unfit for 
the market.’
Both the British government, following the Asquith Commission 
(1945), and the French, following the Brazzaville meeting (1944), 
saw the university in the colonies as extensions of the British and 
French university systems, and assumed that the best students 
would study in the metropolis (Sherman 1990). The model was 
not Oxbridge or grande écoles. According to Castells (2001), the 
recruitment of social elites – first for the colonial administration 
and later for the new political regimes – became the fundamental 
function of universities in the ‘Third World’ – not only in Africa, 
but also in Latin America and East Asia. Mamdani (2008) concurs 
with this by stating that the purpose of Makerere University in 
Uganda was to train a tiny elite on full scholarships (which included 
tuition, board, health insurance, transport and even a ‘boom’ to 
cover personal needs). From the point of view of the students, this 
was an extraordinary opportunity; from the point of view of the 
society, an extraordinary privilege (Mamdani 2008).
Higher education in Africa is still an elite system, although the 
private sector has increased access to mainly small, low quality 
institutions which, in the majority of cases, should not be called 
universities.3 The higher education participation rate in sub-
Saharan Africa is still much lower than in the rest of the world, 
averaging between 5–10%. In the HERANA group of countries 
specifically (see Chapter 7 below), only Mauritius and Botswana 
had a participation rate above 20% by 2012 (World Economic 
3 One of the most bizarre examples of this is Mauritius where, with a population of 
less than 1.5million, there are more than 60 ‘universities’. 
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Forum 2012). There has been a common misconception that a 
major problem in African higher education is that it has massified 
without resources. In reality, nowhere on the continent is there a 
differentiated and massified system; there are simply overcrowded 
elite systems (i.e. they massified without resources). 
However, when it came to the ideological apparatus function, 
things unravelled very quickly owing to the instability of the 
conflicting and competing political elites – the universities 
were cauldrons of conflicting values, ranging from conservative-
reformist to revolutionary ideologies. The contradictions between 
academic freedom and political militancy, and between the drive 
for modernisation and the preservation of cultural identity, 
were detrimental to the educational and scientific tasks of the 
university. These new universities could not merge the formation 
of new elites with the ideological task of forging new values and 
the legitimation of the state (Castells 2001).
This analysis of Castells does not mean that there was not an 
intention for or a discourse about the university contributing 
to professional training and, more broadly, to development. A 
basic assumption following independence was that universities 
in Africa4 were expected to be key contributors to the human 
resource needs of their countries; in particular, the development of 
human resources for the civil service and the (public) professions. 
This was to address the acute shortages in these areas that were 
the result of the gross underdevelopment of universities under 
colonialism, as well as the departure of colonial administrators 
and professionals following independence.
The training function in Africa has become more important 
– although not as important as for the ‘explosion’ in Asian 
universities, which have increased their enrolment and technical 
training on an unprecedented scale (Carnoy et al. 2013). African 
universities have also grown, but much more moderately than 
4 At the time of independence, the higher education systems in most African countries were 
mostly limited to a single national university. It is thus not possible to speak of a higher 
education system as such at that time.
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their counterparts in the rest of the world, and mainly at the lower 
degree or diploma level. Much of the growth in student numbers 
has taken place in traditional fields such as law, humanities and 
social sciences, rather than in science, engineering and technology 
(Bunting et al. 2014; Kapur & Crowley 2008). The scientific 
function has received far less attention.
Soon after independence, a ‘development’ discourse emerged 
and 1960 was heralded as the ‘Year of Africa’ and the beginning 
of the so-called ‘development decade’. In September 1962, 
UNESCO hosted a conference on the Development of Higher 
Education in Africa. A decade later, in July 1972, the Association 
of African Universities held a workshop in Accra which focused 
on the role of the university in development (Yesufu 1973). 
The importance of the university in newly independent African 
countries was underscored by the now-famous ‘Accra declaration’ 
that all universities must be ‘development universities’ (Yesufu 
1973). Controversially, workshop participants agreed that this 
was such an important task that the university could not be left to 
academics alone; it was also the responsibility of governments to 
steer universities in the development direction.5 
While many nationalist African academics enthusiastically 
supported the role of the ‘development university’, seeing it as a 
plus in their contestations with the expatriate professoriate that 
dominated institutions, it sat uncomfortably with expatriates 
and some more ‘globally-oriented’ African academics. This was at 
least partly because this ‘development discourse’ was more along 
the lines of the land-grant model rather than that of the research-
orientated model. It was also partly because this latter group was 
more comfortable with the traditional model of the university as 
a self-governing institution (i.e. governed primarily by scholars) 
that predominated in the UK and the US at the time. This self-
governing model was the dominant model during the first two 
decades following independence and there was considerable 
5 Arguably, this was the last time, until 2009, that governments in Africa agreed, at least in 
continental statements, that universities are important for development (MacGregor 2009).
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agreement between universities and ‘liberation’ governments6 
that the role of elite universities was to produce human capital 
for the new state.
Despite the rhetoric about the ‘development university’, African 
governments did little to promote the development role of these 
institutions. In part this was because many of these governments 
had not developed a coherent development model, with notions 
of what the role of the universities would be. Instead, many had 
become increasingly embroiled in internal power struggles, as 
well as the external politics of the Cold War and the politics of 
funding agencies such as the World Bank. Instead, ‘not leaving the 
universities alone’ became interference by government, rather than 
steering (Moja et al. 1996). Furthermore, universities became sites 
of contestation – partially around the development model of the 
new state, and partially around the lack of delivery which included 
inadequate funding for the institutions. The result was that many 
governments, other stakeholders and academics became sceptical, 
if not suspicious, of the university’s role in national development. 
It was during this period that the World Bank in particular, 
in part based on the infamous ‘rate of return to investments in 
education’ study (Psacharopoulos et al. 1986), concluded that 
development efforts in Africa should be refocused to concentrate 
on primary education. This is evident in the dramatic decreases 
in per capita spending on higher education in Africa: ‘Public 
expenditure per tertiary student has fallen from USD 6 800 in 
1980, to USD 1 200 in 2002, and recently averaged just USD 
981 in 33 low-income SSA [sub-Saharan Africa] countries’ 
(World Bank 2009: xxvii). This is a staggering decrease of 82%. 
At a meeting with African vice-chancellors in Harare in 1986, the 
World Bank went so far as to argue that higher education in Africa 
was a ‘luxury’ and that most African countries would be better off 
closing their universities at home and training graduates overseas 
instead. When the Bank realised this position was unsustainable, 
they modified it to argue that universities should be trimmed 
6  Many of the liberation leaders had studied at foreign universities.
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down and restructured to train graduates only in the skills that the 
market required (Mamdani 1993). This was followed by a number 
of privatisation drives which, in 1997 at Makerere University, led 
to the creation of part-time and temporary staff, competition 
between faculties for vocational (income-generating) courses, and 
later the introduction of private and public students in the same 
public university. The cumulative effect of this was, according to 
Mamdani (2008), the commercialisation of the university at the 
expense of quality and research.
Castells (2001) argued that the major area of underperformance 
in Africa and, to some extent, Latin America is in the research or 
‘generation of new knowledge’ function. Africa is at the bottom 
of almost every indicator-based ranking and league table in 
science and higher education. For instance, in 2002, Africa’s share 
of publication output was 1.6% and of researchers by region/
continent was 2.2%. By 2008, Africa’s share of publications had 
risen to 2.5% although the share of researchers declined slightly, 
from 2.2% to 2.1% (Zeleza 2014). 
In his 2000 lecture (see Chapter 3 above), Castells presented 
a number of structural and institutional reasons which might 
explain the lack of progress in research. These included low 
funding levels and ‘the cumulative character of the process of 
uneven scientific development’ leading, amongst others, to a lack 
of centres of excellence that were at the cutting edge of a specific 
area of specialisation (Castells 2001: 215–217). In other words, 
the academic environment in African universities is not attractive 
enough for talented national scholars, who as a consequence 
move to overseas universities, especially in North America and 
Europe, which offer more attractive academic environments. In 
addition, the main institutional reason for a lack of progress is 
argued to be the difficulties African universities have in managing 
contradictory functions (i.e. managing the political and ideological 
functions alongside the academic activities of the university), as 
well as managing the tension between the social friction – rapid 
expansion – and the scientific function of research.
However, there was a revitalisation of higher education in 
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the post-2000 period and a number of the accepted reasons for 
poor performance did not hold anymore. Over the last 10 to 15 
years, universities and university systems have gone through far-
reaching quantitative and qualitative changes in many developing 
countries and emerging economies such as the so-called BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). In 
general, however, sub-Saharan universities still appear to be 
lagging behind. In their book, Altbach and Balán (2007) focus 
on the transformation of research universities in Asia and Latin 
America. According to these authors, their analysis did not include 
Africa because they believed that ‘Africa’s academic challenges are 
sufficiently different from those of the nations represented here 
that comparison would not be appropriate’ (Altbach and Balán 
2007: vii). Strikingly, the authors did not provide any arguments 
or data for their claims. 
The gloomy analyses of higher education in Africa by Castells 
and Mamdani presented above were largely based on the four 
decades from 1960 to the end of the 1990s. During the late 
1990s and early 2000s, some influential voices started calling for 
the ‘revitalisation’ of the African university and for linking higher 
education to development (Sawyerr 2004). From this followed a 
series of revitalisation initiatives and this issue would be revisited 
again in 2015 at an all-Africa higher education summit in Dakar.
Perhaps a brief reflection on the term ‘revitalise’ is appropriate. 
The Collins dictionary defines revitalise as ‘breathe new life into, 
bring back to life, reanimate, refresh, rejuvenate, renew, restore, 
resurrect’. This raises questions as to what has to have new life 
breathed into it or to be restored or resurrected. Mamdani provided 
an evocative reflection during the 1990 symposium on academic 
freedom held in Kampala and organised by the Council for the 
Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA), which 
suggests that the revitalisation needed had to do with ‘relevance’ 
(Mamdani 1993: 11):
We discovered local communities, communities which we had 
hitherto viewed simply as so many natural settings. Forced to 
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address these communities, we were compelled to look at ourselves 
from the stand-point of these communities. We came to realise 
that universities have little relevance to the communities around 
us. To them, we must appear like potted plants in greenhouses – 
of questionable aesthetic value – or more anthropological oddities 
with curious habits and strange dresses, practitioners of some 
modern witchcraft. To academics accustomed to seeing ourselves 
as leaders-in-waiting or students accustomed to be cajoled as 
the leaders of tomorrow, these were indeed harsh realities. We 
were forced to understand the question of relevance, not simply 
narrowly from the point of view of the development logic of 
the state, or even narrower market logic of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, but broadly from 
the point of view of the needs of surrounding communities. But 
we had always resisted any demand for a broad relevance in the 
name of maintaining quality. Faced with popular pressures for 
democracy in education, universities and independent states 
were determined, not only to preserve intact those universities 
inherited from colonial mentors but also to reproduce replicas 
several times over to maintain standards.
From another perspective, is the university that needs to be 
revitalised the ‘commercialised’ Makerere University referred to 
earlier? Mamdani (2008) described this commercialisation as 
reform that devalued higher education into a form of low-level 
training that lacked a meaningful research component. And, 
while Makerere is a case study of market-based reform at a single 
university, it raises larger issues about neo-liberal reform of public 
universities globally (Mamdani 2008: vii). Or, does revitalisation 
mean that new life must be breathed into university systems where 
the ‘generation of new knowledge’ function is the major area of 
underperformance (Castells 2001)? 
Interestingly, most of the revitalisation reports were produced in 
preparation for major donor-driven events. Both the Sawyerr (2004) 
publication and the African Union/NEPAD (2005) workshop 
report, Renewal of Higher Education in Africa, contributed to the 
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Gleneagles G8 summit. Similarly, the United Nations University 
project report (2009), Revitalizing Higher Education in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but particularly the Pityana (2009) paper, ‘Revitalisation 
of Higher Education: Access, equity and quality’, were prepared 
for and delivered as proposals to the 2009 UNESCO World 
Conference on Higher Education.
No systematic assessment of the outcomes of these pleas for 
revitalisation has been done. However, in an overview of the public 
donor dimension in Africa, Maassen and Cloete (2009) wrote that 
while the G8 summit certainly created a momentum for a new 
focus in Africa, the G8’s renewed commitment to Africa was far 
from uncontroversial: not only did part of the British government 
react negatively, but agencies such as the United Nations Envoy 
for HIV/Aids and even the IMF responded critically to the debt-
relief proposals. 
Regarding higher education in particular, two of the most 
important documents to be released following the G8 summit 
were the Africa Action Plan and the Report of the Commission for 
Africa. The Africa Action Plan focused broadly on developing 
research and higher education capacity as well as information and 
communication technologies. The Commission for Africa report 
identified four priorities in the sector, namely: professional skills, 
physical infrastructure, human resources and research capacity. It 
specifically called for a fund of USD 500 million to be created 
for revitalising African institutions of higher education and a 
fund of USD 3 billion for strengthening science, engineering 
and technological capacity.7 Of the call for USD 500 million, 
only the USD 10 million allocated by the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) to the Association of African 
Universities during 2006 could be seen as a direct outcome of 
the G8 meeting. However, what did change was that DFID, in 
responding to the Millennium Goals and the UK Prime Minister’s 
enthusiasm during the G8, finally abandoned their rather slavish 
7 It has to be noted that the Commission charged with making recommendations to 
the G8 did not directly represent the G8.
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support for the outdated World Bank policy to not support higher 
education – long after the World Bank itself had abandoned this 
position (Maassen & Cloete 2010).
As for the UNESCO World Conference, the most positive 
outcome was the unanimous expression of support for the 
importance of higher education by a group of 16 African ministers 
of education at a preparatory meeting in Dakar entitled New 
Dynamics on Higher Education and Research: Strategies for change 
and development.8 In particular, the ministers ‘called for improved 
financing of universities and a support fund to strengthen training 
and research in key areas’ (MacGregor 2009). Perhaps more 
importantly, MacGregor reported that there had been considerable 
awareness about the role that should be played by knowledge as 
the driving force of development with an emphasis on reforming 
higher education systems (MacGregor 2009). Ironically, however, 
soon after committing to an increased emphasis on strengthening 
higher education at the World Conference, UNESCO itself then 
devalued the status of higher education by merging the higher 
education division with the general education division within 
its own structures. Since then, not much has emerged from this 
structure – which, in 2014, was without a director. 
Concurrent to the revitalisation discourse, other voices arose 
to support higher education in Africa. The World Bank itself, 
influenced by Castells’s (1991) ‘engine of development’ paper, 
started to embrace the idea of the role of higher education in 
the knowledge economy and for development in the developing 
world. In 2002, the World Bank report Constructing Knowledge 
Societies: New challenges for tertiary education described how 
tertiary education contributes to building a country’s capacity 
for participation in an increasingly knowledge-based world 
economy, and investigated policy options for tertiary education 
that had the potential to enhance economic growth and reduce 
poverty (Salmi 2002). This amounted to a 360-degree turnaround 
from the Bank’s earlier notion of higher education as a ‘luxury’. 
8 This title is arguably a considerable improvement on ‘revitalisation’. 
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However, in personal communications, Salmi admitted that the 
Bank had neither the political will nor the capacity to implement 
a programme to build capacity in African countries to participate 
in the knowledge economy. To its credit the World Bank did 
sponsor studies such as Bloom et al. (2006), which empirically 
demonstrated a relationship between investment in higher 
education and an improvement in gross domestic product in 
Africa. Additional evidence has been generated by subsequent 
studies by the African Development Bank (Kamara & Nyende 
2007) and the World Bank (2009). 
A much stronger political voice came from Kofi Annan, the 
then Secretary General of the United Nations, who strongly 
promoted the importance of universities for development in 
Africa (quoted in Bloom et al. 2006: 2):
The university must become a primary tool for Africa’s development 
in the new century. Universities can help develop African expertise; 
they can enhance the analysis of African problems; strengthen 
domestic institutions; serve as a model environment for the 
practice of good governance, conflict resolution and respect for 
human rights, and enable African academics to play an active part 
in the global community of scholars.
While the above statements clearly demonstrate support for the 
role of higher education in development, they do little to clarify 
what this role is. There seem to be two different notions hidden 
within the idea of a ‘development tool’ – a direct instrumentalist or 
‘service’ role and an ‘engine of development’ role that is based on 
strengthening knowledge production and the role of universities 
in innovation processes. 
The instrumentalist role is arguably the more dominant 
of the two notions in Africa and indeed has been so since the 
1960s. For instance, the demands for university revitalisation by, 
especially, foreign donors and multilateral agencies such as the 
United Nations and UNESCO are, in many cases, underpinned 
by the assumption that universities are ‘repositories of expertise’ 
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which should be applied to solving pressing development issues, 
such as poverty reduction and education for all. This thinking of 
‘university as service provider’ in Africa is also strongly present 
within academia itself, and particularly in certain post-colonial 
contexts. University World News reported that at the Association 
of Commonwealth Universities conference (April 2010) it was 
stated that: ‘Universities must be “citadels not silos”, defending 
communities around them rather than being inward-looking, if 
they are to actively advance global development goals’ (MacGregor 
& Makoni 2010), and that universities must ‘orientate their 
activities more directly towards supporting UN Millennium 
Development Goals’ (MacGregor 2010). The chief executive 
officer of the Southern African Regional Universities Association, 
Piyushi Kotecha, argued that in recent decades, higher education 
had assumed growing importance for both personal development 
and for driving social and economic development: ‘Now more 
than ever before, higher education in developing nations is being 
expected to take on the mantle of responsibility for growth and 
development, where often governments fail’ (MacGregor 2010). 
This ‘direct’ instrumentalist notion assumes that universities have 
a concentration (surplus) of expertise, and presumably spare time, 
that must be applied directly, or in partnership, to pressing socio-
economic issues such as poverty, disease, governance and the 
competitiveness of private firms or companies. 
The second role for higher education embedded in Annan’s 
‘development tool’ is Castells’s ‘engine of development’ notion 
which, as highlighted earlier, has much more recently become the 
dominant discourse for many developed countries. The underlying 
vision of this notion is the need to create a university that is 
dynamic and responsive to socio-economic agendas and that gives 
priority to innovation, entrepreneurship and competitiveness. 
Supporting Annan (perhaps on the other end), the high-profile 
African scientist at Harvard University, Calestous Juma, has 
promoted the role of higher education in science-led development 
through, amongst others, the UN Millennium Project Task Force 
on Science, Technology and Innovation (Juma & Yee-Cheong 
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2005). In addition, the African Ministerial Council on Science 
and Technology, established in November 2003 under the 
auspices of the African Union and NEPAD, created a high-level 
platform for developing policies and setting priorities on science, 
technology, research and innovation for development in Africa.
In conclusion, in developing countries, and especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, there are different forces and policy arguments 
driving university dynamics. Here the university is positioned in a 
development cooperation policy arena where the dominant actors 
are operating in policy frameworks co-determined by ministries 
of foreign affairs and development cooperation agencies. The 
development mission of the university is primarily linked to 
poverty reduction and community support, rather than economic 
competitiveness, entrepreneurship and innovation. This raises two 
key questions: What are the consequences of these different policy 
frameworks for African universities? And, how do they affect the 
circumstances under which African universities are expected to 
contribute to economic development? 
While Castells’s analyses of the functions of universities outlined 
above provide an innovative, sociologically based framework for 
discussing the development of universities around the world, in 
the case of Africa, these analyses were not informed by strong 
empirical evidence. Many negative stories are told about African 
universities when it comes to their facilities, research output, 
overcrowded lecture halls, weak leadership and so on. But are 
these stories all there is to tell? What is required is research that 
does not take these factors as a given, but instead conducts detailed 
empirical analyses of the dynamics of a number of African flagship 
universities and their socio-economic and political contexts, while 
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During the post-independence period, every African country has 
struggled with the problematic of the role of higher education in 
development. Until the mid-1990s, the role of higher education in 
development programmes and policies in Africa was somewhat of 
an anomaly, with most education development projects focusing 
on primary school education. International donors and partners 
regarded universities, for the most part, as institutional enclaves 
without deep penetration into the development needs of African 
communities. As such, higher education was seen as a non-focal 
sector and even as a ‘luxury ancillary’, a view that was for many 
years promoted by the World Bank (Brock-Utne 2002; Hayward 
2008; Maassen et al. 2007; Mamdani 2008; Psacharopoulos et al. 
1986; Sawyerr 2004).
Dramatic declines in expenditure on higher education were 
associated with these policies: spending per student fell from 
USD 6 800 in 1980, to USD 1 200 in 2002, and later to just 
USD 981 in 33 low-income sub-Saharan African countries. Lack 
of investment in higher education delinked universities from 
development, led to development policies that had negative 
consequences for African nations, and caused the decline, and in 
some cases closure, of institutions and areas of higher education 
that are critical to development (Hayward 2008).
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During the 1990s and early 2000s some influential voices 
(including the World Bank 1999, 2007, 2009) started calling for 
the revitalisation of African universities and for linking higher 
education to development. At a World Bank seminar in Kuala 
Lumpur in 1991, Manuel Castells argued that in an information 
or knowledge economy, the knowledge institution (university) 
will be ‘the engine of development’ (Castells 1991: see Chapter 
3 above). This paper had, according to Jamil Salmi, contributed 
substantially to the recognition at the World Bank about the 
importance of knowledge, as their subsequent series of publications 
show: Knowledge for Development (1999); Constructing Knowledge 
Societies: New challenges for tertiary education (Salmi 2002); The 
Knowledge Economy (2007) and Accelerating Catch-up: Tertiary 
education for growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (2009). 
Research during the last decade has suggested a strong 
association between higher education participation rates and 
levels of development, and considerable theoretical and empirical 
evidence has emerged about the importance of the university in 
producing high levels of what Castellls calls ‘self-programmable’ 
skilled workers, and research and innovation (Carnoy et al. 1993; 
Castells 2001). However, this notion has also become something 
of an ideology: the European Commission and the OECD in 
particular, often beat this drum without empirical evidence and it 
is the current dominant discourse (Douglass et al. 2009).
Many rapidly developing nations such as Korea, China 
and India put knowledge and innovation policies, and higher 
education, at the core of their development strategies, based on the 
assumption that the ability to absorb, use and modify technology 
developed mainly in high-income countries will drive more rapid 
transition to higher levels of development and standards of living 
(Pillay 2010).
For Africa, the change in direction was clearly signalled when 
Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
promoted the importance of universities for development in 
Africa, stating that: ‘The university must become a primary tool 
for Africa’s development in the new century’ (quoted in Bloom et 
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al. 2006: 2). This position was endorsed ahead of the UNESCO 
World Conference on Higher Education in 2009 when a group 
of African education ministers called for improved financing of 
universities and a support fund to strengthen training and research 
in key areas (MacGregor 2009).
The Higher Education Research and Advocacy Network in Africa 
(HERANA) 
The Higher Education Research and Advocacy Network in Africa 
(HERANA) was established in 2008 with funding support from 
the US Foundation Partnership (Ford Foundation, Carnegie 
Corporation of New York, Rockefeller Foundation and Kresge 
Foundation) and from the Norwegian Agency for Research and 
Development (NORAD). It was managed by the Centre for 
Higher Education Trust (CHET) in South Africa. 
The HERANA network consisted of eight African universities 
– the University of Botswana, University of Cape Town, University 
of Dar es Salaam, Eduardo Mondlane University, University of 
Ghana, University of Mauritius, Makerere University and the 
University of Nairobi – and more than 50 participating academics 
from Africa, Europe and the US.1 The universities included in the 
study were selected primarily on the basis of previous collaboration, 
and because each was regarded as a national or flagship university.
At its inception, the broad aim of the project was to 
investigate the complex relationships between higher education 
and economic development in selected African countries with 
a focus on the contexts in which universities operate, the 
internal structure and dynamics of the universities, and the 
interaction between the national and institutional contexts. It 
1 Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) participated in the first two phases of 
HERANA and was included because of its comparability in terms of its size and profile to 
the other African universities. The University of Cape Town was added to the HERANA 
network at the request of other African universities who wanted to be compared to the flagship 
university in South Africa (UCT is the highest ranked university in South Africa). NMMU 
did not participate in the third phase of the HERANA project. 
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also aimed to identify factors and conditions that facilitate or 
inhibit universities’ ability to make a sustainable contribution to 
economic development.
The first phase of the HERANA project began with a review 
of the international literature on the relationship between higher 
education and economic development This was followed by case 
studies of three systems that have effectively linked their economic 
development and higher education policy and planning – Finland, 
South Korea and North Carolina State in the US (Pillay 2010).
In the second half of phase 1 of the HERANA project, data 
were collected at both the national and institutional levels in the 
eight African countries and HERANA universities. 
In Phase 2 and 3 HERANA continued its focus on knowledge 
production, albeit at an institutional level only. Activities in 
Phases 2 and 3 included the collection of data on the academic 
core and the institutionalisation of data collection and analysis 
at the eight participating African universities in order to guide 
research-informed policy-making in support of creating research-
intensive universities.
This chapter provides the findings and insights from Phase 1 of 
the HERANA project and shows how Castells’s model of the four 
university functions and, in particular, the university function of 
knowledge production for development, shaped the early work of 
the HERANA project.
Notions of the role of the African university in development
At a more systemic level, the HERANA project sought to establish 
how national and institutional stakeholders conceptualise the 
role of higher education and of the university in development. 
HERANA was keen to establish whether there was consensus or 
disjuncture between the national level and the universities included 
in the project. HERANA’s analytical framework for addressing 
these interests comprised four notions of the relationship between 
higher education (especially universities) and national development; 
notions that draw loosely on Castells’s proposition that there are 
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four historically determined and contradictory university functions. 
In particular, the notions of the university as ancillary and of 
the university as a critical producer of new knowledge that fuels 
its function as an engine of development, derive from Castells’s 
thinking on the functions of universities, and his conceptualisation 
of self-programmable labour, innovation and the knowledge 
economy. The four notions are:
 
• The university as ancillary: When the starting-point for develop-
ment is predominantly ideological, it is assumed that there is no 
need for a strong (scientific) knowledge basis for development 
strategies and policies. Neither is it necessary for the university 
to play a direct role in development since the emphasis is 
on investments in basic healthcare, agricultural production 
and primary education. The role of universities is to produce 
educated civil servants and professionals (with teaching based 
on transmitting established knowledge rather than on research), 
as well as different forms of community service.
• The university as self-governing institution: The knowledge 
produced by the university is considered important for national 
development – especially for the improvement of healthcare 
and the strengthening of agricultural production. However, this 
notion assumes that the most relevant knowledge is produced 
when academics from the North and the South cooperate 
in externally funded projects, rather than being steered by 
the state. This notion portrays the university as playing an 
important role in developing the national identity, and in 
producing high-level bureaucrats and scientific knowledge – 
but not directly related to national development; the university 
is committed to serving society as a whole rather than specific 
stakeholders. This notion assumes that the university is most 
effective when it is left to itself, and can follow institutional 
priorities, independent of the particularities of a context. It 
also assumes there is no need to invest additional public funds 
to increase the relevance of the university.
• The university as instrument for development agendas: In this 
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notion, the university has an important role to play in national 
development – not through the production of new scientific 
knowledge, but through expertise exchange and capacity 
building. The focus of the university’s development efforts 
should be on contributing to reducing poverty and disease, 
to improving agricultural production, and to supporting 
small business development – primarily through consultancy 
activities (especially for government agencies and development 
aid) and through direct involvement in local communities.
• The university as engine of development: This notion assumes that 
knowledge plays a central role in national development – in 
relation to improving healthcare and agricultural production, 
but also in relation to innovations in the private sector, 
especially in areas such as information and communication 
technology, biotechnology and engineering. Within this 
notion, the university is seen as (one of ) the core institutions in 
the national development model. The underlying assumption 
is that the university is the only institution in society that can 
provide an adequate foundation for the complexities of the 
emerging knowledge economy when it comes to producing 
the relevant skills and competencies of employees in all major 
sectors, as well as to the production of use-oriented knowledge. 
These four notions are situated in the interaction between the 
following scenarios: (1) Whether or not a role is foreseen for new 
knowledge in the national development strategy; and (2) Whether 
or not universities, as knowledge institutions, have a role in the 
national development strategy.
Drawing on data gathered via interviews with national and 
university stakeholders, several insights emerged with regard to 
the envisaged or projected role of the university as knowledge 
producer in development. 
At the national level, three main observations are made based 
on the data collected. Firstly, the instrumental notion was the 
strongest, followed by engine of development and self-governing. 
Secondly, the engine of development notion was to be found 
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mainly in science and technology policies and in national vision 
statements, but seldom in ministries of education – with the 
exceptions of Botswana and Mauritius. The references to the 
knowledge economy, and its importance in vision statements, seem 
to draw considerably from ‘policy-borrowing’, particularly from 
World Bank and OECD sources and websites. Thirdly, in the case 
of the instrumental notion, most national government officials felt 
that universities were not doing enough, but there were no policies 
that spelt out, or incentivised, this instrumental role.
Regarding the institutionally located notions, the following 
observations could be made. Firstly, self-governance and the 
instrumental roles were strongest, which reflect the traditional 
debates about autonomy and community engagement, 
respectively. Secondly, only within the universities of Ghana and 
Dar es Salaam was there still a traditional notion of the university 
producing human capital for the nation, and of the university 
‘knowing best what is required’. Interestingly, the leadership of 
neither of these two institutions expressed a knowledge economy 
discourse. Thirdly, Mauritius was the only institution with 
the engine of development as the dominant discourse, and it 
corresponded with the view of government. At Makerere there was 
considerable agreement between government and the university, 
except that there was an increasing awareness at the university 
about the knowledge economy and the engine of development 
notion. Finally, at NMMU, which is an institution where a 
former ‘traditional’ university was merged with a technikon 
(polytechnic), all four notions were present and in contestation.
In terms of notions of the role of the university in 
development, at both national and institutional levels, the most 
obvious unresolved tension was between the self-governance and 
instrumental roles. This reflects the well-known tension between 
institutional autonomy, on the one hand, and engagement or 
responsiveness, on the other.
At the national level in most of the countries, the dominant 
expectation for higher education was an instrumental one, with 
a constant refrain that the university was not doing enough to 
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contribute to development – but often referring to social problems, 
and not economic growth. The engine of development notion 
was stronger amongst government stakeholders than within the 
universities, but it could be that government saw knowledge as a 
narrow instrumental, rather than an engine of development notion. 
It is nevertheless surprising that amongst university leadership the 
support for a knowledge economy approach was weak.
The academic core of eight African universities
The university’s unique contribution to development is via 
knowledge – transmitting knowledge to individuals who will go 
out into the labour market and contribute to society in a variety 
of ways (teaching), and producing and disseminating knowledge 
that can lead to innovation or be applied to the problems of 
society and economy (research, engagement). Part of what impacts 
on a university’s ability to make a sustainable contribution to 
development therefore focuses on the nature and strength of 
its knowledge activities, or in Castells’s terms, its education and 
scientific functions.
According to Burton Clark (1998), when an enterprising 
university evolves a stronger steering core and develops an 
outreach structure, its heartland is still in the traditional academic 
departments, formed around disciplines and some interdisciplinary 
fields. The heartland is where traditional academic values and 
activities such as teaching, research and training of the next 
generation of academics occur. Instead of ‘heartland’, this study 
used the concept ‘academic core’ – it is this core that needs to be 
strong and relevant if flagship universities – such as those included 
in this study – as key knowledge institutions, are to contribute to 
development. 
While most universities also engage in knowledge activities in 
the area of community service or outreach,2 a key assumption is 
2 See Chapter 9 of this volume for a more detailed account of the HERANA project’s 
empirical work on university–community engagement, including outreach and 
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that the backbone or the foundation of the university’s business is 
its academic core – that is, the basic handling of knowledge through 
teaching via academic degree programmes, research output, and 
the production of doctorates (those who, in the future, will be 
responsible for carrying out the core knowledge activities).
The eight participating HERANA universities are the leading 
knowledge-producing institutions expected to contribute to 
research and development in their respective countries. This is well 
expressed in the University of Botswana research strategy (2008: 3):
The university has the largest concentration of research-qualified 
staff and research facilities in the country and has an obligation 
to develop the full potential of these resources. By doing so, it can 
play a central part in the multiple strategies for promoting research, 
development and innovation that are now on the national agenda. 
A review of the vision and mission statements of the eight 
universities reveals a number of common aims relating to both 
the nature and strength of their academic cores, as well as their 
contribution to development. These aims can be summarised as 
follows:
• To have high academic ratings, making them leading or premier 
universities – not only in their respective countries but also in 
Africa;
• To be centres of academic excellence which are engaged in 
high-quality research and scholarship; and
• To contribute to sustainable national and regional social and 
economic development.
The question HERANA poses is: Does the evidence support these 
ambitious aims for academic excellence? In other words, is there 
evidence that these universities have strong academic cores or, at 
the very least, are moving in that direction? 
community service, on the academic core of the university.
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Data on the academic core in African flagship universities
CHET started to compile data on a group of African universities in 
2007 as part of a project titled ‘Cross-National Higher Education 
Performance (Efficiency) Indicators’.3 The data collected was 
discussed at a workshop in March 2009 where it emerged that 
although a basic data set had been compiled from institutional 
representatives and planners, most of the universities had 
experienced difficulties in completing the 2007 data templates. 
The first finding about the academic core was clear: there is a need 
to improve and strengthen the definition of key performance 
indicators, as well as the systematic, institution-wide capturing 
and processing (institutionalisation) of key data.
To evaluate empirically the strength of the academic core 
of the HERANA universities, eight indicators were identified, 
all of which refer to characteristics or activities that reflect the 
production of high-quality scholarship which, in turn, forms the 
basis of each university’s potential contribution to development. 
The eight indicators, and the rationale for their inclusion, are 
outlined below. They are divided into five input and three output 
indicators. Some of these indicators are based on traditional 
notions of the role of flagship universities (e.g. the production 
of new knowledge and the next generation of academics) while 
others (e.g. science, engineering and technology enrolments and 
student–staff ratios) are pertinent to the African context.
The five input indicators are as follows:
1. Increased enrolments in science, engineering and technology (SET): 
In African governments and foreign development agencies 
alike, there is a strong emphasis on SET as important drivers of 
development (Juma & Yee-Cheong 2005). Included in SET are 
3 See http://www.chet.org.za/programmes/indicators/ 
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the agricultural sciences, architecture and urban and regional 
planning, computer and information science, health sciences 
and veterinary sciences, life sciences and physical sciences.
2. Increased postgraduate enrolments: The knowledge economy 
and universities are demanding increasing numbers of people 
with postgraduate qualifications.
3. A favourable academic staff to student ratio: The academic 
workload should allow for the possibility of research and PhD 
supervision.
4. A high proportion of academic staff with doctoral degrees: Research 
(CHET 2010) shows that there is a high correlation between 
staff with doctorates, on the one hand, and research output and 
the training of PhD students, on the other.
5. Adequate research funding per academic: Research requires 
government and institutional funding and ‘third-stream’ funding 
from external sources such as industry and foreign donors.
The three output indicators are as follows:
1. High graduation rates in SET fields: Not only is it important 
to increase SET enrolments, it is crucial that universities 
achieve high graduation rates in order to respond to the skills 
shortages in the African labour market in these fields.
2. Increased knowledge production in the form of doctoral graduates: 
There is a need for an increase in doctoral graduates for two 
reasons. Firstly, doctoral graduates form the backbone of 
academia and are therefore critical for the future reproduction 
of the academic core. Secondly, there is growing demand 
for people with doctoral degrees outside of academia (e.g. 
in research organisations and other organisations such as 
financial institutions).
3. Knowledge production in the form of research publications in 
Web of Science journals: Academics need to be producing 
peer-reviewed research publications in order for the university 
to participate in the global knowledge community and to 
contribute to new knowledge and innovation.
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The strength of, and changes in, the academic core
The data indicate that, apart from NMMU and Ghana, each of 
the universities had at least one ‘strong’ rating (see Table 2 in 
Appendix 1) across the eight indicators. Cape Town was rated 
‘strong’ for all eight indicators, Mauritius for four of the eight, 
Dar es Salaam and Nairobi for three of the eight, and Botswana, 
Eduardo and Makerere for two of the eight indicators.
A large number of ‘weak’ ratings appear in the scores of 
different universities. Eduardo was rated as ‘weak’ on six of 
the eight indicators; Botswana and Ghana on five of the eight 
indicators. Makerere and Nairobi were rated as ‘weak’ on four of 
the eight indicators, and Mauritius on three of the eight indicators. 
NMMU had two ‘weak’ ratings and Cape Town none.
On the input side, Cape Town’s overall rating was ‘strong’, and 
those of Dar es Salaam, Mauritius and Nairobi were about mid-
way between ‘strong’ and ‘medium’. Two universities, Makerere 
and NMMU, had overall input ratings which were close to the 
average ‘medium’ rating. Three universities – Botswana, Eduardo 
and Ghana – had overall input ratings mid-way between ‘weak’ 
and ‘medium’. On the output side, Cape Town’s average rating 
was ‘strong’, and no other university had output ratings of above 
‘medium’, except NMMU had a ‘medium’ rating. The remaining 
seven universities had overall output ratings below the ‘medium’ 
rating.
From these scores the institutions can be broadly categorised 
into the following groups:
• Group 1: University of Cape Town, the only university which 
was ‘strong’ on all input and output ratings.
• Group 2: University of Mauritius, Makerere University and 
NMMU which had ‘medium’ or ‘strong’ ratings on both the 
input and the output sides.
• Group 3: The universities of Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and 
Botswana which had overall ‘medium’ and ‘strong’ ratings on 
the input side, but were ‘weak’ on the output side.
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• Group 4: University of Ghana and Eduardo Mondlane which 
had ‘weak’ ratings on both the input and the output side.
The data indicate that, with the exception of Cape Town, the other 
universities do not have academic cores that live up to the high 
expectations contained in their mission statements. However, the 
data show considerable variance amongst the institutions in terms 
of input indicators, and some convergence regarding output 
indicators, again with the exception of Cape Town.
Two input indicators with considerable variation are student–
staff ratios and permanent academics with doctorates. With regard 
to student–staff ratios, two institutions managed to decrease 
the instruction loads of their academic staff (Mauritius: ratio 
of 24:1 in 2001 to 16:1 in 2007; NMMU: 31:1 down to 28:1) 
(see Table 2 in Appendix 1). The student–staff ratio at Ghana 
increased substantially from 12:1 in 2001 to 31:1 in 2007, as did 
that of Botswana from 14:1 in 2001 to 27:1 in 2007. The ratios 
at other institutions increased, but not dramatically.
These ratios do not support the stereotype of ‘mass 
overcrowding’ in African higher education; certainly not at the 
flagship universities. While one institution (Ghana) had a ratio of 
over 30:1, six institutions were under 20:1. These gross figures do, 
however, obscure substantial variations within the fields of study 
offered by institutions. For example, at Nairobi, the student–staff 
ratio in 2007 in SET was 8:1 while it was 42:1 in business. More 
unfavourable examples are Ghana where the 2007 SET ratio was 
9:1 and the business ratio was 68:1, and Makerere where the 2007 
SET ratio was 11:1 and the business ratio 96:1. More ‘normal’ 
variations were observed at Cape Town which, in 2007, had a 
22:1 ratio for SET and 42:1 for business, and Dar es Salaam 
which had 14:1 for SET and 22:1 for business.
A study by CHET (2010) on higher education differentiation 
showed that in South Africa there is a highly significant 
correlation of 0.82 between the proportion of the academic staff 
of a university that has a doctorate as their highest qualification 
and the research publications produced at that university. This 
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implies that it is only in exceptional cases that academics without 
a doctorate publish in internationally recognised peer-reviewed 
journals or books.
The data show that in 2007 three universities had proportions 
of permanent academics with doctorates of 50% or higher. They 
were Nairobi (71%), Cape Town (58%) and Dar es Salaam 
(50%). This is very strong capacity – in South Africa, only 3 of 
23 universities in 2007 had a proportion of 50% or higher of 
permanent academic staff with doctorates. Ghana, Makerere, 
Mauritius and NMMU had, in 2007, proportions of permanent 
academic staff with doctorates in the band 30% to 49%. No trend 
data are available for this indicator to comment on whether the 
percentages of staff with doctorates are increasing or decreasing. 
The three output indicators are SET graduation rates, doctoral 
graduates and publications in ISI-recognised journals. For SET 
graduation rates, an average annual ratio of 25% SET graduates to 
SET enrolments is roughly equivalent to a cohort graduation rate 
of 75%, a ratio of 20% is equivalent to a cohort graduation rate of 
60%, and a ratio of 15% is equivalent to a cohort graduation rate 
of 45%. The SET graduation rates show that Botswana, Makerere, 
Mauritius and Cape Town all have rates of at least 60% of the 
cohort of students graduating, while Dar es Salaam’s is just under 
60%. The rest are under 50%. Eduardo Mondlane, which had the 
highest proportion of enrolments in SET (54% of its enrolments 
during 2001–2007), had the poorest graduation rate. 
Doctoral output is very low. Five of the universities (Botswana, 
Dar es Salaam, Ghana, Mauritius and Eduardo) produced 20 or 
fewer doctorates in 2007, while three universities (Makerere, 
Nairobi and NMMU) produced between 20 and 40, and 
Cape Town over 100. Most worrisome is that amongst all the 
institutions, the growth in doctoral graduations is below 10%, 
with the exceptions of Ghana, Dar es Salaam and Makerere, 
which grew from a very low base. At the University of Nairobi, 
doctoral enrolments declined by 17%.
The slow growth in doctoral enrolments is in sharp contrast 
to the ‘explosion’ of masters enrolments. At Dar es Salaam, 
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enrolment of masters increased by 23.5% (from 609 in 2001 to 
2 165 in 2007). Three other universities (Mauritius, Makerere 
and Botswana) had average annual increases of higher than 10% 
between 2001 and 2007. At the other universities growth was 
below 10%, with Cape Town growing less than 1%.
As was indicated above, the fast growth in masters enrolments 
was not matched by a commensurate expansion in doctoral studies. 
For example, at Nairobi, masters enrolments between 2001 and 
2007 grew at an average annual rate of 7.7% while doctoral 
enrolments declined. At Makerere, masters enrolments grew at 
an annual rate of 15.5% while doctoral enrolments grew at only 
2.3%. The continuation rates from masters to doctoral studies seem 
absurdly low in certain cases. An ideal ratio of masters to doctoral 
enrolments should be at least 5:1, which is an indication that 
masters graduates flow into doctoral research programmes. In 2007, 
Cape Town, Mauritius and NMMU all had ratios of masters to 
doctoral students below 4:1. Botswana, Dar es Salaam and Ghana 
all had ratios between 10:1 to 23:1, while the other three – Eduardo 
Mondlane, Makerere and Nairobi – had ratios above 50:1.
Regarding research publications, it is assumed that a flagship 
knowledge producer must produce research-based academic 
articles that can be published in internationally peer-reviewed 
journals and/or books. The target for permanent academics was 
set at one research article in a Web of Science indexed journal 
to be published every two years, which translates into an annual 
ratio of 0.50 research publications per academic. In our sample, 
which deals with average ratios for the period 2001–2007, only 
Cape Town (with an average of 0.95) met this requirement. 
With the exceptions of NMMU (0.31) and Mauritius (0.13), the 
ratios of the other universities imply that on average each of their 
permanent academics is likely to publish only one research article 
every ten or more years.
From the above it is evident that particularly the output 
variables of the universities are not strong enough to make a 
sustainable knowledge production contribution to development. 
Nevertheless, there are some positive trends. The majority of 
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universities have strong input performance in academics with 
doctorates, student–staff ratios, and an increase in enrolments 
at the masters level. On the output side, the graduation rate of 
SET is quite strong for most of the institutions. There is also an 
increase in research output, albeit from a very low base. However, 
it should also be noted that even though the research productivity 
in terms of academic articles produced is increasing at the 
universities in the study, since the productivity in the rest of the 
world is increasing much faster, the relative position of Africa as 
knowledge producer is decreasing gradually. Sub-Saharan Africa 
contributes around 0.7% to world scientific output, and this 
figure has decreased over the last 15 to 20 years (French Academy 
of Sciences 2006).
Capacity and productivity 
There is a long-held common-sense view that the lack of research 
output in African universities is simply a lack of capacity and 
resources. However, a closer inspection of the input and output 
indicators raises some interesting questions about this assumption. 
In order to explore this further, we selected Cape Town from 
Group 1, Dar es Salaam from Group 3 and Ghana from Group 4 
as representatives of these groups and plotted a comparative graph 
based on standardised scores (see Figure 1). 
The data show that there are surprising similarities between 
Dar es Salaam and Cape Town in terms of input indicators such as 
SET enrolments (Cape Town 41%, Dar es Salaam 40%), student–
staff ratio (Cape Town 13:1, Dar es Salaam 14:1) and academics 
with PhDs (Cape Town 58%, Dar es Salaam 50%). Ghana, on 
the other hand, is only similar to the other two in terms of staff 
qualifications. On the input side, the big difference between Cape 
Town, on the one hand, and Dar es Salaam and Ghana on the 
other, is in percentage of postgraduate students (Cape Town 19% 
versus Dar es Salaam 9% and Ghana 7%) and research income 
per permanent staff member (Cape Town USD 47 700 versus 
Dar es Salaam USD 6 400 and Ghana USD 3 400).
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With regard to output indicators, Cape Town and Dar es Salaam 
have similar SET graduation rates (21% and 19%, respectively). 
The dramatic difference is in doctoral graduates (average for 2001–
2007): Cape Town 15% of academic staff, and Dar es Salaam and 
Ghana less than 3% per academic staff member; and publications 
(2007): Cape Town 1 017, Ghana 61 and Dar es Salaam 70.
These data pose some intriguing issues for higher education 
in Africa. Cape Town and Dar es Salaam have remarkably similar 
































Cape Town 41% 19% 13 58% 47 700 21% 15.00% 0.95
Dar es Salaam 40% 9% 14 50% 6 400 19% 2.18% 0.08
Ghana 19% 7% 22 47% 3 400 16% 0.17% 0.11
*   In the data table the student:staff ratio is given, whilst the inverse of the student:staff ratio has been used in the graph 
representing the results of the k-means clustering. This was done because a high student:staff value is unfavourable and 
should thus reflect a low value in the k-means clustering. The University of Ghana has a high value for student:staff value 
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profiles in terms of SET (input and output), student–staff ratios, 
and staff with doctorates, but are not comparable regarding the 
production of doctorates and publications. What distinguishes 
Cape Town from the other institutions is much higher 
proportions of postgraduates, research income and knowledge 
production outputs. 
In terms of input capacity, Cape Town and Dar es Salaam 
are surprisingly similar, with the exception of research income 
(resources). Does this mean that research income is the only 
factor that prevents Dar es Salaam from achieving the same level 
of outputs as Cape Town?
During interviews with senior academics, three factors emerged 
that raise questions and warrant further research. The first is 
the problem of research funding. Not only is there very limited 
research funding, but the cumbersome application procedures 
and the restrictions on what the research funds can be used for 
makes consultancy money much more attractive; in other words, 
consultancy money directly supplements academics’ income, 
and the researchers also have much more discretion about how 
it is used. The negative side of consultancy funds is that there is 
no pressure or expectation to publish, nor to train postgraduate 
students. It thus affects negatively both aspects of knowledge 
production, that is, postgraduate training and publishing.
Incentives to publish, as is the case in many countries, are 
a problem. After obtaining the professorship, publishing in 
international journals is not directly rewarded, but is rather a matter 
of prestige or ‘institutional culture’. In order to incentivise this 
activity, universities in Africa might have to start exploring incentive 
systems. In South Africa, the national government subsidises each 
institution to the tune of about USD 45 000 per PhD graduate and 
USD 15 000 per accredited publication. But this is not a simple 
correlation. Two of the universities with the highest publication 
rates per permanent academic (Cape Town and Rhodes) do not pass 
a portion of the subsidy directly to the academic or the department, 
but put it in a pool which funds common research infrastructure, or 
where everybody can compete for it. 
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Another dimension that certainly warrants further exploration 
is the relationship between research and consultancy. A PhD study 
by Langa (2010) suggests that having a strong academic network 
link, with publications, is an entry for getting consultancies. So, 
it is not that academics choose research or consultancy; some do 
a balancing act between research and consultancy, while others 
seem to ‘drift off’ into consultancy and foreign aid networks.
A second problem that is affecting the production of 
doctorates, and associated research training and publication, is 
the huge increase in taught masters courses which do not lead to 
doctoral study. For example, the University of Cape Town had 
2 906 masters enrolments and 1 002 doctoral enrolments in 2007. 
In contrast, in 2007 Dar es Salaam had 2 165 masters students 
and only 190 doctoral enrolments (see Table 3 in Appendix 1). 
This means that there is a serious ‘pipeline’ problem at universities 
like Dar es Salaam. This could be because the masters degree does 
not inspire sufficient confidence in students to enrol for the PhD, 
or because there are no incentives to do so, or because individuals 
are pursuing their PhD degrees abroad. Whatever the reason, the 
effect is a serious curtailing of PhD numbers and hence of an 
essential ingredient in the knowledge production process. 
According to the discussions with interview respondents, the 
third factor that distracts academics from knowledge production is 
supplementary teaching. The new method of raising third-stream 
income – namely, the innovation of private and public students in 
the same institution, with additional remuneration for teaching the 
private students – has the result that within the university, academics 
are teaching more to supplement their incomes. In addition, the 
proliferation of private higher education institutions, some literally 
within walking distance of public institutions, means that large 
numbers of senior academics are ‘double’ or ‘triple teaching’.
PhD supervision, in a context where the candidate in all 
likelihood does not have funds for full-time study and where 
there are no extrinsic (only intrinsic) institutional rewards, is a 
poor competitor for the time of the triple-teaching academic. The 
same applies to rigorous research required for international peer-
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reviewed publication: it is much easier and far more rewarding to 
triple teach and do consultancies. 
The implication of the above is that the lack of knowledge 
production at Africa’s flagship universities is not a simple lack 
of capacity and resources, but a complex set of capacities and 
contradictory rewards within a resource-scarce environment. 
Conclusions
The main conclusion from the HERANA Phase 1 research is 
that the knowledge production output variables of the academic 
cores do not reflect the lofty ambitions expressed in their mission 
statements. With the exception of the University of Cape Town, 
none of the universities in the HERANA group seem to be moving 
significantly from their traditional undergraduate teaching role 
to a strong academic core that can contribute to new knowledge 
production and, by implication, to development.
Amongst the universities there is considerable diversity regarding 
input variables. The weakest indicators are the low proportion of 
postgraduate enrolments and the inadequate research funds for 
permanent staff, with the strongest input indicators in manageable 
student–staff ratios and well-qualified staff.
On the output side, SET graduation rates are generally positive. 
But there is a convergence around low knowledge production, 
particularly doctoral graduation rates and ISI-cited publications. 
The most serious challenges to strengthening the academic 
core seem to be the lack of research funds and low knowledge 
production (PhD graduates and peer-reviewed publications). The 
study also suggests that the low knowledge production cannot 
be blamed solely on low capacity and resources; the problematic 
incentive structures at these universities require further study.
These findings should be interpreted in a context that, according 
to the system-level analysis done by the HERANA project in 
Phase 1, there is inconsistency within and between African nations 
insofar as articulating the role of the university in development and 
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infrequent acknowledgement of the contribution of the university 
as a producer of knowledge to national economic development.
In terms of further research, there is a clearly identified need to 
improve and strengthen institution-wide capturing and processing 
(institutionalisation) of key performance indicator data and to 
focus more on key performance indicators more directly related 
to knowledge production. 
For Castells, the education function, if injudiciously expanded, 
‘suffocates’ the scientific research function. The market also 
offers competing rewards. Between teaching and the allures of 
consultancy, we can surmise that Castells’s stern warning about 
balancing the functions for universities in developing countries is 
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The main findings of the second phase of the HERANA project 
provided empirical support for Castells’s assertion that the focus 
of African universities had historically been on elite formation 
and training, and that ‘research production at seven of the eight 
(UCT excluded) was not strong enough to enable them to 
build on their traditional undergraduate teaching roles to make 
a sustainable, comprehensive contribution to development via 
new knowledge production’ (Cloete et al. 2011: 165). HERANA 
Phase 2 also concluded that in none of the countries was there a 
coordinated effort between government, external stakeholders and 
the universities to systematically strengthen the contribution that 
higher education can make to development (Cloete et al. 2011). 
This chapter continues the thread from HERANA Phase 2 but 
focuses more specifically on findings from the third phase of the 
HERANA project, specifically on knowledge production and the 
ambitions of African universities to become research-intensive 
universities.
The need for research universities in Africa 
Internationally, there is growing consensus among national policy-
makers and other central socio-economic actors that the university 
is a driver for economic growth and development. This has to do 
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with the role of the university in producing a highly skilled and 
competent labour force, as well as in producing new knowledge. 
Both contributions are essential to the creation of innovation and 
development of a national economy that is globally competitive. 
This position is well summed up by Olsson and Cooke in an 
OECD/IHERD report: 
Top research universities in industrialised countries […] 
usually dominate the global ranking tables. In contrast, their 
counterparts in middle and low-income countries have, if 
anything, more important missions because they are the engines 
of local and regional knowledge development and natural 
leaders of their own evolving academic systems. As these systems 
become increasingly complex and the need to nurture knowledge 
networks for research grows ever more essential, the success 
of these institutions becomes even more crucial for national 
development policy. (2013: 18)
Echoing the above sentiments, Altbach (2013) states that, while 
research universities in the developing world have not yet achieved 
the top levels of global rankings, they are extraordinarily important 
in their countries and regions, and are steadily improving their 
reputations and competitiveness on the international stage. A key 
point is that research universities around the world are part of 
an active community of institutions which share values, foci and 
missions.
But not all universities are research universities. Research 
universities are a relatively small percentage of the higher 
education sector. In America, the proportion of research-intensive 
universities is about 5% (220 research universities in a system 
of more than 4 000 post-secondary institutions: see Chapter 3: 
39 above), in the UK 25% (25 research universities among 100 
universities) and in China 3% (100 research universities out of 
more than 3 000 institutions countrywide). In many smaller 
developing countries, there is often only one research university 
and many countries have none (Altbach 2013).
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A clearly differentiated academic system is needed for research 
universities to flourish. For that, developing countries need to 
differentiate the missions of institutions in the post-secondary 
system, and to organise institutions in a rational way. But 
according to Altbach: 
The fact is that few if any developing countries have a differentiated 
academic system in place; and this central organisational 
requirement remains a key task [...] These institutions must be 
clearly identified and supported. There must be arrangements 
so that the number of research universities will be sufficiently 
limited so that funding is available for them and that other 
resources, such as well-qualified academics, are not spread too 
thinly. (2013: 328)
The reluctance of governments in Africa to support differentiated 
research universities is a major stumbling block towards developing 
a research university.  
Does Africa have research universities? 
Altbach and Balán (2007) did not include Africa in their book 
World Class Worldwide that deals with the transformation of 
research universities in Asia and Latin America. They justify the 
exclusion of Africa on the grounds that the continent’s academic 
challenges are sufficiently different from those of Latin America 
and Asia (Altbach & Balán 2007: vii). They provide no empirical 
evidence for the exclusion of Africa. Nevertheless, in the current 
context of world class and rankings, an inevitable starting point 
is considering how Africa is doing in the global rankings, and it is 
obvious that African universities do not fare well. 
Times Higher Education’s (2017) ranking of universities 
in BRICS and Emerging Economies scoring has a heavy bias 
towards research, with half of the score made up of ‘direct’ research 
components: 30% of the score for ‘Research (volume, income 
and reputation)’ and 20% for ‘Citations (research influence)’. 
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Other components could be described as being comprised of 
‘indirect’ research such as ‘Doctorates awarded to academic staff’ 
at 6% (academic staff with doctorates reflect an institutional 
commitment to producing the next generation of academics and 
the awarding of PhDs is an indicator of new research capacity), 
‘International collaboration’ at 3.34% (often predicated on 
research collaboration), and ‘Industry income’ at 10% (in which 
case the university must have produced knowledge or have the 
expertise to apply to transfer existing cutting-edge knowledge to 
industries eager for innovation and invention).
Times Higher Education’s (2017) ranking of universities 
in BRICS and Emerging Economies1 reveals that in the Top 20 
there are two universities from Africa, both from South Africa 
(University of Cape Town, 4th; University of the Witwatersrand, 
8th). Only ten other sub-Saharan African universities appear in 
the ranking of 300 universities, and only three of these are outside 
of South Africa: University of Ghana, University of Nairobi and 
University of Ibadan.2 In comparison, Russia has three universities 
in the Top 20 while Brazil and India each have one university in 
the Top 20. China and Taiwan lead the way with seven and three 
universities respectively in the Top 20.
Evidence about Africa’s performance on the global research 
and science stage is not encouraging. Zeleza, in a broad-
ranging review of Africa’s performance in science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics (STEM), shows that Africa 
remains at the bottom of the global science, technology and 
innovation league tables and lags behind on key indicators, such 
as the gross domestic expenditure on research and development, 
1 The  BRICS & Emerging Economies Rankings  use the same 13  calibrated 
performance indicators as for the World University Rankings, but the weightings are 
specially recalibrated to reflect the characteristics of emerging economy universities. 
Universities are excluded from the BRICS & Emerging Economies Rankings if they 
do not teach undergraduates or if their research output amounted to fewer than 200 
papers a year between 2010 and 2014.
2 Makerere University is not listed in the BRICS and Emerging Economies Rankings 
because Uganda is not eligible for inclusion. It is ranked in the 401–500 band of 
the World University Rankings 2016–2017 of 980 universities.  
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number of researchers and share of scientific publications and 
patents (Zeleza 2014: 1). 
While Africa is at the bottom of every indicator, a positive 
feature is the growth in the publication of journal articles in Africa. 
According to Elsevier (Schemm 2013), from 1996 to 2012, the 
number of research papers published in scientific journals with 
at least one African author more than quadrupled from about 
12 500 to over 52 000. During the same time the share of the 
world’s articles with African authors almost doubled from 1.2% 
to around 2.3%, although admittedly from a low base. 
A more favourable picture also emerges from the latest 
assessment of the state of science in the African Union. Using 
the Scopus database for peer reviewed publications, the African 
Observatory for Science, Technology and Innovation (2013) 
reports that, over the period 2008 to 2010, African Union 
publication output grew by 43% compared to the world average 
of 18%. If the African Union were considered a country, it would, 
in the BRICS context, be just behind India, China and Brazil, but 
ahead of Russia in publication output. 
Zeleza argues that there is a considerable literature, by both 
national and international agencies and scholars, on the capacity 
constraints and challenges facing African countries in building 
robust research systems. Four key issues are highlighted:
1. Basing science policy on the technological and industrial 
needs of the particular society and integrating it into 
national development plans, with adequate and stable 
funding for implementation;
2. Massively expanding the size and support for the higher 
education sector;
3. Incentivising the business sector to invest in research and 
development by itself and through industry–university 
collaborations; and
4. Promoting scientific literacy as a critical means of 




However, the underlying assumption of Zeleza’s synthesis is ‘more 
for everybody’ because in Africa no government or university 
sector wants to openly promote differentiation; at the same time, 
in all the countries there are national, first post-independence 
universities which are much better resourced and have much 
higher status than most other public and private universities. 
Research by CHET shows that, in South Africa, the sector is 
differentiated into clearly distinguishable clusters or groups in 
terms of a wide range of performance indicators (Bunting 2013). 
This differentiation occurred due to a combination of historical 
factors and performance-based funding in the post-1994 higher 
education system. 
Castells (2001: 215–217) presents a number of structural and 
institutional reasons which might explain this lack of progress. The 
structural reasons include low levels of funding and ‘the cumulative 
character of the process of uneven scientific development’ leading, 
amongst other things, to a lack of centres of excellence that are at 
cutting edge of a specific area of specialisation. In other words, 
the academic environment in African universities is not attractive 
enough for talented national scholars who relocate to overseas 
universities as a consequence, especially in North America and 
Europe, which offer more attractive academic environments. The 
main institutional reason for a lack of progress is that African 
universities battle to manage the contradictory functions described 
by Castells; that is, African universities are unable to manage 
successfully the political and ideological functions alongside the 
academic teaching activities of the university. 
An empirical overview of research at seven African universities
In its analyses of research outputs at African universities from 
2001 to 2014,3 the HERANA project, in collaboration with the 
3 To achieve consistency in the data reporting, all dates have been converted to 
calendar years. If for example a university reports its academic year as 2013/14, 
then its data for that year will be reported as simply 2014. Seven of the original 
eight HERANA universities submitted data covering the full 14-year period. The 
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Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology at 
Stellenbosch University, extracted from the Web of Science4 all 
papers which contained at least one author whose address was 
that of one of the eight flagship universities. If the authors of a 
research publication recorded on a citation index were employed 
by different universities, then full publication units were assigned 
to each of the universities concerned (Bunting et al. 2015).
To ensure maximum accuracy, the data that had been 
collected, systematised and analysed were returned to each 
institution’s planning department in three stages for verification. 
The publication emerging from this research, An Empirical 
Overview of Eight Flagship Universities in Africa (Bunting et al. 
2015), was also reviewed by each of the participating institutions 
before finalisation. A dataset which is unique to the African 
context was developed during this process, and contains 11 years 
of comparable data across these eight flagship universities.5
In its analyses of performance indicators, the HERANA project 
followed the OECD guidelines in taking the primary high-level 
knowledge inputs of universities to be doctoral enrolments and 
academic staff, and their high-level knowledge outputs to be 
doctoral graduates and research publications. For the purposes of 
these analyses, staff members were defined as persons who were 
on the payroll of a university in either a full-time or part-time 
capacity. They were classified as permanent if they held a full-time 
contract of more than three years, and as temporary if they did 
not have such a contract. The staff employed by universities were 
placed into three broad categories: academic (more than 50% 
of time on research or instruction); administrative (including 
executive management, deans and other senior administrative 
positions spending less than 50% of their time on teaching/
research); and service (mainly lower-skilled, such as cleaning and 
gardening employees).
University of Dar es Salaam was not able to meet the data requirements for the 
HERANA Phase 3 of 2011/12 to 2013/14 (but has subsequently done so). 
4 Web of Science: http://thomsonreuters.com/thomson-reuters-web-of-science/ 
5 See http://www.chet.org.za/data/african-he-opendata 
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A key component in the analyses of performance was the 
link between knowledge outputs and high-level academic 
staff inputs of universities, which were taken to include their 
permanent academic staff with doctoral qualifications, and 
their senior academic staff who hold ranks of full professor or 
associate professor. These two sets of permanent academics do not 
necessarily overlap: some staff with doctorates may hold the rank 
of lecturer or senior lecturer, while some professors and associate 
professors may not have doctoral qualifications. The key issue is 
that a university’s permanent academic staff in the two groupings 
should be its research leaders.
The data shows substantial enrolment growth over the 14-year 
period (see Table 1 in Appendix 2). Total enrolments increased by 
147 000 (or 162%) in 2014 compared to 2001. Undergraduate 
enrolments increased by 123  000 (or 155%) and postgraduate 
enrolments by 24 000 (or 212%). The average annual growth rate 
in total enrolments was a very high 7.7% over this period. The 
patterns of growth differed widely across the seven universities 
(see Figure 1 in Appendix 2). Three universities (Nairobi, Ghana 
and Eduardo Mondlane) accounted for 111 000 (or 76%) of the 
total growth of 147 000. Their average annual growth rates ranged 
from 10.2% to 12.8%, compared to the growth rates of between 
3.0% and 4.1% for the other four universities. The most striking 
is Nairobi which increased by almost 53 000 students (average 
annual growth rate of 11.9%).  
The average annual enrolment growth rate in enrolments of 
7.7% between 2001 to 2014 was more than double the average 
annual growth rate of 3.4% in permanent academics. The most 
striking data are those for Nairobi which reported an average 
annual increase of 11.9% in student enrolments and an average 
annual increase of only 0.1% in permanent academics (see Figure 
1 in Appendix 2). Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between 
growth in student enrolments and academic staff. It shows that 
UCT, Botswana and Makerere maintained a ‘balance’ between 
staff and student growth and Nairobi grew too fast in terms of 
student growth while Eduardo Mondlane grew fast in both. 
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In terms of producing more doctorates and research publications, 
the proportion between postgraduate and undergraduate student 
numbers is important (Cloete et al. 2015). The data show that 
with the exception of Cape Town, the other six universities were 
mainly undergraduate institutions in 2014 with four having an 
undergraduate proportion of more than 90%. It is clearly difficult 
for African universities to change the mix between undergraduate 
and postgraduate students: during the period 2001 to 2014 
the decrease in the proportion of undergraduates was only 2 
percentage points (see Figure 2 in Appendix 2).  
A university which is well equipped for the production of 
high-level knowledge should be one which has a high proportion 
of senior academic staff and a high proportion of academic staff 
with doctorates. The 2014 data for the proportion of permanent 
academics in the senior ranks to the proportion of those with 
doctorates as their highest formal qualifications show that Cape 
Town and Botswana were the only universities with more than 


















































50% of academic staff in the senior ranks, and Botswana, Ghana 
and Cape Town were the only universities with more than 60% of 
staff with doctorates (see Figure 3 in Appendix 2).
During the period 2001 to 2014 there was growth in the 
percentage of staff with doctorates at Cape Town, Ghana, 
Mauritius and Makerere to levels of between 40% and 70% in 
2014. However, the proportion of staff with doctorates decreased 
at Botswana and there was a significant decline of 21% at Nairobi 
to just over 20% of staff with doctorates in 2014 (see Figure 4 in 
Appendix 2). 
The knowledge production outputs of universities are generally 
taken to be doctoral graduates and research publications. The seven 
universities produced a total of 3 538 doctoral graduates over the 
14-year period 2001 to 2014. Cape Town produced the highest 
total and proportion of 2 013 and 57%, followed by Nairobi with 
a total of 539 and 15% of the doctoral aggregate. The overall 
trend is an increase in output (see Figure 5 in Appendix 2). For 
example, Nairobi’s doctoral graduate total increased from 26 in 
2001 to 100 in 2014, and Makerere’s total increased from 10 in 
2001 to 54 in 2014. Nairobi, with the largest increase in student 
enrolments, and the biggest decrease in staff with doctorates 
also shows an increase in doctoral output. The only decline 
is at Mauritius, and the lack of doctoral graduates at Eduardo 
Mondlane is attributable to the fact that their doctoral students 
are registered in Sweden as part of Swedish SIDA grants. From 
2016 this will change with doctoral students registered at Eduardo 
Mondlane and participating in joint doctoral programmes with 
Swedish and South African universities. 
The research publication data show that the seven universities 
produced a total of 32 371 research publications over the 14-
year period 2001 to 2014. Cape Town was assigned 23 055 whole 
units (or 63%) of the total for this period, followed by Makerere 
with a whole unit total of 4 012 or 12% of the total. Figure 2 
shows that there was an increase in output at all the universities, 
with Makerere and Ghana showing the strongest growth. 
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Table 1:  Ratios of total publication units to total permanent academic staff 
at eight African universities, 2001–2014
2000/01 2004/05 2007/08 2010/11 2013/14
Botswana 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.18 0.20
Cape Town 1.18 1.24 1.76 2.02 2.19
Eduardo Mondlane 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
Ghana 0.14 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.27
Makerere 0.09 0.15 0.24 0.41 0.38
Mauritius 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.22 0.25
Nairobi 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.26
Table 1 expresses the research publication units allocated to the 
seven universities as ratios of their permanent academic staff totals. 
The resulting ratios are related to a HERANA performance target 





















































of 1.0 research publication units per permanent academic staff 
member per annum. The data in the table show that only Cape 
Town  exceeded the target. Its ratio of research publications to 
permanent academic staff members rose from 1.18 in 2001 to 2.19 
in 2014. None of the other six universities exceeded a ratio of 0.5.
Contradictory functions 
In terms of the different functions of universities, Castells 
(1991) observed that ‘because universities are social systems and 
historically produced institutions’, they undertake all of the four 
functions simultaneously within the same structure – although 
with different emphases at different historical moments. Castells 
concludes that the ‘critical element in the structure and dynamics 
of university systems is to combine and make compatible 
seemingly contradictory functions’.
To illustrate these possible ‘contradictions’, three case studies 
were chosen from the group of HERANA universities. These case 
studies appear in a paper entitled ‘Data Trends and Institutional 
Performance: An overview of seven HERANA universities’, which 
was presented  at a meeting in Cape Town in November 2015 
(Bunting & Cloete 2015). 
The University of Mauritius was selected because it is located 
in the only African country studied that had a pact about the role 
of higher education and explicit knowledge economy policies. 
The universities of Nairobi and Makerere were included because 
they are both large, well-known African universities that have 
intentions and policies to become research-led, but are grappling 
with trading off enrolment expansion with a focus on doctoral 
training and research, albeit with somewhat different outcomes.
 
Mauritius
Mauritius is the only country in the HERANA group that has a very 
explicit role for higher education in development, as articulated 
in national policy documents such as ‘Developing Mauritius 
into a Knowledge Hub and a Centre of Higher Learning’, and 
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is currently rated the most competitive economy in Africa by the 
World Economic Forum.
However, the assessment of the University of Mauritius as 
a flagship institution showed that it met only 3 of 13 flagship 
targets – those relating to its proportion of students in science, 
engineering and technology (SET), and to its throughput rates 
of masters and doctoral graduates. Furthermore, the institution 
exhibited a number of weaknesses in relation to knowledge 
production, for instance:
• Mauritius remained primarily an undergraduate institution 
over the14-year period 2001 to 2014, with more than 90% 
of students enrolled in undergraduate programmes. As a 
consequence, Mauritius’ proportions of masters and doctoral 
enrolments remained low, and below the flagship targets as 
well as the averages for the other HERANA universities.
• Mauritius’s total of tenured academics grew at only half the 
average annual rate of its total student enrolment growth over 
the period 2001 to 2014: 3.3% compared to 6.6%. Student 
to academic staff ratios nevertheless remained favourable, and 
the capacity of Mauritius’ academic staff to supervise doctoral 
students and produce research outputs improved. By 2014, 
47% of tenured academics held doctoral degrees, but doctoral 
enrolments in that year totalled only 20. There were therefore 
seven academics with doctorates available per doctoral student 
requiring supervision.
• The research outputs of Mauritius were low throughout the 
14-year period. In 2014, the university had 295 tenured 
academics, and they produced a total of only 144 research 
articles. Its average annual article output per academic staff 
member has been about 0.5, which is below both the flagship 
target of 1.0 and the output averages of other HERANA 
universities.
In summary, the assessment of the University of Mauritius shows 
that despite Mauritius being the only country in the HERANA 
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project that had a pact of policies and strategies to be a leader in 
the knowledge economy, without a policy of differentiation in the 
higher education system, the University of Mauritius has not been 
able to make a trade-off between being a largely undergraduate 
teaching institution and a research-led flagship university. In other 
words, the contradictory functions of training for the labour 
market and producing (and applying) scientific knowledge have 
not been managed in a way that allows the university to assume 
a role as a producer of new knowledge. As previous HERANA-
related research has shown, there is clearly misalignment between 
system-level aspirations and the University of Mauritius’s ability to 
fulfil those aspirations (Van Schalkwyk 2011).  
Nairobi
The University of Nairobi has taken some steps towards its ambition 
of being a research-intensive university, such as establishing an 
office for a deputy vice-chancellor for research, appointing a 
director of research, increasing research funding, introducing 
recognition and incentives for outstanding researchers, and 
strengthening support for postgraduate research.
The assessment of the University of Nairobi as a flagship 
university shows that by 2014 the university met only 3 of 
HERANA’s 13 flagship targets. It had a high proportion of 
enrolments in masters programmes, a favourable ratio of full-time 
equivalent students to academic-staff in science and technology 
programmes, and a high throughput rate of masters graduates. 
The assessment also highlights the areas in which the university 
appears to be facing serious challenges, including the following:
• Nairobi had substantial increases in masters students between 
2001 and 2014. The total of masters enrolments increased 
from 1 700 in 2001 to 11 800 in 2014; an average annual 
increase of 10.8%. In 2014, 17% of Nairobi’s students were 
enrolled for masters degrees, which implied that it could not 
be termed a ‘primarily undergraduate’ university. But despite 
this increase in masters students, the number of doctoral 
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enrolments remained low and reached only 700 in 2014. 
The proportion of Nairobi’s students in doctoral programmes 
reached only 1% in 2014, which was well below the HERANA 
flagship target of 3%.  
• Nairobi’s total undergraduate plus postgraduate student 
enrolment grew at an average annual rate of 11.9% between 
2001 and 2014. In marked contrast, its total of tenured 
academics increased at an average annual rate of only 0.1% over 
the period. Its student to academic staff ratios for fields of study 
in business and management, education, and social science and 
humanities became increasingly unsatisfactory over the period.
• The numbers of Nairobi’s academic staff who had doctoral 
degrees and who could be expected to supervise research 
students dropped by half over the five-year period 2010 to 
2014. In 2010, 600 or 45% of the university’s permanent 
academics held doctoral degrees, compared to the 2014 total 
of 302 or 24%.
• Nairobi increased its research outputs in the form of doctoral 
graduates and research articles over the 14-year period 2001 
to 2014. Its doctoral graduate total increased from 26 in 
2001 to 100 in 2014, and its research article total from 172 
to 314 in 2014. Its publication output relative to the number 
of academics employed was however only 0.26 in 2014, 
compared to the flagship target of 1.0.
In summary, Nairobi is an interesting example of a university that 
is trying to resolve the tensions of enrolment expansion (earning 
more income) and developing a stronger research postgraduate 
function, but without a supporting government policy framework. 
However, from the research and doctoral output figures, it is clear 
that the staff complement cannot cope with the contradictory 
pressures. 
Makerere
Makerere’s strategic plan has three pillars: becoming a research-
led university, transitioning from a teacher-centred to a learner-
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centred institution, and making a paradigm shift from outreach 
to knowledge transfer.
In order to move towards a research-led institution, Makerere 
instituted a number of strategies and structures, including the 
establishment of a directorate of research and graduate training, 
strengthening institutional planning, developing a framework 
for research management, and developing a research monitoring 
framework.
The assessment of Makerere shows that the institution met 
3 of the 13 flagship targets. These relate to its favourable ratio 
of full-time equivalent students to academic staff in science and 
technology programmes, as well as the throughput rate of total 
graduates and of masters graduates. The assessment also showed 
that over the period 2001 to 2014, Makerere had faced specific 
challenges, including the following:
• The proportions of masters students and of doctoral 
students were below the flagship targets, below the average 
for the HERANA universities. In 2014, 6% of Makerere’s 
enrolments were in masters programmes and 1.4% in doctoral 
programmes, compared to the targets of 12% and 3%. 
Nevertheless, between 2001 and 2014, masters enrolments 
doubled from 1 100 in 2001 to 2 200, while doctoral 
enrolments grew phenomenally from 32 to 563 (an average 
annual rate of 22.7%).
• Of particular concern for Makerere’s ambition to become a 
research university is that it has remained a predominantly 
undergraduate university: in 2001, 94% of the student body 
was at the undergraduate level and this proportion had only 
dropped to 90% by 2014 – compared, for instance, to 65% 
at the University of Cape Town.
• Makerere’s proportion of tenured academics with doctoral 
degrees improved to 44% in 2014, which was close to the 
flagship target of 50%. Its proportion of senior academics 
who could be research leaders was however problematic, 
being only 30%, which was half of the flagship target of 60%. 
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These proportions, and in particular the low proportion of 
senior academics, raise concerns about Makerere’s research 
leadership capacity. 
• Makerere’s research publication output went from 92 in 2001 
to 528 in 2014, an average annual increase of 14.4%, which 
was substantially higher than the average annual increase of 
8.8% for the HERANA universities. But the publication totals 
were still low relative to the number of tenured academic staff. 
In 2014, Makerere’s ratio of research publications to tenured 
academics was 0.38, which was well below the flagship target 
of 1.0.
• Makerere’s research output in the form of doctoral graduates 
increased from 10 in 2001 to 54 in 2014. The output per 
tenured academic was however well below the flagship target: 
0.04 compared to the target ratio of 0.15.
While Makerere’s overall research outputs are low in international 
terms, the improvements in doctoral enrolments and graduation, 
and in research productivity, do represent substantial increases 
from the low starting base. These improvements also show that 
institutions with determined strategies and structural changes – 
such as capping undergraduate growth and increasing doctoral 
enrolments while curbing masters-level growth – can bring about 
change, even under adverse conditions.  
Managing contradictory functions
Two important ideas put forward by Manuel Castells were the 
importance of a university system and the challenges associated 
with managing contradictory functions. The challenge, then, is to 
develop institutions that will be strong and dynamic enough to 
withstand the tensions inherent in these contradictory functions, 
while at the same time be able to respond to what they see as their 
specific ‘mission’ or task in a particular moment in the history 
of the system. In Castells’s formulation, the challenge is not to 
do with the endless rhetorical calls to shift the university from 
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the so-called ivory tower to the community, or the diametrically 
opposite demand of shifting the university from the public arena 
to secluded laboratories or capitalist boardrooms. Rather, for 
Castells (1991: 14; see also Chapter 3: 42–43 above): 
The ability to manage the contradictions while emphasizing the 
universities’ role in generating knowledge and training labour in 
the context of the new requirements of the development process 
will to a large extent determine the capacity of countries and 
regions to become part of the new world economy. 
While it is important that different institutions fulfil different 
functions, which might be accentuated at different moments of 
history, universities need the capacity to constantly combine and 
re-combine their functions and emphases. Furthermore, this has to 
happen both within a university and also within a higher education 
system because all the contradictory functions of a system cannot 
be resolved within a single university (Castells 1991). That is why 
system differentiation is so critical. Ideally, these various functions 
of the university need to be distributed throughout a system with 
particular institutional types undertaking different combinations 
of functions. Yet it is in determining these combinations that 
prevailing debates and contestations arise.
While there are national factors (such as the lack of a coherent 
research policy framework) and institutional factors (such 
as incentives for teaching privately sponsored students) that 
mitigate against strengthening an institutional research culture, 
a major structural obstacle is the lack of differentiation in the 
national system.
Differentiation
Van Vught (2007: 5-6) has argued that differentiation has the 
following positive effects for higher education systems: 
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• It improves access for students with different educational 
backgrounds and achievements;
• It enables social mobility by offering different modes of entry 
into higher education, multiple forms of transfer, and upward 
as well as ‘honourable downward’ mobility;
• It can meet the needs of the labour market by creating a 
growing variety of specialisations that are needed for economic 
and social development;
• It serves the needs of interest groups by allowing many to 
develop their own identity and political legitimisation; and
• It permits the crucial combination of elite and mass higher 
education: this combination is more diversified than elite 
systems on their own as they absorb a heterogeneous clientele 
and try to respond to a range of demands from the labour 
market.
Van Vught (2007) concluded that despite these obvious 
advantages, in recent decades, tertiary systems around the world 
have been becoming less diverse and differentiated. He attributed 
this to a combination of uniform (one-size-fits-all) government 
policies which tend to drive towards homogenisation, and the 
ability of powerful academic communities to defend their norms 
and aspirations (Van Vught 2007). 
Njuguna Ng’ethe from the University of Nairobi reported 
on one of the first (and only) systematic studies focusing on 
differentiation in Africa (see Ng’ethe et al. 2008). This World 
Bank-sponsored investigation covered higher education systems 
in 12 African countries and, for comparative purposes, Korea, 
Singapore, Chile, the United Kingdom and France. Significantly, 
Ng’ethe observed that the expansion of higher education in 
Africa had not been accompanied by differentiation; instead, 
there was evidence of institutional isomorphism whereby newly 
established institutions strove to replicate the dominant ‘mother’ 
university (MacGregor 2008). In other words, the impulse was 
for universities to become more and more alike, rather than to 
develop diverse missions. 
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Ng’ethe highlighted four aspects which contribute to the trend 
towards institutional homogenisation in Africa (see MacGregor 
2008).6 Firstly, in most African countries, higher education 
funding is based on total student enrolments. Thus, even if 
an institution starts out with the intention of specialising in a 
particular area, in a context of low regulation, institutions are 
free to add other academic programmes, which are often money-
spinners (meaning cheaper but popular). This can have the 
effect of undermining the potential for differentiation. Secondly, 
the uniform approach to institutional governance, in which 
institutions are established in the same way, under similar laws, 
does not allow for differentiation in governance mechanisms. 
If this is added to the undifferentiated government funding 
mechanism, then there is a great homogenising pressure. Thirdly, 
a phenomenon in African higher education is that of off-shore 
(private) providers. While these institutions do introduce some 
level of differentiation by offering degrees from other countries, 
they also offer popular courses in commercial areas (e.g. business 
administration or information and communication technology). 
In this regard, Ng’ethe concluded that ‘overseas universities are 
not driving a high level of differentiation’ (MacGregor 2008). 
Finally, even when it appears that there are different types 
of institutions as reflected in different nomenclature (such as 
‘universities of technology’), more often than not, the curricula 
are not very different across these apparently different institutional 
types. The same can be said of academic programmes where 
different course titles belie otherwise very similar content.
Manuel Castells (see Chapter 4 above) emphasised the 
importance of the relative quality of a university system and 
observed that ‘the quality, effectiveness and relevance of the 
university system will be directly related to the ability of people, 
society and institutions to develop’ (Chapter 4: 95). The case 
6 Ng’ethe’s focus on the issue of differentiation in the African context was mainly 
on size and shape (programme/curriculum) differences, with little attention to 
differentiation in terms of knowledge production (doctoral education and research 
output), which is the core focus of the HERANA project.
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studies of the three African flagship universities discussed above 
illustrate that neither a university alone, nor a government on 
its own, can bring about a differentiated system that creates the 
conditions favourable for research-intensive institutions to thrive. 
An important question is whether differentiated systems are 
more likely to be created by a strong, regulating government, or 
by autonomous institutions operating in market-like settings. As 
the studies referred to earlier show, the situation in Africa is not 
different from elsewhere; that is, autonomous higher education 
institutions do not attempt to develop a profile which is different 
from all other higher education institutions. Instead of looking for 
a fitting niche, each institution is driven by income- and status-
maximisation. As a consequence, higher education institutions are 
naturally inclined to mimic other successful institutions, thereby 
effectively limiting system-level differentiation. 
This change dynamic can only be moved in a differentiation-
enhancing direction through effective government-led policies, 
incentives and regulations. Unfortunately, as the HERANA 
data show, the current situation in Africa deviates from this 
emerging understanding of the factors that stimulate system 
differentiation in higher education. First, government policies 
aimed at increasing the capacity of the higher education system 
by establishing new universities have in general used one basic 
university model, resulting in new universities becoming ‘clones’ 
of existing universities in the same system. Second, public 
and private institutions that enjoyed the level of institutional 
autonomy that  allowed them to develop unique profiles have, in 
general, combined mimicking and budget-maximising behaviour 
(e.g. recruiting large numbers of fee-paying ‘private’ students). 
As part of the broader HERANA project, Bailey (2015) 
concluded from the study of higher education councils in Africa 
that there was evidence of a shift from a state control approach to a 
state supervision model of higher education governance in all eight 
countries. This is a very significant and positive development in sub-
Saharan Africa. A state supervisory system is characterised by ‘multi-
level multi-actor’ governance which includes the redistribution of 
156
CASTELLS IN AFRICA
decision-making powers, responsibilities and accountability among 
external and internal stakeholders. The governance architecture 
in such systems consists of a parent ministry (and its relevant 
department or unit) with overall responsibility for policy-making, 
strategic planning and ensuring compliance; semi-autonomous 
agencies responsible for, amongst others, policy implementation, 
distributing and monitoring public funds, external quality 
assurance and regulation (including setting norms and standards), 
monitoring and analysing, and providing expert advice; as well 
as informal national-level forums, comprising different levels of 
institutional leadership, which can make proposals to the parent 
ministry regarding the development of the sector.
A strong indicator of the move towards a state supervisory 
approach to governance is the emergence of specialised, semi-
autonomous government agencies in what is often referred to 
as a process of ‘agencification’. Here, the main motives for the 
establishment of such agencies include demands on governments for 
greater efficiency, responsiveness, transparency and accountability; 
decreased political interference in governance matters; and enhanced 
technical expertise and the specialisation of functions. 
The study on higher education councils (Bailey 2015) concluded 
that factors that were inhibiting the ability of the national 
councils/commissions to carry out their governance roles more 
effectively related to a lack of capacity and appropriate expertise; 
the lack of comprehensive and up-to-date data; a lack of system-
level coordination; and the absence of the necessary leverage to 
compel institutions to meet their targets or the absence of a pact 
to guide the work of the councils/commissions within the overall 
system. Key policy issues identified were the need for a more 
detailed national plan for the tertiary/higher education system in 
each country; a review of governance roles and coordination at the 
system level; capacity-building and identification of expertise; the 
location (government or agency), development and maintenance 
of higher education management information systems; and 
greater clarity regarding autonomy and political independence – 
that is, a better understanding and acceptance of the need for 
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governments’ higher education agencies to have an adequate 
degree of operational autonomy (Braun 2008).
A concurrent study by CREST (Mouton et al. 2015) of science 
(research) granting councils in Africa concluded, amongst others, 
that the relatively low investment in R&D in many sub-Saharan 
African countries, which has a direct impact on the science 
funding models, points to different ‘inscriptions’ of science in 
different countries and different values accorded to science. On 
the one hand, some governments clearly recognise the value and 
importance of science and hence invest in science funding and in 
the establishment of a national funding agency. On the other hand, 
many governments have not – at least until very recently – judged 
science to be of sufficient value and importance to invest in the 
establishment of a relatively autonomous agency to disburse state 
funds for research and development. But the fact that there has 
been a surge of interest in the recent past in reformulating existing 
science policies as well as in the establishment of a separate ministry 
of science, may be indicative of a change even amongst the latter 
category of countries. Both the Mouton et al. (2015) and Bailey 
(2015) studies conclude that there is an urgent need for greater 
investment in science and the restructuring and strengthening of 
the research systems in the countries studied.
In conclusion, while the universities seem to be committed to 
strengthening the knowledge production function, Mauritius shows 
that even with government policies on the role of the university in the 
knowledge economy in place, if there is not a deliberate commitment 
to differentiation at both the national and institutional levels, the 
function of undergraduate training will continue to dominate. And, 
despite strong institutional commitments to strengthening research 
at both Nairobi and Makerere, without national support that can 
curtail the strong pressure for fundraising by means of expanding 
undergraduate enrolments, African universities will not be able to 





African universities and connectedness  
in the information age 
François van Schalkwyk
In China Miéville’s The City and The City, the cities of Besźel and Ul 
Qoma co-exist in the same geographical space and in the same time 
continuum. In both cities, the citizens’ complicit but voluntary 
perception of separateness sustains their cleavage. Citizens are socially 
programmed to ‘unsee’ the inhabitants, buildings, machines and 
urban furniture of the other city, and to cross over without sanction 
is to ‘breach’, invoking punishment meted out by the eponymous 
oversight authority that is a law unto itself. Movement from one 
city to another is permitted, but is subject to authorisation, and 
entry is controlled via a shared border-crossing at The Copula Hall. 
The Copula is a switch of sorts, allowing passage from one social 
order to another across a shared physical space. 
Manuel Castells postulates the ‘discovery of a new social 
structure in the making, […] conceptualised as the network 
society because it is made of networks in all the key dimensions 
of social organisation and social practice’ (Castells 2010: xviii). 
In Castells’s network society, structurally different from previous 
networks because of the advent of digital information and 
communication technologies, space and time collapse to create 
a new space of flows while, simultaneously, citizens search for 
meaning in their local realities. In such a society, and particularly 
for those global citizens who occupy key social institutions, 
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universities included, switching between networks can be both 
complex and contradictory.  
While previous chapters in this collection have paid attention 
to the role of the university in Africa, and placed particular 
emphasis on their aspirations to become research intensive within 
a quadrant of competing historical functions described by Castells, 
this chapter explores with reference to Castells’s narrative of the 
network society how universities are connecting in an increasingly 
digitally networked world to meet their objective of producing 
new knowledge while simultaneously meeting the expectations of 
their relevance to society.
This chapter is therefore a modest attempt to extend Castells’s 
theory of the network society by exploring the possibility of 
different types of connectedness in university networks. It does 
so by examining the connections university academics make in 
different networks, proposing a particular type of connectedness 
in operation at universities, and by showing that the directionality 
of connections between nodes matters for development. The 
focus is on two African universities as key social institutions 
in the production and dissemination of new knowledge in a 
globalised world.
On networks in the Information Age
Networks as a form of organisation is neither new nor disruptive; 
it is the advent of digital networking technologies in the 
information age that gives rise to the network society, a society 
whose social structure is determined by networks activated by 
digital information and communication technologies (Castells 
2009). Digital networks are therefore the axis on which the 
reorganisation of society’s constitutive processes turn, shifting 
from hierarchical flows of information to the processing of flows 
of information that are global, horizontal, reflexive and indifferent 
to historical notions of communications across time and space.
From the global digital network emerges a new form of 
spatiality, the space of flows: ‘the material support of simultaneous 
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social practices communicated at a distance. This involves the 
production, transmission and processing of flows of information. 
It also relies on the development of localities as nodes of these 
communication networks, and the connectivity of activities 
located in these nodes by fast transportation networks operated 
by information flows’ (Castells 2010: xxxii). While the network 
is therefore global, the nodal ‘localities’ retain their importance 
as geographically defined sites for the location of local, place-
specific, face-to-face micro-networks. Castells emphasises the 
inherent contradiction between the space of flows and the space 
of places. In the network society, cultural and social meaning is 
defined in place terms, while functionality, wealth and power are 
defined in terms of flows. 
In the Castellian conception of the network society two separate 
but interacting processes prevail: the mode of production and the 
mode of development. The mode of production constitutes the 
production of goods and services in specific social relationships, 
driven historically by capitalism. The mode of development is 
constituted by those technological arrangements through which 
labour acts on matter to generate products and evolves according to 
its own logic, which is predominantly predicated on the interaction 
between scientific and technological discovery (see also Chapter 2: 
24–25 above). According to Castells, economic development 
and technological development are necessarily separate processes 
because technological development is also driven by non-
economic considerations such as invention and experimentation. 
The outcomes of inventiveness and experimentation may or may 
not be taken up by society. 
It is not only the modes of production and development that 
are distinct in the network society; multiple, distinctive networks 
exist, each with their own geography and their own logic: ‘the 
most strategically important observation for an analysis in terms 
of spatial networks is that these global networks do not have the 
same geography; they usually do not share the same nodes. […] 
Political agencies, nationally and internationally, build their own 
spatial sites and networks of power. The global network of scientific 
162
CASTELLS IN AFRICA
research does not overlap with the networks of technological 
innovation’ (Castells 2010: xxxviii). Each network is defined by a 
programme, formulated by social actors, that assigns to a network 
its goals and its rules of performance (Castells 2009: 20). 
Distinctive networks may compete with one another but they 
may also cooperate. Cooperation depends on the connectedness 
between networks and is made possible by introducing 
interoperability via shared protocols and languages/code, or by 
the presence of switches (connecting points).
On the African university in the Information Age
The trajectory of the African university as a social institution in 
terms of its historically-determined functions and its relationship 
with society has already been described (see Chapter 6). What is 
clear is that the contemporary African university must grapple 
with competing demands, both exogenous and self-imposed. 
According to Castells, African universities must take seriously 
their scientific function of knowledge production: they ‘must also 
emphasise research, both basic and applied, since this will become 
the necessary ground for upgrading the country’s productive 
system’ (Chapter 3: 49) and ‘[w]ithout the self-determination of 
the scientific community in the pursuit of the goals of scientific 
research, there will be no discovery’ (Chapter 3: 47–48). However, 
in a world where trust between society and its public institutions is 
waning (a point made by Castells in Chapter 5 above), academics 
are increasingly expected to engage with those beyond their 
ramparts and, in doing so, they are expected to become relevant and 
responsive to the needs of society. Castells is attuned to the social 
pressures that universities face: ‘But universities as organisations are 
also submitted to the pressures of society, beyond the explicit roles 
they have been asked to assume, and the overall process results in a 
complex and contradictory reality’ (Chapter 3: 41).
Responding to the needs of society is often framed under the 
banner of ‘university–community engagement’ or of its ‘third 
mission’. Typically, the notion of ‘engagement’ (or ‘third mission’) 
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is used to denote the university’s closer relationship with the 
market and/or society in order to meet the needs of society; a 
relationship imposed on the university by society as it expects the 
academy to find solutions to the challenges it faces. 
Such engagement is normative, an activity to be undertaken 
by academics that is inherently good for society. But proponents 
of engagement rarely consider the academic dividends for the 
university, that is, the scientific returns from its engagement with 
society (other than, from a scientific point of view, the relatively 
lower returns of higher levels of transparency and accountability 
to external stakeholders). And the engagement literature fails to 
acknowledge that these returns to the university are not necessarily 
(narrowly) self-serving – it is the academic dividends that accrue 
to the university that place the university in a stronger position to 
contribute to social and economic development. 
Key then to the relationship between higher education and 
development is the establishment of a productive interaction 
between the university’s knowledge enterprise and its engagement 
activities. An overemphasis on the basic knowledge activities of 
teaching and research – in other words, a predominantly inward 
orientation – risks the university becoming disconnected from the 
needs of society. However, an overemphasis on connecting to those 
external to the university potentially leaves the university with 
little new knowledge to foster innovation and fuel development. 
The challenge for universities is to manage this inherent tension 
between ‘buffering’ (protecting) the core technologies of the 
institution and ‘bridging’ (linking) those with external actors (W. 
Scott 2001: 199–211). In the words of Castells (Chapter 3: 42):
The real issue is not so much to shift universities from the 
public arena to secluded laboratories or to capitalist board 
meetings, as to create institutions solid enough and dynamic 
enough to withstand the tensions that will necessarily trigger 
the simultaneous performance of contradictory functions. 
The ability to manage such contradictions, while emphasising 
the role of universities in the generation of knowledge and the 
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training of labour in the context of the new requirements of the 
development process, will condition to a large extent the capacity 
of new countries and regions to become part of the dynamic 
system of the new world economy.
There are network dynamics at play here. On the one hand, the 
university is required to be part of the global network of science if 
it is to participate in and add value to the flows of network-specific 
information that will advance knowledge and yield new discoveries:
[B]ecause we are in a global economy and in a global research 
system the notion of universities being stand-alone, major 
research centres is gone. The critical thing is to be in the networks 
of global production of knowledge, of research and innovation. 
[…] You need to have a ticket to enter one of the networks; you 
have to provide something that is not necessarily the best in the 
world but is interesting enough that all the other participants in 
the global research network of one particular field want you to be 
in the network. (Chapter 4: 60)
In this sense, it is less about participation than about universities 
in Africa being included or excluded because the university as 
a key institutional component of science (in turn, one of the 
dominant functions in the network society) is organised around 
the space of flows. 
On the other hand, the university must negotiate entry 
into and foster links in new socially relevant and representative 
networks. This requires the university to position itself in place-
based local networks that first, are distinct from the global 
network of science and second, are of different kinds (of industry, 
entrepreneurs, law-makers, neighbourhood communities, and so 
on). Noting the challenges at the system and organisational levels 
of managing these contradictions effectively, for academics at 
African universities who have historically been on the margins of 
global knowledge production and who are increasingly expected to 
contribute to national development, engaging with those external 
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to the university in such a manner so as to ensure the creation of 
knowledge valued by the global scientific community is equally 
challenging. They must both cultivate the non-scientific networks 
that will allow them to engage, and maintain their position in 
global scientific networks by ensuring that they have something 
of value to offer.
In sub-Saharan Africa, in a context of relatively underpaid and 
poorly incentivised permanent academic staff, engaged research 
– that is, research of the kind that situates itself in stakeholder 
networks rather than exclusively in scientific networks – is often 
synonymous with consulting work. And there are those who warn 
of the dangers of such engaged research becoming dislocated from 
the academy and from home-grown development prerogatives 
and strategies as researchers bend to the research prerogatives 
of government and international funding agencies (Cloete et al. 
2011; Mamdani 2016; Mkandawire 2011).
***
The above brutal truncation of the network society and the 
position of the African university, brings to the fore a least two 
lacunae. The first is that Castells is not specific when it comes 
to the variety of types of connections made between networks. 
Shared protocols, code and switches make interoperability 
possible, but what does cooperation between human networks 
look like? Being engaged requires academics to connect between 
two or more different networks: each with distinctive geographies, 
mega-nodes and logics. For universities, at least two types of 
networks emerge in the information society: networks that are 
global and predominantly focused on making connections within 
the science community to support knowledge production; and 
networks that are predominantly more local and focused on the 
provision of solutions in response to the needs and demands of 
local communities. In other words, there are, for universities, 
specialised and non-specialised connections to be made – 
specialised connections between academics, within a globalised 
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academy; and non-specialised connections between academics 
and predominantly local stakeholders external to the academy.
The second lacuna is that while Castells acknowledges that 
networks, particularly global digital networks, accelerate infinitely 
the speed at which information is exchanged, he offers little by way 
of the velocity, that is, the speed at which information travels in a 
given direction. In other words, his networks are not specific about 
the direction of information flows, nor are they specific about the 
direction in which value travels between nodes in networks.
It is these creases within the grand narrative that this chapter 
explores. The empirical basis for the explorations is a study by 
Van Schalkwyk (2015) that sought to examine more closely the 
impact of university–community engagement projects at two 
African universities; specifically, the contribution that university–
community engagement made to strengthening the core functions 
of knowledge production (research) and teaching (knowledge 
transfer) at those universities. Whether the engagement activities 
of university academics were strengthening the academic core was 
taken as a proxy for the extent to which those academics are able 
to manage the tension between supporting the core functions of 
the university and the pressure for their academic activities to be 
relevant and responsive to society. Where necessary, the discussion 
is supplemented by data from additional sources.
The two universities included in the study were Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University (NMMU) located in Port Elizabeth, 
South Africa, and Makerere University located in Kampala, 
Uganda. Makerere University is positioning itself as a research 
university and there is evidence of early successes in moving 
in that direction if the number of research articles published is 
used as a proxy for research output (Bunting et al. 2014), while 
NMMU is a comprehensive university which, in South African 
terms, implies a mix of both research and teaching in its strategic 
focus. Makerere relies largely on funding from donor agencies to 
fund its research (Makerere University 2013) while NMMU has 
a history of close links with the automotive and other regionally-
located industries. These variances were deemed to make each 
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university a potentially informative case to explore how academics 
are navigating the tension inherent in university–community 
engagement.
Spaces
Castells points to the contradiction between the space of flows 
and the space of places in the network society. He also recognises 
the presence of multiple networks, each with its own geography 
and value logic. The study of university–community engagement, 
with its dual interest in the connections university academics make 
to the academic core of the university (where the university is a 
potential node in the globalised network of science programmed 
around the production of knowledge and discovery), and to the 
communities external to the university (where the university is 
a potential node in local networks programmed around solving 
the problems faced by specific communities), provides empirical 
evidence to explore how academics are pivoting around the 
university as a switching node in multiple networks.  
An examination of the location of university–community 
engagement projects at NMMU,1 in other words, their sites of 
implementation, shows that the execution of projects is almost 
exclusively local, that is, within either the city, region or country 
in which the university is located. Data on the location-specificity 
of 76 university–community engagement projects at NMMU 
show that 12 (16%) projects indicated South Africa as the site of 
implementation; 10 (13%) the Eastern Cape Province; 20 (26%) 
Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality; 7 (9%) a specific 
precinct or suburb within the Metro; and 2 (3%) indicated that 
the university campus was the site of implementation.2 Only 4 
(5%) projects indicated that project implementation was at the 
international level, which is not to suggest that these projects 
are any less place-based than those with a more local site of 
1  The analysis in this instance is limited to NMMU because of its larger sample size.
2  The remainder of the projects (18%) provided no site of implementation.
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implementation. The obvious point here is that these engagement 
activities undertaken by academics at NMMU are place-based, 
and that this requires academics to enter into local, micro-
networks in order to connect to relevant actors in the community 
in a quest for relevance. 
At the same time, academics are required to participate in 
and contribute to the flow of information in the global network 
of science. Figure 1, using data on the co-authorship of journal 
articles indexed in Scopus between 2008 and 2012 to create 
connections between the cities in which authors are located 
(Beauchesne 2014), reveals three insights. The first is the existence 
of mega-nodes in the globalised scientific network (highlighted 
in Figure 2 by adjusting the contrast of Figure 1), determined by 
the presence of what Castells would term ‘powerful’ universities 
on the US East Coast, in the UK, in Northern Europe and in 
Japan, and, to a lesser extent in Brazil and India. The second is 
that the connections between mega-nodes on either side of the 
Atlantic are most prominent. In the cases of Brazil, India, Japan 
and China, connections are between authors in the same country – 
partly, but not only, because of co-authors publishing in a language 
other than English. The third insight is the relatively insignificant 
contribution by NMMU, notably in relation to the relatively more 
central nodes of Cape Town and Gauteng in the same country. At 
face value, it would therefore appear that academics at NMMU 
are connected both to local networks as a requisite for engaging 
with local actors and to the globalised network of science, but only 
marginally so in the latter instance. According to Castells: ‘the 
more organizations depend, ultimately, upon flows and networks, 
the less they are influenced by the social context associated with the 
places of their location. From this follows a growing independence 
of the organizational logic from the societal logic’ (Castells 1989: 
169–170). It would appear that such an organisational transition is 
yet to materialise at NMMU, and most likely also at other African 
universities, including Makerere University, attempting to manage 
the tension between national development priorities (relevance) 
and participation in global science. 
169
CHAPTER 9 Van Schalkwyk: African universities and connectedness
A deeper understanding of these dual network connections 
and how academics at two African universities pivot around 
these shared nodes, is explored in the section that follows on 
interconnectedness.
Figure 1: Global collaboration between researchers (2005–2009)
Figure 2: Mega-nodes in science based on global scientific collaboration
(Inter)connectedness
The study by Van Schalkwyk (2015) operationalised university–
community engagement (and the management of the inherent 
tension) as ‘interconnectedness’. Framing university engagement as 
interconnectedness makes possible the exploration of a particular 
type of connectedness in the network society. The study defined 
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interconnectedness as ‘the relationship (in tension) of academics 
engaging with those outside of the university while simultaneously 
linking back to the university’ (Van Schalkwyk 2015: 205). 
Interconnectedness was operationalised along two dimensions. 
The first dimension is ‘articulation’, which has a number of 
characteristics. First, articulation includes the extent to which 
the aims and outcomes of engagement activities articulate with 
the university’s strategic objectives. Second, articulation factors in 
the degree to which projects were self-determined or steered by 
the interests of external stakeholders. Third, articulation includes 
the linkages that engagement activities have with external 
stakeholders such as government, industry, small businesses, non-
governmental organisations and others. An additional link is the 
extent to which there are connections with an ‘implementation 
agency’ (i.e. an external body which takes up the knowledge and/
or its products generated or applied through research or training). 
Fourth, articulation takes into account linkages generated through 
sources of funding in three respects: whether the engagement 
activity has obtained external funding; the number of funding 
sources secured; and the extent to which the project developed a 
relationship with its funders over time. 
Seen as a type of connectedness, the articulation indicators are 
all of a type that are inside-out connections. Given that the project 
as an organised set of activities is the unit of analysis, engagement 
takes place within the university as a complex organisation with both 
vertical arrangements (university management and the faculties 
or schools below it) and horizontal arrangements (the number 
of autonomous disciplines arranged into faculties or schools) 
(Clark 1983). Articulation therefore not only includes inside-out 
connections between the project and those communities outside 
of the university but also inside-out connections from the project 
to the host university’s structural and symbolic components (the 
strategic objectives formulated by management and the academic 
imperatives formulated by peers).
The second dimension of interconnectedness incorporates 
the extent to which engagement activities serve to strengthen 
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the academic core of the university. According to Clark (1998), 
when an enterprising university develops an outreach structure, 
its academic departments, formed around disciplines and some 
interdisciplinary fields, remain the heartland of the university; the 
heartland being where traditional academic values and the day-
to-day activities such as teaching and research take place. Instead 
of ‘heartland’, Van Schalkwyk (2015) used the concept ‘academic 
core’ developed by Cloete et al. (2011; see also Chapter 7 above). 
In Castellian terms, the academic core consists of the mutually 
dependent education and scientific functions of the university (see 
Chapters 2 and 3 above). The university as a service provider to 
the community risks restricting its contribution to the application 
of existing knowledge in lieu of the production of new knowledge 
and is, consequently, likely to make only a marginal, short-term 
contribution to development. 
Academic core indicators include the extent to which the 
engagement activity generates new knowledge (versus applying 
existing knowledge) using publications and patents as proxies; 
feeds into teaching or curriculum development; is linked to the 
formal training of students; enables academics to disseminate 
their research; and is linked to international academic networks. 
These indicators are all of an outside-in type of connection.
The various aspects relating to ‘articulation’ and ‘strengthening 
the academic core’ were converted into a set of eight indicators 
which could then be applied to an analysis of the engagement 
activities included in the study. Four indicators were developed 
for each of the dimensions to ensure an equal weighting between 
the articulation and the academic core indicators (see Table  1 
in Appendix 3). On the basis of the indicator score totals for 
articulation and for the academic core, the projects were plotted 
on a graph depicting the intersection between ‘articulation’ 
and ‘strengthening the academic core’ in order to provide a 
graphic representation of each project’s interconnectedness. 
Interconnectedness is represented on a third axis, which bisects 
the articulation and academic core quadrants, and which ranges 
from disconnected (-9) to interconnected (9). 
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The articulation, academic core and interconnectedness scores 
for each of the two African universities in the study are presented 
in Figures 3 and 4.
Projects at both universities scored higher on the articulation 
indicators than on the academic core indicators. A closer 
examination of the articulation scores reveals that projects at 
both universities scored well in terms of the project initiation 
and agenda-setting indicators. However, on average, projects 
scored relatively poorly when it came to the other articulation 
indicators. 
Engagement project scores were low at both universities in 
terms of their links to specific institutional strategic objectives, as 
expressed in each university’s mission and vision statements. At 
NMMU, the data show that projects mostly linked to between 
one and three of the institutional objectives, most often to 
NMMU’s commitment to regional development. By contrast, 
the data show that NMMU’s strategic objective of contributing 
to both African and global development was consistently absent 
from the objectives of the university’s engagement projects. An 
analysis of funding sources shows that firms located in the region, 
as well as funding from the province and the city, made up the 
bulk of the project funds at NMMU. It would appear, therefore, 
that for project leaders the local reality in which a project operates 
trumps the continental and global aspirations of the university. 
In the case of Makerere University, the data show that, on 
average, projects linked to at least two of the university’s strategic 
objectives. As in the case of NMMU, responsiveness to global 
challenges was rarely cited as a project objective at Makerere 
University, and most projects indicated an aspiration to respond 
to national needs (rather than regional needs, as was found to 
be the case at NMMU). Unlike NMMU, projects at Makerere 
University relied more heavily on funds from foreign donors, with 
limited funding from government or industry. Perhaps the finding 
that NMMU’s engagement activities are regionally focused while 
Makerere University’s are nationally focused, is unsurprising 
given Makerere’s position as a national flagship university, while 
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NMMU fulfils a more regional developmental role within its 
national higher education system.
In the case of external linkages, the scores indicate that, on average, 
projects at both universities linked to only one external constituent 
other than the project’s funders. This would appear to indicate a 
tendency to focus engagement activities on a single constituency, in 
so doing creating a binary relationship between the university and 
the external constituent, rather than a more networked approach 
to engagement activities in which multiple stakeholders are active. 
However, it could also indicate that academics are connecting to 
a central node in a specific network. The centrality of the node 
negates the need to connect with other nodes. The specificity of the 
network points to the location of value in one network that may be 
absent in other non-scientific networks.  
The academic core indicators reveal which projects are high 
producers in terms of the production, transfer and dissemination 
of new knowledge. From a different vantage point, the academic 
core indicators also reveal which projects are not linking the 
knowledge created (assuming such knowledge has indeed been 
created) to the academic core, even if they are engaging successfully 
with those external to the university. 
At Makerere University, projects scored relatively well in terms 
of knowledge creation, the availability of knowledge in the public 
domain and linking to PhD programmes. Projects at Makerere 
University scored less well in terms of how they linked to teaching 
and learning activities at the university. Of concern at NMMU is 
the fact that, on average, projects did not generate new knowledge. 
Weighing down NMMU’s scores to some extent is the fact that 
much of the knowledge created by its community engagement 
projects was not publicly available. In particular, many projects at 
NMMU (24%) received funding from industry, with embargoes 
being placed on the dissemination of proprietary knowledge. 
This restricts the flow of information to private networks, and 
while these networks may nevertheless be global, the flow of 
information is more likely to be vertical rather than horizontal 
as would be the case if the information were to be made publicly 
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available. Makerere University, in contrast, scores much better on 
the public availability of knowledge. Given that in the case of 
Makerere University, project funding came predominantly (78%) 
from foreign donors who value and even contractually require 
the openness and accessibility of the knowledge produced, public 
access is to be expected. The study did not go so far as to determine 
the quality of the knowledge produced (using, for example, 
citations as a proxy for quality). Without a quality indicator, it is 
not possible to speculate about the value of the publicly available 
knowledge produced and, consequently, whether such publicly 
available knowledge would propel Makerere University’s position 
in global scientific networks. 
With some exceptions, projects that scored lower on the 
academic core indicators tended to be projects that were 
ongoing rather than complete. Certainly, in the case of Makerere 
University, it is evident that completed projects scored better on 
the connectedness axis than did ongoing projects. In fact, the 
samples at both universities tended to have a preponderance of 
ongoing projects. Given that many of the engagement activities in 
the sample were still in the early phases and given the time-lag in 
the academic publishing process, these ongoing projects retain the 
potential to score more highly on the academic core indicators as 
they mature. This highlights the importance of not only producing 
snapshots of university engagement activities at a particular 
moment in time, but also of tracking engagement activities over a 
longer period in order to observe possible improvements in linking 
engagement projects to the core functions of the university.
Disciplinary valency
In the field of chemistry, the valency of an element measures its 
ability to combine with other elements. Following Clark’s (1983) 
conception of the independence of scientific disciplines from one 
another for their survival, it is conceivable that engagement may 
prevail and thrive within one discipline without any impact on 
another discipline. In other words, projects in different disciplines 
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within the same university can be more or less interconnected, 
and the disciplinary ‘charge’ of a project may have a bearing on 
its valency, that is, its ability to combine with external ‘elements’ 
to create (inter)connections between scientific and non-scientific 
networks. 
Mindful of this possibility, the study by Van Schalkwyk (2015) 
included a disciplinary dimension in the data collected in order 
to capture the disciplinary convergences and variances of the 
engagement projects studied. In the case of disciplines that claim 
to be unsuitable for the engagement enterprise, the intention 
of adding a dimension for discipline or field of study was not 
to expose those disciplines that are failing to engage, but rather 
to identify what can be learnt from projects that appear to be 
doing so successfully regardless of their perceived disciplinary 
engagement encumbrances. Moreover, a differentiated picture of 
university–community engagement by discipline would be a first 
step towards defining different engagement criteria for projects 
and their respective academic units across the university.
Figure 3 shows that engagement projects at Makerere University 
are evenly spread across the middle of the interconnectedness 
spectrum. However, projects in the sample from the College 
of the Humanities and Social Sciences, and from the College 
of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, appear to be the 
most successful in mediating the tension between linking both 
externally and with the academy. Projects from the College of 
Veterinary Medicine, Animal Resources and Bio-security and, to 
a lesser extent, from the College of Computing and Information 
Science, appear to be struggling to link their engagement with 
external communities to the core functions of the university.
At NMMU, Figure 4 shows that the Faculties of the Arts and 
of Engineering appear more capable than other faculties at the 
university in managing the tension between engaging externally 
and strengthening the core. While the Faculty of Health has some 
projects that score between 4 and 6 on the interconnectedness 
axis, it also houses several projects (mainly from the Department 
of Nursing) that populate the disconnected end of the spectrum, 
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mainly owing to poor academic core ratings. This may point to 
different valencies within a specific faculty – some faculty units 
may have a more developed academic core while others (such 
as Nursing) may have a less well-developed academic core, and 
struggle to conceptualise connections to the core in the design and 
execution of their university–community engagement projects. 
The findings confirm the relevance of discipline as a determining 
factor of interconnectedness. However, they also show that 
disciplines that are frequently cited as being at a disadvantage when 
it comes to making connections to external communities, such as 
the Faculty of Arts at NMMU and the College of Humanities and 
Social Sciences at Makerere University, are able to interconnect. 
This may point to the relevant but lesser contribution of the 
disciplinary valency of an engagement project when compared 
to the ability of project leaders to connect between different 
networks regardless of their disciplinary background. 
Differentiating the core
While it seems important to distinguish between projects charged 
with distinctive disciplinary properties, it is also possible to 
differentiate at the project-level between the two core functions 
of research and teaching that make up the academic core. In other 
words, some projects may link exclusively to either the knowledge 
transfer function or the knowledge production function.
While very few projects at either university scored well on the 
academic core indicators, it is possible that some projects chose to 
focus exclusively on research while others elect to focus exclusively 
on teaching and learning. An argument could be put forward 
that research (i.e. the production of new knowledge) is the only 
imperative for any university and that everything else, including 
teaching, follows. This stance challenges the inclusion of teaching 
and learning as an equally weighted contributor to the academic 
core. The knowledge creation imperative is not disputed; however, 
conceiving of the knowledge creation and transfer process as one 
that is unitary is contested. In a differentiated arrangement either 
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within or between institutions in a single national system, it is 
conceivable that specialisation occurs, with different actors playing 
different roles at various stages in the knowledge creation and 
transfer process. Knowledge creation remains a critical and non-
negotiable first step in this process, but it seems possible to conceive 
of a process in which certain academics specialise in knowledge 
creation while others specialise in knowledge transfer (including 
teaching and even application). That those with specialist roles in 
the knowledge creation and transfer process are linked together 
across or within universities in a differentiated system is essential 
in ensuring an uninterrupted flow in the process. 
From an organisational perspective, faculties, departments, 
centres and institutes could take a differentiated approach to how 
their projects connect to the academic core. If this differentiated 
approach is one that is coordinated and managed, then it could 
be  that no single project scores well on the interconnectedness 
axis, but that a centre or faculty as a whole may well do so if it 
were to be taken as the unit of analysis. In other words, the sum 
of the parts should be taken into consideration before dismissing 
a coordinated cluster of projects as being disconnected from the 
academic core. 
Switches
The university–community engagement projects referred to thus 
far are the temporary structural arrangements around which 
activity is organised and coordinated. But it is academics who 
create projects and manage their activities. 
The indicators of interconnectedness reveal variance in the 
university–community engagement activities at both universities. 
Some engagement activities returned a high score and can therefore 
be described as interconnected, while others returned a low score 
and can therefore be described as disconnected. Those projects 
that are interconnected are proxies for academic project leaders 
who are seemingly well-equipped or agile enough to connect 
both to the science community and to those communities located 
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externally to the university. In Castellian terms, these academic 
project leaders appear to be able to connect successfully between 
the space of flows and the space of places, acting as network 
switches. In a networked world, this allows academics to ‘exercise 
control over others’ owing to their ‘ability to connect and ensure 
the cooperation of different networks by sharing common goals 
and combining resources’ (Castells 2009: 45).
Castells makes it plain that network switches are not (or at 
least should not be considered as) individuals who are able to 
mobilise their own personal ambitions to reprogramme networks: 
‘[swtichers] are not persons, but they are made of persons. They are 
actors, made of networks of actors engaging in dynamic interfaces 
that are specifically operated in each process of connection’ 
(Castells 2009: 47). Castells does not provide extensive coverage 
on the agency of individuals in global networks. This gap evokes 
similar criticism levelled at neo-institutional theorists who, it is 
claimed, do not account adequately for individual agency within 
social arrangements (see, for example, Greenwood & Suddaby 
2006; Hardy & Maguire 2008; Swanson & Ramiller 1997, 2004). 
In the analysis presented here, individual academics are afforded 
agency in the global scientific network. But their agency as switches 
depends less on their individual or personal character traits and 
more on what they have to offer: knowledge. And knowledge 
due to its cumulative and communal origins does not definitively 
vest in a single individual. To be sure, names of notable scientists 
are attributed to the discovery of vaccines, genomes and social 
theories, but their discoveries and treatises are predicated on the 
work and incremental contributions of others. In this sense, it is 
the knowledge produced by science and embodied in particular 
scientists that makes possible their role as knowledge-network 
switches. What differentiates them is first and foremost the value 
of the knowledge they have to offer place-based networks (and 
potentially to other global networks for which knowledge holds 
currency) and to a lesser extent their ability to attract the attention 
of powerful nodes in other networks.  
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The stand-out example of a project led by a university academic 
switching between science and community networks is to be found 
at NMMU. The Ocean Turtle Task Force Project scored 7.625 
on the interconnectedness axis, the highest of all the projects at 
the two universities. The project brings together representatives 
from national turtle focal points in the Comoros, France, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Seychelles, South Africa and the UK. 
Representatives evaluate sites of potential international importance 
for the conservation, protection and management of sea turtles. 
The project aims to identify sites of particular ecological, socio-
economic, cultural and educational value. Local conservationists 
meet annually for capacity-building exercises and for sharing data 
on the challenging topic of conserving migrating sea turtles.
The project aligned with NMMU’s strategy and was one 
of the few projects bearing on NMMU’s aspiration of being an 
African university. The project was initiated by the United Nations 
Environment Programme; the project proposal was multi-
authored, and deviations to the proposal were permitted. The 
project had in place an advisory group that convened annually. 
The project had established links to government, NGOs, industry 
(regional fishing industry bodies) and to fishing communities. 
Funding came from three sources, all for two years, and with the 
option of being renewed. 
The project has clearly made several place-based connections to 
articulate the meaning and relevance of its engagement activities. 
At the same time, the project connects to the non-material global 
network of science by offering the novel knowledge that has been 
produced by the project as the result of its localised connections. 
The project developed new interventions for the tuna fishing 
industry to protect the sea turtle population, and technology to 
record and track turtle migration. The findings of the project were 
presented at academic conferences and published in academic 
journals, as well as in the form of articles on the web and in the 
print media. The project led to the introduction of a new 15-week 
module on marine biology at the university. Postgraduate students 
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participated in the project as researchers and undergraduates were 
involved as project interns. The project was one of very few at 
either NMMU or Makerere University that included a network 
of international academics.
On the other ends of the spectrum are those projects that returned 
a low interconnectedness score, and that are disconnected, either 
from the science community or from those communities outside of 
the university. Which is not to say that these project leaders are not 
connected; rather they are exclusively connected to one network to 
the detriment of being connected to other networks. 
Of interest at NMMU is how the engagement projects of two 
extension units in the Faculties of Science and in Engineering 
(Innoventon and Entsa, respectively) compare with projects located 
in the parent faculties. In both cases, the engagement projects at 
Innoventon and Entsa score lower on the interconnectedness 
dimension than do projects located in the faculties, although the 
Entsa projects still score relatively well compared to the broader 
population of engagement projects at NMMU. This would suggest 
that these extension units, set up to facilitate interaction between the 
university and external communities, were less successful in linking 
their activities to core functions housed in their parent faculties. 
Describing ‘new Third World universities’ (Chapter 3: 50) and 
their place in the network society, Castells refers to specialised 
organisations that are part of the university system capable of 
organising external connections which, in conjunction with an 
emphasis on research, are needed to elevate a country’s productive 
system (Chapter 3: 49–50). Castells is not specific about the 
role these specialised organisations are to play in the research 
process but he seems to suggest that in addition to faculty-based 
academics acting as switches between networks, certain structural 
arrangements could be put in place to act as switches between 
faculties and external communities.
The findings of the interconnectedness study show that the 
specialised organisations at NMMU responsible for ‘extension’ are 
focusing predominantly on organising external connections for the 
application of existing knowledge, either without consideration of 
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where the required new knowledge will come from as the demands 
of external actors evolve, or with the assurance that the required 
new knowledge will be produced by NMMU academics located in 
the faculty. Using bibliometric data on journal articles published 
as a proxy for the creation of knowledge, it would be possible to 
determine whether the parent faculties of these extension units are 
in fact deserving of the assurance placed in them by their extension 
units. What is not clear and requires further investigation, is whether, 
even if the extension units are successful at connecting to external 
communities and their faculties are independently generating 
new knowledge, there are effective bi-directional institutional 
connections between the extension units and their host faculties. 
Valves
While Castells recognises that in the space of flows, information 
possesses directionality (Castells 1989), he provides little by way 
of evidence on how directionality functions in globalised digitised 
networks, or how information flows between the dynamic 
intersection of the space of flows and the space of places. 
The method proposed by Van Schalkwyk (2015) to operationalise 
interconnectedness does not claim to capture nor reflect the impact 
of engagement activities on those actors with whom academics 
engage. In this sense, the impact of their engagement activities 
is only measured in one direction; that is, on the university. It is 
conceivable that projects that score low in terms of the extent to 
which they strengthen the academic core may nevertheless have 
a meaningful and positive impact on a particular community or 
enterprise. However, such place-based impact does not necessarily 
add value to the university’s position as a node in the globalised 
network of science. Van Schalkwyk’s notion of interconnectedness 
therefore assumes a bi-directional flow, even if it did not operationalise 
impact in both directions due to its primary concern, that is, the 
impact of engagement on the university’s core functions. This is a 
critical point often overlooked by the proponents of engagement. 
A singular focus on the flow of value from the university to a place-
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based community, ignores the vital return flow of information that 
places the university in a better position to contribute to the flow of 
information and, by implication, the creation of the new knowledge 
needed for development, in globalised scientific networks. 
The study of interconnectedness shows that at both NMMU and 
at Makerere University there appears to be an under-appreciation 
of the requirement for bi-directional flow of information (and 
value). Most projects display the properties of valves rather than 
switches in regulating the flow of information. At the same time, 
there does appear to be a growing recognition at the system level, 
in South Africa at least, of the pitfalls of valve-like engagement. 
The South African Department for Higher Education and 
Training’s White Paper for Post-School Education and Training 
(Department of Higher Education and Training 2013) states that 
‘it is likely that future funding of such [engagement] initiatives 
in universities will be restricted to programmes linked directly to 
the academic programme of universities, and form part of the 
teaching and research function of these institutions’. It remains to 
be seen whether such sentiments are leveraged or incentivised in 
order to render them effective.
Conclusion 
Like The Copula Hall that connects the doppelgänger cities 
of Besźel and Ul Qoma, the university and its academics must 
connect between different social realities, that of science and 
that of the communities that lie outside of the university. And 
it must do so to fulfil its dual mandate of knowledge production 
and relevance. However, unlike The Copula Hall that makes 
possible sanctioned connections between two co-located physical 
spaces, universities must connect between two different types of 
networks, one that Castells describes as being defined in terms of 
place and one that is defined in terms of (information) flows. 
The overarching objective of this chapter was to make a 
modest contribution to Castells’s ‘theory’ of the network society 
by exploring the possibility of different types of connectedness 
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in university networks. It did so by examining the connections 
university academics make as part of their community engagement 
activities, proposing that a particular type of connectedness is in 
operation at universities, and showing that disciplinary valency 
and the directionality of connections matter. 
Situating university–community engagement within Castells’s 
network society allows for the interpretation of engagement as 
the (inter)connectedness of university academics and their host 
universities within and between networks. Universities seeking 
to engage with external communities must navigate between two 
distinct networks in tension – one which is global, programmed 
by the logic of science and propelled by the flow of information 
across a space of flows – and one that is local – programmed by the 
logic of innovation in a space of places. The capacity of universities 
and their systems to manage this tension and the dexterity of 
academics and the value of the knowledge they have at their 
disposal to connect between networks is crucial for development 
as it connects new knowledge to entrepreneurs (of both the social 
and economic kind) and to inventors who spur innovation.
The indicators of connectedness reveal a mixed picture at two 
African universities (Van Schalkwyk 2015): in both cases, there are 
engagement activities that can be described as interconnected and 
there are also activities that are clearly disconnected. ‘Articulation’ 
scores at both universities were stronger than the ‘strengthening 
the academic core’ scores. In other words, the degree to which 
university–community engagement activities can be said to 
be strengthening the African university as a key knowledge-
producing institution is uneven and too frequently marginal.
The study of two African universities also shows that there are 
projects located in university structures (organisational sub-units) 
that are adept at connecting the university to external communities. 
However, these structures are not simultaneously connecting to the 
core university enterprise of knowledge production (research) and 
transmission (teaching). This is not to say that faculties at these 
universities are not productive or that they are absent from the 
global networks of science. In fact, if we use publications as a proxy 
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for scientific productivity, then both universities show a marked 
improvement since 2000 (Bunting et al. 2014). It is therefore 
still possible, as suggested by Castells, for bridging agents or 
intermediaries to facilitate bi-directional flows between faculty and 
outreach organisations. Further research is required to establish the 
existence and effectiveness of such structural arrangements. 
What is clear from the study is that some academics at the 
two African universities are able to connect across networks, 
acting as switches in the flow of information between and across 
different networks. These networked academics make possible the 
bi-directional flow of information, in so doing connecting the 
university to external communities in a manner that at the very 
least creates value for the university as a node in the global scientific 
network. This illustrates not only the importance of the direction 
of flows of information for development (often under-appreciated 
by advocates of university–community engagement), but also the 
possibility of African universities strengthening their hand when 
negotiating their participation in global science networks while 
remaining relevant to local development needs.
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Conclusion
Contradictory functions, unexpected outcomes,  
new challenges
Johan Muller, Nico Cloete & François van Schalkwyk
After considering the detailed empirical pictures sketched by the 
data collected in the four African papers, it is sobering to return 
to the very first paper by Castells in this collection and to realise 
again how prescient it was, and how many pitfalls it anticipated. 
It pays to reflect again on the kind of theoretical account he was 
putting forward. In Chapter 3 of this volume (pp. 35–36), he 
told us that, in contrast to Bourdieu’s functionalist theory, his 
was a conflict theory, following that of Alain Touraine’s. The 
important consequence was that we should always expect conflict 
when attending to functions: conflict was the normal, not the 
pathological condition. The four academic functions and one social 
function of universities he went on to anatomise were thus not to 
be understood as equivalent boxes that university administrators 
or policy makers could tick as if signing off on a list. Nor could 
increases or decreases in relevant indicators only be examined on 
a linear scale. They were social forces that were in collision with 
each other, and this collision needed to be understood, mediated 
and managed. His conclusion bears re-statement:
the critical element in the structure and dynamics of the 
university system is their ability to combine and make compatible 
seemingly contradictory functions which have all constituted the 
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system historically and are all probably being required at any 
given moment by the social interests underlying higher education 
policies. It is probably the most complex analytical element to 
convey to policy-makers: namely, that because universities are 
social systems and historically produced institutions, all their 
functions take place simultaneously within the same structure, 
although with different emphases. (p. 42)
What the crucial factors conditioning mediation are, is the question. 
The picture sketched by the empirical data provided in Chapters 
6 to 9 helps to dramatise how this clash of functions and social 
interests play out in African universities still labouring to come out 
from under the shadow of their colonial parent institutions, trying 
to shake off the legacy of their subordinate status. 
Chapter 6 shows how the genesis and tradition of the colonial-
era African university is rooted in a role to serve a primarily 
ideological and elite socialisation function, though these two 
functions are not pursued further in the empirical indicators of 
the HERANA research. Nevertheless, the variable imprint of this 
legacy is clearly seen in the performance indicators of most African 
universities today. The chapter details the long road back from this 
legacy tracked in the changing policy documents accompanying 
the successive establishment of independence in national rule. The 
chapter speaks optimistically of ‘revitalisation’ as a new discourse 
of ‘development’ begins to emerge in response to influential 
voices calling for a re-orientation, Castells’s included. The chapter 
ends by distinguishing between two strands of development 
discourse, one strand what the chapter calls an ‘instrumentalist’ 
sense, the other, what we can call, following Castells, an ‘engine 
of development’ sense.
But how did the universities interpret this changing policy 
environment? Chapter 7 examined the vision and mission 
statements of the eight universities making up the then-newly 
established HERANA project and conducted interviews with key 
informants. Castells had predicted that universities in developing 
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countries may react to the ‘new’ emerging global informational 
economy by ‘rushing’ towards the new mode of production and 
development – making rhetorical commitments to it – without 
fully appreciating what far-reaching changes this would imply for 
the economy and universities alike. HERANA documents a clear 
move, even if it is not exactly a ‘rush’, towards an economically 
instrumental and ‘engine of development’ view of the university 
in the public face the universities presented in their vision and 
mission statements.
This was the aspiration. What was the reality? Defining the 
‘new’ paradigm of ‘development’ as ‘knowledge-led’, HERANA 
posited eight indicators of what they called the ‘academic core’ of 
the university – SET and postgraduate enrolment and graduation 
rates, especially of PhDs; international publications. They then 
compared the eight institutions across the indicators, using data 
from 2001 to 2007. Their conclusion was not a happy one:
With the exception of Cape Town, the other universities (in the 
HERANA sample) do not have academic cores that live up to the 
high expectations contained in their mission statements. (p. 125)
This indicated not only a disconnect between aspiration and 
performance; it also indicated that only one of the institutions 
in the sample could be considered to be making a knowledge-led 
contribution to development. True, they were responding to social 
demand, and had increased their enrolment of undergraduates, 
in some cases quite dramatically. But they had yet to increase 
graduation at the postgraduate level, especially at the PhD level.
Chapter 8 continued with the same sample of institutions, 
now called ‘flagship’ institutions, and using more granular data, 
compared them on the knowledge indicators between 2001 and 
2014. Though more detail and nuance is displayed, the picture 




African universities are unable to manage successfully the political 
and ideological functions alongside the academic teaching 
activities of the university. (p. 140)
This conclusion can be re-phrased in more Castellian terms. First 
of all, most African universities have retained their ideological and 
elite socialisation roles. As we have seen, they have made at least 
public commitments to increasing their research-based activities. 
But they have also responded to social demands for greater 
access by granting greater access at the undergraduate level. In a 
context where resources were not expanding (in contrast to the 
educational systems of the Asian Tigers, for example: see Castells 
2009: 274 & 276; see also p. 26 above), existing staff were expected 
to teach more. Castells had predicted that, where universities 
accede to social demand without the corresponding addition of 
resources, standards drop, and academic teaching becomes little 
more than ‘warehousing’, in his resonant phrase. What we see 
in this chapter, especially in the case of Nairobi University, is 
that research-oriented scholars quickly find the teaching-heavy 
environment inimical to sustained high-level research. To simply 
add new commitments on to existing commitments is to place 
the system under intolerable strain, where something has to give. 
Invariably it is the latest addition to the functional roster - the 
research function, one which requires dedicated nurturance, that 
falls by the wayside. This is not how to balance the contradictory 
functions of higher education in an informational world.
Unlike the Asian Tigers, universities in Africa have been left 
with vague talk of ‘development’, but with no clear idea what this 
might mean for specifying the choices universities might make 
towards an ‘informational’ economy. It is true that the lineaments 
of the informational economy are not yet fully evident in Africa; 
it is also true that without the resources to develop new areas to 
the requisite high level, these initiatives will wither. But a clearly 
enunciated development vision, more particularly practical steps 
to pursue it, is nowhere evident in either the projections of 
government, the plans of the universities or the academic activities 
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examined by the HERANA research. African universities have 
found themselves without effective development signposting, 
either from a directive developmental state like the ones in East 
Asia, or a robust market as might be said to exist in Europe and 
the USA, to signal the high-level needs of the present and future 
economy and the consequent requirements from universities. 
In this context, Gornitzka and others (2007) have developed 
a middle-order governance concept of the pact as an explicit 
normative agreement between government and universities as to 
what each is expected to do to translate the high-level notion of 
the informational mode of development into a device that specifies 
guidelines that can be monitored in the interests of accountability, 
or turned into empirical indicators for purposes of research. 
Chapter 8 above shows that even when something like a pact 
has been enunciated, as it is in Mauritius (the only institution in 
the HERANA sample with anything resembling a pact), without 
concomitant targeted funding and government support, left to itself 
it will remain stuck in the default model for African universities, 
dominated by the social and not the scientific function.  This 
radical disconnect from any development path of the economy 
might, with justification, be called ‘blind’ development.  
At whose door should we lay this failure? It is plausible to 
suggest that this malaise of ‘blind’ development is the outcome 
of a state of paralysis created by a titanic clash of social interests 
unconstrained and unmediated by an encompassing framework 
of common purpose about the essential goals the university 
ought to pursue. The political elites in the society at large, and 
their representatives in government, seem unable to suspend their 
interest-based politics and patronage pursuits long enough to 
forge and agree on a broader common development framework 
for the country at large. Even when such a framework has been 
forged, its implementation is stalled by the interest conflicts that 
consume the energies of the political elite. This is particularly 
evident in South Africa in 2017; a common plan, the National 
Development Plan (National Planning Commission 2012), 
has in fact been accepted by the national Parliament, but its 
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implementation has been stalled by unbridled interest conflicts 
in the ruling party.
Student politics on campus likewise mimics the national 
scene. With political branches of national parties proliferating 
on campuses, student politics abandons student concerns and 
becomes a proxy battleground for national political tensions. 
The relationship between the student bodies and their leaders is 
cemented by patron–client relationships between the national 
parties and student leaders, held in place by what Luescher and 
Mugume (2014) delicately call ‘resource-exchanges’. 
As for the professoriate; the picture painted in the chapters 
above shows them to be riven between rival visions of the 
university; some cling to a golden age vision of autonomy and 
independence partly superseded in the home countries from 
which it was transplanted; others are weighed down with teaching 
responsibilities and could care less; yet others turn to consultancies 
as sources of remuneration supplementation (Mkandawire 2011; 
Wangenge-Ouma et al. 2015 ). This is paradoxical, to say the least: 
foreign donors and the state, the main sponsors of consultancies 
that divert academic energies away from academic publication 
and supervision, are also the loudest voices decrying the lack 
of research publications in the universities. In the absence of a 
common purpose, these activities spiral out as various kinds of 
individual survival or advancement strategies. As we commented 
above, this kind of academic milieu is not only unproductive for 
serious scholars, but is actively abrasive, and those that can, seek 
greener academic pastures, usually abroad.
A secondary consequence of this unmediated clash of social 
interests is also becoming apparent. In some institutions, students 
pursue their political battle not only against local and national 
opponents, but against science itself, epitomised in the rather 
chilling rallying cry ‘Science must Fall’ (Steerpike 2016), a possibility 
Castells warned against in Chapter 3 above (see also Chapter 2).         
The second difference between most African universities 
and successfully developing university systems has to do with 
differentiation, or rather its lack. With the partial exception of 
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South Africa, African countries do not have a higher education 
system. Not infrequently, the colonial powers left behind them 
a national university with an entrenched ideological/elite-
socialisation mandate, and the other universities that have since 
sprung up, public and increasingly private, have developed rather 
haphazardly in its wake. Insofar as universities are state-organised 
at all, they tend to be treated all the same, with the same policy 
tools and funding formulae. Consequently, when the policy 
emphasis changes, it triggers a chain reaction of mimicry, where 
less prestigious institutions try to emulate the more prestigious 
ones. The result, in the absence of any direction or incentive to 
do otherwise, is institutional convergence. There are signs of this 
isomorphic mimicry in South Africa where there are at least the 
basic lineaments of a differentiated system based not on design 
or direction but on differing historical legacies of colonialism and 
apartheid. 
There is a third feature of African universities that marks it 
out from the universities of the first world. This is the particular 
form of evolution of the indigenous elite. The institutions Castells 
cites as performing the elite-socialising function in France – the 
grandes écoles, or in England – Oxford and Cambridge, are a far 
cry from the national universities of Africa. Where the former 
increasingly select and educate a highly skilled elite, capable, as 
in the French case, of training also for high level positions in the 
private sector (see p. 37 above), the latter are trained to staff the 
lower and middle layers of the civil service. We may call this cadre 
of university graduates a demographic or indigenous elite, one 
which is still also predominantly male. They can be compared 
with the educated elite in name only. 
The main difference, and the one critical to success in 
the informational economy, is what Castells has called self-
programmability. The high-level elite trained in France and 
England are trained to self-adapt; the skills of the indigenous elite, 
on the other hand, rarely rise above the generic, produced as they 
were and are to perform reproductive functions for the colonial 
and post-colonial state. This form of labour, Castells has repeatedly 
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stressed, is uniquely incapable of driving a developmental project 
towards the informational mode of production.
It is thus not exactly wrong to refer to students in African 
universities as an elite. In Trow’s (1973) terms, they are still part 
of an elite system that has yet to be massified, even though the 
increased enrolments and lack of adequate resource allocation 
leads to overcrowding. We may call these universities ‘overcrowded 
elite institutions’. In Mamdani’s terms, these students are still 
considered indubitably privileged. But unlike Bourdieu’s (1973) 
elite, which comes from the social elite and is, according to him 
at least, destined for it, what Castells means by an ‘elite’ is neither 
the university system they are part of, or the social stratum they 
come from. To be part of the sustainable elite in the informational 
world means to be self-programmable. To be fair, the colonialists in 
Africa assumed that this top layer of the colonial elite would be 
trained back in the home institutions, hopefully to be inducted 
into self-programmability, as Castells has pointed out. But that 
was never likely to be a long-term solution after independence, 
yet another solution has simply not been planned for. 
What this elaboration of differing senses of ‘elite’ has highlighted 
is the following: African universities have not only succumbed to 
the social function of letting in more students than they can cope 
with, which ‘suffocates’ the performance of the generative scientific 
and research function, they have also continued to produce an 
indigenous elite increasingly unsuited to the networked world 
and informational economy Africa is inexorably headed towards. 
In other words, African universities and their overseeing states 
have yet to recognise and respond to their historical mission in 
the emerging informational economy – to develop numbers of 
highly qualified labour that is essentially self-programmable. It is 
this quality of their teacher corps that distinguishes the teachers of 
Finland, say, who top the PISA and TIMSS performance tables, 
from teachers in more modestly-performing countries like Norway 
(Afdal 2012). This is the lesson that all high-performing developing 
countries have learnt.
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Chapter 9 switches focus from functions to networks, a 
dimension so far little attended to in the previous three chapters. 
Yet the larger concern, that of mediating tensions, is the same. 
The chapter identifies two characteristic kinds of network that 
universities are involved in; the network with the scientific 
community, and the network with the world outside the university, 
often called ‘engagement’. Each kind of network can act as a ‘block’ 
to the other. This is not for reasons of bad faith. The more that 
academics engage in high level research that will draw the attention 
of the international peer community, the more the work runs the 
risk of being so decontextualised as to make its relevance to local 
contexts difficult to describe and discern; this is the basis for the 
long-standing animus against the ‘ivory tower’. The converse is 
also true; the more the work focuses on the local context only, the 
more that local context consumes its relevance, and the less the 
work will concern itself with relevance to a broader context – say, 
to the country, to regional Africa or to the scientific field. It is this 
potential conflict which must be mediated if the university is to be 
successful in both these key networks.
The particular focus in the chapter is on whether work which 
is directed to the local context is also directed to the scientific 
context, the tension above notwithstanding. The chapter finds 
examples of work that does both, and it is clear that careful 
design of the project at the outset is key. Certain academics are 
thus particularly adept at acting as ‘switches’ between the two 
networks. Equally, however, these are few and far between, and 
by and large few contextually directed projects also manage to 
contribute productively to the science function.
The conclusions of these chapters should not be taken as 
cataloguing the failure of African academia only. The intention 
is the opposite. We already know from international indicators 
that African universities do not perform well by comparison with 
their global peers. The question is why and how. This is the path 
opened by Castells’s trilogy. His work shines a particularly powerful 
light on the developmental predicament, and is especially valuable 
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in pointing to the many structural impediments that must be 
acknowledged and strategically accommodated if they are to be 
overcome. 
Envoi
We ended our previous book on Castells with a reference to World 
Book Day on the 23 April 2001, which had the happy dividend 
of also paying tribute to Catalonia, Castells’s spiritual and literal 
homeland. We end this volume on 18 July 2017, International 
Mandela Day, a day which saw some of the Mandela Elders1 march 
through central Cape Town to launch the global project ‘Walk 
together’, to commemorate his ‘Long walk to freedom’. Unhappily, 
this day of re-affirmation of our global hopes and dreams was also 
a day of anger, recrimination and fear as South African political 
elites continue to struggle for the power to determine the direction 
of the modernity of our country. The titanic struggle between the 
global and the local is not one easily ended, for all the reasons that 
Castells has given throughout his incomparably rich work. Yet 
the continent, and its higher education systems, is uncontestably 
in a better place than it was in 2001 when we ended the previous 
book, and the indices, also those shown in this book, are mostly 
on an upward trajectory. Castells has always enjoined us to take 
the long view, the basis for what Gramsci called the ‘optimism of 
the will’ and for any optimistic vision for the future. We hope to 
continue this intellectual adventure with him for a while yet.
1 The Mandela Elders are: Nelson Mandela (founder), Martti Ahtisaari, Kofi Annan, 
Ban Ki-moon, Ela Bhatt, Lakhdar Brahimi, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Fernando H 
Cardoso, Jimmy Carter, Hina Jilani, Ricardo Lagos, Graça Machel, Mary Robinson, 




The analyses and policies on higher education and development 
compiled in this volume were elaborated and discussed in South 
Africa with the broader African context in mind. I add here a few 
considerations that take into account the social transformations 
that have taken place in the last decade in the world economy and 
in the global institutional environment.
Specifically, three major processes are changing the coordinates 
of the global political economy, and are thus the challenges and 
strategies to which higher education must respond. First, global 
financial markets are increasingly the core of national and 
international economies, and they are characterised by systemic 
volatility, as manifest in the 2008 to 2012 financial crisis and 
its aftershocks. Second, the social and political reactions to the 
inequality of the policies drafted in response to the financial 
crisis have deepened the crisis of political legitimacy everywhere, 
and brought the state, once again, to the forefront of social 
dynamics and policy-making once again. Third, the information 
technology revolution has accelerated, creating entire new 
economic sectors, particularly in biotechnology, biomedicine, 
energy, nanotechnology, internet-based social media, artificial 
intelligence, automation and informational education. In all 
these areas, the role of knowledge production and management 
is central, and so is the strategic positioning of higher education. 
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However, the most important feature of the new institutional 
landscape is that these three processes interact. Depending on 
the forms and outcomes of this interaction, a virtuous circle of 
development may be created, or new contradictions will emerge, 
leading to an impasse in policy-making. Allow me to elaborate.
First, the financial crisis, as I have shown elsewhere (Castells 
2012; Castells 2017a), vindicated the role of the state as the 
ultimate guarantor of global capitalism. Without the decisive 
intervention of governments between 2008 and 2010 in the United 
States and Western Europe, there could have been a financial 
meltdown. Indeed, in terms of value destroyed in the financial 
markets, the impact of the crisis was greater than in the 1930s, 
even relative to GDP. However, in contrast with the undisputable 
primacy of public financial policies, the neoliberal mantra at the 
source of crisis (Engelen et al. 2011) continued to be preached 
and practiced in business circles and in academia. The reason is 
very simple: given that governments absorbed the shock of the 
crises by using public resources, what was a crisis for most, was 
in fact a bonanza for the business elites. The share of capital over 
labour in the GDP increased substantially, higher income groups 
appropriated more income and assets than ever, and inequality 
skyrocketed both within countries and between countries. The 
upper middle classes connected around the world forming new 
profitable markets while the lower income groups saw their 
relative, and sometimes absolute, social condition worsen. Class 
polarisation, aggravated by gender and race, emerged again as a 
fundamental feature of humanity.
The convergence of business interests and the interests of the 
political elites deepened the crisis of political legitimacy world-
wide. In the gap of trust thus created in the political institutions, 
arose alternative social movements proposing alternative policies 
(Castells 2015; Castells 2017b), undermining even further the 
legitimacy of mainstream political parties. Furthermore, a new 
brand of demagogic politics, fed by xenophobia and racism, 
obtained significant social support, and introduced a new populist 
leadership that hinted at reversing globalisation in a move that 
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was simply unthinkable a few years ago when globalisation came 
to be considered as a natural, unstoppable fact of life (Castells 
forthcoming). Trump and Brexit epitomised this movement 
precisely in the two countries, central in the world economy, 
that launched liberalisation and globalisation policies during 
the 1980s. With global capitalism suffering from economic 
uncertainty, social discontent and institutional turmoil, statist 
countries, such as China and Russia, came to play a hegemonic 
role in the global economic and the new geopolitics. The end of 
history preached by neoliberal ideologues became the re-run of 
history in which states used capitalism in their strategies of power-
making, rather than submitting to the logic of capital. Therefore, 
the world became more interconnected and more fragmented at 
the same time. 
In a different, but not unrelated development, the technological 
revolution that took shape in the 1970s accelerated in its three 
major components: the biological revolution, the information 
technology revolution, and the communication revolution. 
Entire realms of human activity are being transformed, and so 
new industries and new markets are being created in a globally 
interdependent dynamic. Education is one of the key sectors in 
this transformation, and the most promising market for many 
venture capitals as it represents a substantial share of employment, 
spending and investment in every country. However, because of the 
dominance of government, and of government bureaucracies, the 
technological and institutional transformation in the education 
sector is proceeding at a much slower pace than in the economy at 
large. Moreover, the penetration of a business logic in education 
is confining the transformation of education to education for 
the elites or, in the opposite direction, for mass education with a 
much lower quality for the majority of the population.
In this context, higher education is, at the same time, on the 
edge of economic and technological transformation, and a key 
engine of development in the transformation of society. As argued 
in this volume, knowledge and human resources are the source of 
productivity growth and competitiveness in our interdependent 
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world. And at the root of these processes are the universities, in 
their multiple manifestations. This is now an accepted discourse 
in development policies in almost every country. Yet, a simple 
observation of the practice of higher education policies in 
teaching, research and management belies the actual priority given 
by governments to the developmental goal of higher education. In 
fact, the ideology of education for development often is used to 
feed the interests of the higher education establishment, inside 
and outside government, with some notable exceptions, some of 
which I have been able to observe in the South African and Latin 
American context. 
The elements potentially conducive to a developmental higher 
education are presented in some of the chapters of this volume, 
and so I will not reiterate the discussion here. I simply want to 
emphasise that higher education institutions are essential for both 
economic growth and social justice. If we forget that the need 
for social, gender and racial equality is equally as important as 
innovation and growth, then higher education will sharpen social 
fragmentation, ultimately disabling the institutional capacity to 
manage universities and countries at large.
However, these considerations could apply equally to the 
situation in the last two decades. Do the changes in the world that 
I have summarised here affect the diagnosis and policies for higher 
education? No, if I refer to the definition of goals, because the 
developmental hopes for economic growth and social justice are 
still largely unfulfilled. But yes, if we consider the means to achieve 
these goals. This is because of the interaction between the three 
processes of transformation I presented here. Given the instability 
of the financial core of capitalism, the source of economic 
growth has to shift decisively to innovation and technological 
transformation spurred by entrepreneurship and venture capital; 
this is to say, to the productive economy in simplified language. 
Such a leap forward depends almost entirely on research and 
training in the universities, and on the quality of the labour force 
at large. This requires not only a greater share of resources devoted 
to higher education, but much smarter and more selective policies: 
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not socially selective policies, as this would increase social injustice, 
but pedagogically and institutionally selective. 
Yet, for governments to play a legitimate role in this higher 
education transformation, they have to be legitimate themselves. 
And they are not. But this is not a catch-22. There is one way 
to re-establish legitimacy: to design and implement policies that 
truly have the public interest at heart. If governments continue 
to pillage public resources in the interest of politicians, then 
demagogues, such as Trump, will increase their popular appeal. 
And populist demagogues hate universities because they are, after 
all, the bastions of critical thinking and legitimate resistance to 
abuses and idiocy. But universities cannot simply mobilise against 
destructive politics; they also have to protect their mission as 
beacons of innovation, ideas and equality, without surrendering 
everything to activism. Ultimately, the convergence between the 
shift to a new form of economic organisation (Mason 2015), 
the acceleration of the technological revolution, and the re-
legitimation of political institutions, has a site in society: higher 
education. This is why the university is simultaneously a decisive 




Appendix 1: Data on the academic cores of the eight 
HERANA universities (2001–2007)


















2001 2007 2001 2007 2001 2007 2001 2007 SET BUS 2001 2007 2001 2007 2001 2007
Cape Town 40 42 2788 2906 706 1002 12 15 22 42 86 102 700 1017 0.92 1.14
Botswana 22 22 493 951 8 41 14 27 10 59 3 4 69 106 0.10 0.14
Dar es 
Salaam 52 36 609 2 165 54 190 11 14 14 22 10 20 49 70 0.12 0.07
Eduardo 
Mondlane* 61 48 0 420 0 3 10 13 12 51 0 0 0 11 0.03 0.03
Ghana 22 18 1344 1580 69 102 12 31 9 68 2 20 77 61 0.12 0.08
Makerere 16 32 1167 2767 28 32 15 18 11 96 11 23 72 139 0.07 0.20
Mauritius 51 43 350 859 114 193 24 16 12 34 7 10 23 36 0.12 0.13
Nairobi 33 31 3937 6145 190 62 12 18 8 42 26 32 143 136 0.12 0.11
NMMU 18 31 1100 1332 175 327 31 28 26 54 27 35 154 180 0.30 0.34
* 2001 figures for Eduardo Mondlane for masters and doctoral enrolments, and doctoral graduates and 
research publications, were not provided by the institution.
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Table 2: Academic core indicators: Ratings per university
INPUT INDICATORS OUTPUT INDICATORS
PERIOD Average for 2001–2007 2007 only Average for 2001–2007
















































































Cape Town 41% 19% 13 58% 47 700 21% 15.00% 0.95
Botswana 22% 5% 15 31% 2 000 20% 0.66% 0.11
Dar es Salaam 43% 9% 14 50% 6 400 19% 2.18% 0.08
Eduardo 
Mondlane 54% 2% 12 24% 0 6% 0.00% 0.03
Ghana 19% 7% 22 47% 3 400 18% 0.17% 0.11
Makerere 24% 5% 16 31% 4 900 22% 1.63% 0.09
Mauritius 48% 13% 17 45% 3 000 26% 2.80% 0.13
Nairobi 31% 16% 14 71% 5 300 17% 1.87% 0.09
NMMU 25% 6% 30 34% 12 300 18% 5.50% 0.31
Key:   Strong    Medium    Weak   
Table 3:  Academic core indicators for nine African universities:  
Average annual growth rates, 2001–2007









Cape Town 3.1% 0.7% 6.0% 2.9% 6.4%
Botswana 5.3% 11.6% 31.3% 4.9% 7.4%
Dar es Salaam 8.3% 23.5% 23.3% 12.2% 6.1%
Eduardo Mondlane 6.6% n/a n/a n/a n/a
Ghana 12.9% 2.7% 6.7% 46.8% -3.8%
Makerere 16.3% 15.5% 2.3% 13.1% 11.6%
Mauritius 2.2% 16.1% 9.2% 6.1% 7.8%
Nairobi 7.6% 7.7% -17.0% 3.5% -0.8%
NMMU 3.7% 3.2% 11.0% 4.4% 2.6%
Note: Annual growth rates for Eduardo Mondlane are not available in the table above for masters and doctoral enrolments, and doctoral 
graduates and research publications, because the institution could not provide us with this information for 2001.
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Appendix 2: Data on research output and related 
indicators at seven HERANA universities (2001–2014)
Table 1: Changes in head count enrolments over 14-year period
Average annual increase  
in total enrolments:
2001 to 2014
Head count  
enrolment total  
2014
Change in head count 
enrolments:
2014 compared to 2001
Eduardo Mondlane University 12.8% 36 800 +29 100
University of Nairobi 11.9% 68 900 +52 900
University of Ghana 10.2% 40 200 +28 800
Makerere University 4.1% 36 400 +14 700
University of Cape Town 3.0% 24 700 +7 900
University of Botswana 3.4% 18 200 +6 500
University of Mauritius 3.4% 12 200 +6 700
Average/totals 7.7% 237 400 +146 800














































































































Figure 2: % of undergraduate enrolments: 2001 vs 2014















Average decrease in 
undergraduate enrolments  
as percentage of total  
head count enrolments  
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% senior academics
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Figure 4: Percentage of academic staff with PhDs: 2001 vs 2014







































Table 1: Indicators of interconnectedness and scores per indicator
Articulation indicators Score Max score 
A1 Alignment between 
project and university 
strategic objectives
For each project objective in alignment with university mission/vision = 0.25 1.0
A2 Initiation/agenda-setting Self-initiated = 1 1.0
Proposal more than one author = 0.5 0.5
Project plan/terms of reference flexible = 1 1.0
Advisory group and meets at least once per annum = 0.5 0.5
A3 Links to external 
stakeholders (non-
academic) and to 
implementation agencies
For each link to an external stakeholder = 0.25 (max = 1) 1.0
Direct link to implementation agency = 2
OR Indirect link to implementation agency = 1 
OR Self-implemented = 1
2.0
A4 Funding For each source of funding = 0.25 (max = 1) 1.0
Long-term funding (more than three years) = 0.5 0.5
Renewable funding (at least one source) = 0.5 0.5
Academic core indicators Score Max score
C1 Generates new knowledge 
or product
New knowledge or product = 1.25 OR New data = 0.5 1.25
Publicly available = 0.25 0.25
PhDs linked to project = 0.5 0.5
C2 Dissemination For each publication/presentation listed = 0.25 2.0
C3a Teaching/curriculum 
development
Changes to courses/modules = 1
OR New courses/modules/programmes = 2
2.0
C3b Formal teaching/learning 
of students
Students involved = 0.5 0.5
Participation in project is course requirement = 1 1.0
Other roles for students in project = 0.25 per role 0.5
C4 Links to academic 
networks
Links to academics from other universities = 1 1.0
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Edited by Johan Muller, Nico Cloete & François van Schalkwyk
“ Castells in Africa: Universities and Development collects the papers produced by 
Manuel Castells on his visits to South Africa, and publishes them in a single volume 
for the first time. The book also publishes a series of empirically-based papers which 
together display the multi-faceted and far-sighted scope of his theoretical framework, 
and its fecundity for fine-grained, detailed empirical investigations on universities and 
development in Africa. Castells, in his afterword to this book, always looking forward, 
assesses the role of the university in the wake of the upheavals to the global economic 
order. He decides the university’s function not only remains, but is more important than 
ever. This book will serve as an introduction to the relevance of his work for higher 
education in Africa for postgraduate students, reflective practitioners and researchers. 
“ The convergence between the shift to a new form of economic organisation, 
the acceleration of the technological revolution, and the re-legitimation of 
political institutions, has a site in society: higher education. This is why the 
university is simultaneously a decisive battlefield and our hope for a better 
future in the midst of the current darkness.”
 Manuel Castells in the Afterword to Castells in Africa
“ Castells in Africa is by far the best book-length publication yet on what went 
wrong with higher education after apartheid and why South Africa struggled 
to create from among its more promising universities leading producers 
of new knowledge in this part of the world system. In the work of this 
incomparable intellectual we find not only powerful diagnoses of what holds 
back our universities but also compelling solutions about what can (still) 
be done to harness the intellectual resources of Africa’s best institutions.” 
 Jonathan Jansen, President of the Academy of Sciences of South Africa
“ This book is doubly important. First, it showcases the work of Manuel Castells 
re-emphasising its continuing endurance as a framework for thinking creatively 
about the evolution of higher education globally. Second, it focuses on 
development, a preoccupation that has rather got lost in the self-referential 
squabbles about tuition fees and marketisation that have obsessed higher 
education in the developed ‘West’ in these dog days of neoliberalism. 
This collection brings us back to fundamental issues of reform, social justice 
and global equity.” 
 Peter Scott, University College London Institute of Education   
IN AFRICA
